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 Congressional policymaking occurs in an information-rich environment, among 
a vast and complex set of institutional and representational demands.   In this 
dissertation, I examine how congressional institutions interact with the broader political 
and policymaking environment in order to successfully manipulate the policy process.  
My theory of information management in Congress argues that committees and 
subcommittees provide the Congress with the management tools necessary to adaptively 
respond to demands in the policy environment by structuring the flow of information in 
policy debates and facilitate policymaking success, primarily through the use of 
congressional hearings.  Using expectations produced by my theory of information 
management in Congress, I address four primary research questions: 1) When and why 
do committees publicly manage information?  2) When and why do committees 
delegate the management of information to subcommittees?  3) Which subcommittees 
are most likely to conduct information management activities and why?  4)  How do 
committees utilize subcommittees in the management of information to generate policy 
success? 
 Utilizing my theory of information management in Congress, I derive 
empirically testable hypothesis regarding the influences on and impact of committee 
and subcommittee hearing activity in the U.S. Congress.  I assemble original datasets of 
committee and subcommittee characteristics and hearing activity in both the House and 
Senate via a variety of primary and secondary sources.  I supplement my theoretical 
developments and quantitative analyses of committee and subcommittee activity and 
success with qualitative data collected via semi-structured interviews with House and 
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Senate committee staff, and participant observations made by the author while working 
for the House Committee on Education and Labor during the first session of the 111th 
Congress.   
 Statistical analyses and illustrative anecdotes provide consistent empirical 
evidence supporting my expectations for committee and subcommittee activity and 
influence.  I find that Congress’ committee system is able to respond to simultaneous 
and competing demands facing the national policy making process.  Through adaptively 
managing the flow of information in the policy debate, committees and subcommittees 
provide Congress with the tools required to navigate the complex policy environment to 
achieve policy success.  Additionally I find that while House and Senate committees 
appear to serve a common purpose and generate similar influence in the policy process, 
despite variation in the details of how certain factors in the policy environment 
influence committee and subcommittee activity and success across chambers.  By 
presenting and examining a generalizable explanation of legislative organization in both 
the House and Senate, as well as revealing the influential role of subcommittees in the 
policy process, this dissertation makes unique contributions to the study policymaking 





COMMITTEES, SUBCOMMITTEES, AND INFORMATION – 
POLICYMAKING IN CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter 1:  Introducing a Theory of Information Management in 
Congress 
Introduction 
Congressional scholarship traditionally focuses on the examination of how 
institutional procedures and individual action within the institution relate to and achieve 
the goals of individual members of the institution.  This common rational-behavioral 
approach leaves open questions regarding how congressional institutions interact with 
the surrounding policy environment by focusing questions on how the goals and actions 
of congressional members relate to and cause institutional action and output.  In this 
dissertation, I seek to examine questions of how interactions between congressional 
institutions and the surrounding policy environment influence congressional activity 
and the law-making process.   Specifically, I argue and empirically confirm that 
congressional committees manage information flow within the surrounding policy 
environment through committee and subcommittee hearings in order to respond to the 
abundance of competing demands in the policy environment, and ultimately facilitate 
success in the policymaking (law-making) process. 
To build this argument, I develop an original “theory of information 
management in Congress” by building off of theories of legislative organization, a 
theory of policy change, and theories of public management dealing with organizational 
success.  While the literature on legislative organization points to expectations for 
committee activity based on the accepted goal structure of members and parties, the 
question of how committees and subcommittees respond to the surrounding policy 
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environment and act in response to that environment to pursue public policy is left 
unanswered.  Theories of policy change demonstrate that institutional attention to 
specific information regarding policy issues (and the choice to ignore other 
perspectives) relates to policy stasis as well as change, yet the specifics of how 
environmental factors influence and are influenced by institutional action remains 
unclear.  Finally, by consistently viewing committee organization and behavior through 
the lens of individual member goals scholarship fails to describe or explain the 
necessary action committees and subcommittees take in order to systematically adapt 
and respond to the policy environment in order to successfully navigate the policy 
process.  I argue that committees adapt and respond to the surrounding policy 
environment by utilizing committee and subcommittee hearings to manage and structure 
the flow of information in the policy debate to promote the legislative goals of the 
committee.    
In the following chapters, I present and test my “theory of information 
management in Congress” in order to address three primary research questions ignored 
by the current literature: Which committees are most active in the management of 
information and which committees are more likely to utilize subcommittees for this 
task?  Which subcommittees are most likely to be active in managing information?  
And, how do committees utilize subcommittees in this complex environment to achieve 
policy success?  I utilize committee and subcommittee data from the 104th – 108th 
Congresses, along with interviews of congressional staff to empirically examine these 
questions in the chapters to follow (See Appendix:  Staff Interviews for details 
regarding the interview procedure and respondent demographics). 
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 The remainder of this chapter will accomplish three tasks.  First, I discuss why 
committees and subcommittees are the appropriate institutional level to examine how 
congressional institutions interact with the surrounding policy environment in the policy 
process.  Second, I discuss the role and definition of information in the policy process 
as evidenced by existing institutional research of the congressional policy process.  
Thirdly, I will present an original “theory of information management in Congress” by 
applying the implications of theories in public management to our knowledge of 
legislative organization and the policy process.  Lastly, I provide a broad summary of 
the dissertation. 
Committees in Congress 
 With one of the most recognizable quotes in studies of American government, 
Woodrow Wilson once noted that members of Congress in the committee room 
epitomize the notion of “Congress at work” (Wilson 1981).   This classic observation 
first painted the factual picture that remains true to this day, Congress’ system of 
committees and subcommittees serves as the primary workhorses of the legislative 
process.  Due to this fact, it seems appropriate that any examination of how 
congressional institutions interact with the surrounding policy environment in the 
legislative process focus on the committee and subcommittee system of both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate.  A vast body of scholarship on legislative 
organization in Congress provides implications regarding what factors in the policy 
environment committees must respond to in the policy making process, although this 
literature fails to develop a generalizable perspective on committee activity.  The 
following discussion examines the existing scholarship on legislative organization for 
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implications regarding factors in the policy environment which committees and their 
subcommittees should be expected to interact with in the policy making process.  
Research examining legislative organization in Congress consists for four primary and 
competing perspectives:  the distributive (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and 
Marshall 1988; Adler and Lapinsky 1997), the informational (Gilligan and Krehbiel 
1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991), and the partisan (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), 
and the conditional (Hall and Groffman 1990; Maltzman 1998; Young and Heitshusen 
2003).  Grounded in the long-standing, and widely accepted tripartite goal structure of 
congressional members: re-election, good public policy, and prestige (Fenno 1973; 
Mayhew 1974), each of these theories of institutional structure and purpose draw on 
rational-behavioral explanations of individual behavior.   
Centralized on the re-election goal of congressional members, the distributive 
perspective relies on the notion that members developed and maintain the existing 
organization of the committee system to facilitate legislative coalitions through “gains 
from trade” and provide distributive benefits that a member can take home to his or her 
district in policy domains of need, unique to different groups of like congressional 
districts (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Adler and Lapinsky 
1997; Hurowitz, Noiles and Rohde 2001; Martin 2003; Evans 2004).  The informational 
(Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991) and partisan (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005) perspectives link with the other two goals of congressional 
members:  good public policy and prestige.  Under the information explanation of 
legislative organization, the committee system provides the Congress a means to 
subdivide into like units, creating policy gains due to trustworthy specialization within 
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the vast array of policy domains, on which Congress legislates (Krehbiel 1991).  The 
partisan perspective argues that the committee system is organized in a majoritarian 
fashion to facilitate policy gains through procedural advantages and legislative agenda 
control (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  Each of these theories implies that members 
achieve policy and prestige goals through the control of jurisdictionally separated units 
of the policy process.  Unlike the distributive perspective, the strongest evidence for 
these perspectives comes from formal theoretic derivations (Gilligan and Krehbiel 
1987, 1989, 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) and what should be considered at 
best, indirect empirical evidence (Hall and Groffman 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Rohde 1994; 
Gilligan and Krehbiel 1997; Hurowitz, Noiles and Rohde 2001) that fails to clearly 
distinguish concepts such as partisanship and information.  Although each of these 
theories has considerable merit, and clearly supplies some explanation for the design of 
legislative organization, each can only explain actual committee organization in 
conditional terms (Maltzman 1998), often ignoring organized committee activity.  In the 
long run this led to many scholars choosing to argue that each is correct, for different 
committees under different conditions (Hall and Groffman 1990; Maltzman 1998; 
Young and Heitshusen 2003).  In other words, some demands are more strongly related 
to specific types of policy issues and thus the point of focus for committees primarily 
concerned with satisfying a single specific demand, such as constituent benefits, or 
good policy, or providing prestige.  While the resulting tripartite typology of 
committees fails to address how the committees system interacts with the policy 
environment, this body of work goes suggests factors in the policy environment with 
which committee and subcommittee should be influenced by and respond to. 
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 While the competing perspectives of legislative organization are developed by 
looking at the individual concerns of congressional members, such individual demands 
suggest, in the aggregate, demands that also populate the broader policy environment.  
Although the when’s, how’s, and why’s regarding how these aggregated demands in the 
broader environment influence committee and subcommittee activity, they provide 
implications for factors that must be considered in a generalizable examination of 
committee and subcommittee activity and purpose in the policy process.  The 
distributive perspective suggests that committees and their subcommittees must interact 
with and respond to the demand of organized constituencies.  The partisan perspective 
suggests that intra-institutional and intra-committee party dynamics may create 
demands that committees and subcommittees must be concerned with.  Finally, the 
informational perspective suggests that committees and subcommittees would be 
concerned with developing specialized expertise in order to create a trustworthy, 
informational advantage for producing public policy within committees as opposed to 
the chamber at large.  Interestingly, the informational model of legislative organization 
appears to present the most reasonably generalizable approach to committee activity in 
the congressional law-making process, yet seems to be conceptually inconsistent and 
empirical investigations only provide indirect evidence to support the theory as 
conceived by Krehbiel (1991).   
 The informational theory of legislative organization suggests that the committee 
and subcommittees system represents a purposeful creation of a “division of labor” to 
manage the need of creating policy solutions for public problems across an immense 
array of policy issues (Krehbiel 1991).  While this seems to be factually correct and 
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representative of institutional needs (Deering and Smith 1997), the theory has not been 
tested regarding how the analysis of information surrounding policy issues by 
committees influences the legislative process or relates to the conditions of the 
surrounding policy environment.  Empirical evidence presented to support the theory 
focuses on committees being ideologically representative of the chamber median voter, 
and the relationship between ideological representativeness and the ability for 
committees to acquire procedural advantages, such as a closed rule, for legislation 
(Krehbiel 1991).  Considering that committee assignments are determined primarily by 
the individual parties (Frish and Kelly 2006) that procedural decision are controlled by 
the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 2005), the informational theory of legislative 
organization is rich in implications regarding the nature of committees activity in the 
policy process, but its current explanatory and predictive power is week.  However, this 
body of work does raise questions regarding how committees collect and manage 
information in the policy environment, and the impact of committee activity on 
congressional lawmaking. 
 While the generally accepted theories of legislative organization in Congress, 
discussed above, provide a solid background regarding the how the needs facing 
members could drive institutional design, they fail to provide a practical explanation 
regarding how institutional activity meets the competing demands members face from 
the broad policy environment and influences the legislative process.  Public policy 
scholarship does a much more effective job at addressing the question of how and why 
committees do what they do and its influence in the policy process as well as more 
effectively defining the notion of “information” in the policy process.  The following 
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section explores existing public policy scholarship in order to further perspective on 
how the committee system interacts with the surrounding policy environment along 
with the role and definition of information in the policy environment.  
Information, Committee Activity, and the Policy Process 
More so than institutional studies of legislative organization, public policy 
scholars have both theoretically and empirically defined the notion of information 
within the policy environment and demonstrated the importance and influence of the 
committee activity (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Via 
the examination of institutional information processing and attention shifts in Congress, 
a vast body of theoretic and empirical research demonstrates that the collection and 
display of information through, committee activity, is a key dynamic of national 
policymaking. When and how Congress manages information, and what information it 
deems relevant can determine outputs and outcomes of the policymaking process by 
influencing attention shifts related to problem definition, policy learning, and subsystem 
breakdowns (Bosso 1987; Hansen 1991; Sabatier-Jenkins Smith 1993; Jones, 
Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones and 
Baumgartner 1995; Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Worsham 2006), all of which are consequential to the end game of the policy 
process.  The following discussion explores the definition of information as presented 
by this body of work as well as the impact of that information on the policy process in 
order to gleen the implications of this work on a generalizable theory of committee 
interaction with the policy environment, especially regarding the management of 
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information by congressional committees and the impact of this activity on the 
legislative process. 
Drawing on both institutional studies of congressional committees and 
institutional theories policymaking, information is defined somewhat ambiguously but 
its impact on policymaking is widely recognized.  Some have defined information 
simply as “policy expertise” and other knowledge that is “policy relevant.”  Jones and 
Baumgartner (2005) further specify the definition of information as two specific 
components needed by decision makers:  “an understanding of the problem and 
knowledge of the possible solutions.”  However, information is not limited to some sort 
of prospective or reflective truth.  Information can be scientific evidence, qualified 
opinion, or even “propaganda masquerading as science” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
In abundance, such policy information is available to individual congressional 
members, Congress’ policymaking institutions, and congressional staff.  It is supplied 
by issue advocates, interest groups, private and public sector experts, academics, 
citizens, as well as other members, institutional units, staff and leadership among other 
sources (Bosso 1987; Hansen 1991; Hall 1996; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006).  Although it is clear that individual committees and subcommittees of 
jurisdiction may have the most intimate knowledge of particular policy issues, relative 
to other committees and subcommittees or the congressional chambers at large, when, 
how, and why the committees system interacts with this vast array of information in the 
policy process remain open questions.  Yet the impact that attention to specific pieces of 




Policy scholarship demonstrates that the flow of information in a policy debate 
impacts the policy process by influencing the makeup, power, and beliefs of policy 
subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993), 
empirically supported theories of the policy process demonstrate a direct relationship 
between the display of policy information and changes in the policy making arena.  
Shifts in attention to particular information regarding particular policy issues by the 
right people at the right time can influence how public problems are defined, what 
policy makers and advocates learn about particular policies and issues, and breakdown 
policy subsystems allowing for new actors access to the law-making process (Bosso 
1987; Hansen 1991; Sabatier-Jenkins Smith 1993; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 
1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995; 
Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Worsham 2006).  
In a practical sense, evidence suggests that ebbs and flows in attention to information 
within specific policy domains is linked to changes in policy outcomes such as changes 
in law or changes in federal budget allocations (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005; True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007) or even shift a policy issues 
such as pesticides from being a topic dominated by farming interests to a topic where 
the related policy became dominate by health concerns (Hansen 1991).  Clearly, 
information effects policymaking, and theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that 
the committee system is where “information processing” occurs in Congress 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Institutional theories of the policy process emphasize the role of macro-
institutional information processing as a primary purpose for congressional activity.  
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The work of Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner (2005; Baumgartner and Jones 1993) 
portrays the congressional committee system as a “parallel information processing” 
system, whereby different committees and their subcommittees collect and distribute 
information on different policy topics simultaneously.  According to this literature, 
“serial shifts” in attention to particular topics can facilitate policy changes due to 
increased attention to the topic by the Congress as a whole by creating competition for 
power over a policy topic and typically facilitates policy change (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; King 1994, 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  This highlights the 
importance of information flow in the battle over policy problem definitions and 
potential policy solutions (Heclo 1978; Bosso 1987; Hansen 1991; Jenkins-Smith, St. 
Clair and Woods 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Wood 2006; Worsham 2006), 
but it does not address a need to understand what factors in the policy environment may 
systematically influence committee activity.  Additionally, this only explains policy 
changes, or lawmaking, that occurs during a serial attention shift to a particular policy 
issue, ignoring more traditional policymaking that occurs in the normal order of the 
Congress.  While serial shifts in attention to information revolving around a particular 
policy topic may be a sign of change, the information processing that occurs in parallel 
during periods of stability does not simply occur in a vacuum.  Much like the traditional 
institutional examinations of legislative organization, scholarship focused on 
policymaking leaves a gap regarding the explanation of the interaction of congressional 
institutions with the surrounding actors in the policy environment and the general 
impact of committee activity on the policy process.  
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Institutional studies of legislative organization detail the motivations individual 
congressional members hold that promote the maintenance of the committee and 
subcommittee system.  Studies of policymaking focus on the importance of attention to 
specific information in facilitating policy changes leaves.  Between these two bodies of 
research, remains an intellectual gap that is critical to understanding when, how, and 
why congressional institutions interact with the surrounding policy environment.  
Existing scholarship implicitly suggests factors that may be influential in this process. 
Still, we have failed to theorize regarding when, how, and why institutional subunits are 
active in the information processing dynamics of Congress.  I propose a theory of 
information management in congressional policymaking that bridges the gap between 
studies of legislative organization and public policy change, leading to a theoretically 
and empirically practical explanation of when, how, and why the committees and 
subcommittees seek to manage and control information flow in the vast and complex 
policy environment, at the center of which is the United States Congress.  In order to 
develop such theory and explanation, one must consider a variety of issues directly:  1) 
What factors make up the policy environment facing the Congress and how should 
those factors influence when and why some committees and their subcommittees are 
more active in the processing of information in the policy process?  2) Why and how are 
committees and their subcommittees able and active institutional location for processing 
the flow of information in the policy environment?  3) How and why does activity by 
congressional committees and subcommittees actually serve to process information 
circulating throughout the policy environment? The following presentation of “a theory 
of information management in Congress” seeks to address these issues directly. 
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A Theory of Information Management in Congress 
At the national level of policymaking, a complex and information-rich 
environment surrounds a central actor, Congress, intending to influence the 
policymaking process.  Through the committee and subcommittee system, Congress is 
able to avoid being overwhelmed by competing demands within this complex and 
information-rich environment through managing the information flow via the 
infrastructure of legislative organization, i.e. committees and subcommittees.  In the 
following sections, I develop this theory in three steps.  First, I providing evidence for 
the abundance of information emanating from the complex policy environment 
surrounding Congress. Second, I explain how legislative organization provides the 
management infrastructure to balance the competing demands of the information 
environment.  Finally, I argue that the congressional hearing process serves as the 
empirical tool for information management.  
Information in a Complex Environment 
 In the arena of national policymaking, Congress is at the center of the storm.  
Congress is the bulls-eye, where competing demands seek access, attention, and policies 
for a countless number of issues.  Countless “asks” bombard the Capitol and the halls of 
congressional office buildings constantly, all representing different kinds of 
information.  Face-to-face verbal communication, written pamphlets, policy research, 
drafts of legislation, phone calls, emails, voicemails, media coverage, and any other 
form of communication imaginable invade members’ personal and committee offices on 
an almost constant basis.  These messages are sent and delivered by constituents, PACs, 
advocacy groups, special interest groups, executive departments, state governments, 
local governments, not to mention the endogenous demands of members, committees, 
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their staff, and party leadership.  The influence on, and activity in, national politics of 
these various types of actors has been well documented in political science. 
Political scientists traditionally examine the influence of these demands in terms 
of the individual representation members of Congress provide their constituency 
(Mayhew 1974; Eulau and Karps 1977; Fenno 1978; Evans 2004), and occasionally in 
terms of macro-representational issues facing the institution (Erikson, Mackuen and 
Stimson 2002; Adler and Lapinski 2006).  Micro-level studies demonstrate that 
members are clearly influenced by these demands and respond in a variety of ways 
found throughout the legislative process such as votes (Miller and Stokes 1963), bill 
sponsorship (Swers 2002), and case work (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1984).  
Meanwhile, macro institutional studies tend to focus on policy outputs (Hartley and 
Russett 1992; Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995), neglecting the totality of how the 
institution can and does respond to these demands throughout the legislative process.   
In terms of the policy process more generally, these various sources of influence 
listed above are seeking access in order to promote desired end goals of policy outputs 
and outcomes (Arnold 1990).  I argue that in the decision-making process that is 
policymaking. Congress serves as an “adaptive system” that:  
is capable of attaining goals in a range of environmental conditions.  It consists 
of an inner system, an outer environment, and an interface between the inner and 
outer systems.  Information acts as input for adaptive systems, and action in 
response to this information is output to the environment.  (Jones 2001). 
 
For actors in the policy environment external to the Congress, access and influence 
comes in the form of having “your” information deemed relevant to the policymaking 
process.  PACs, interest groups, and “constituents” invest money in campaigns and 
provide policy support in pursuit of influential access to the process (Hall and Wayman 
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1990; Grier and Munger 1991; Leyden 1995; Heitshusen 2000).  Individual constituents 
seek policy makers who produce policies matching their opinions (Hojnacki and 
Kimball 2001; Chin, Bond and Geva 2000), even if those opinions are often 
endogenously produced by members of Congress through public communications 
(Gerber and Jackson 1993).  This access and influence is often provided as some form 
of information.  While constituents provide opinions, groups provide other types of 
information such as policy research, polling to capture constituency opinions, policy 
assistance, or even policy expertise (Hall and Deardorff 2006).  The demands facing 
Congress are not only targeted benefits requested by narrow demanders, such demands 
also make up general expectations about the democratic process or broad policies that 
have truly regional or national constituencies.  Although in political media and the 
coverage it may be stylish or common to emphasize earmarks or pork barrel 
policymaking as the way Congress satisfies demanders, the issue runs much deeper than 
that.  Such demands permeate the policy process at all levels. Members of Congress 
desire good public policy (Mayhew 1974).  However, there is severe uncertainty in the 
policymaking environment where “surprise and the prospect of embarrassment lurk 
beneath any policy choice” (Krehbiel 1991).   
This uncertainty, along with constant rhetoric demanding at least a specific 
appearance of how the process of attaining policies should occur, where the expectation 
to solicit opinions and information from all sides of a policy debate or political conflict 
exists, members and the institution at large must go to great lengths to navigate the 
policy environment in a way that allows for the avoidance of blame when things go 
wrong but room to claim credit when problems are solved (Arnold 1990).  Yet for the 
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most part, no single member has the ability to achieve or stop a policy output or 
individual portions of the policy process without at least some coalition of support 
within the institution.1
 The committee and subcommittee system provides Congress with an 
information management infrastructure to manage the exhausting information 
environment, allowing only certain bits and pieces entry into the public forum.  While 
committees were initially installed to provide the institution at large with the 
  This fact is missed by tradition congressional scholarship that 
centers all expectation of the micro-level needs of individual members. Examining the 
simultaneous and competing demands that Congress faces can result in conclusions 
about the institutions of Congress that may be accurate, but not necessarily precise.  If 
such a plethora of demands faces every member uniquely, the institution must find ways 
to manage the multitude of information produced by these demands.  Think of this 
situation as analogous to a family buying a car, but with one key difference.  A family 
will seek input from each of its individual members about what the needs and desires 
regarding this major decision are.  The family will then seek out as much expert advice, 
opinion, and research possible to completely inform the decision.  The Congress has 
similar consideration in policymaking.  However exogenous and endogenous sources 
constantly bombard the Capitol with more information about how to define policy 
problems and solutions than it would be possible to completely consider.  Unlike the 
family seeking information, Congress must find institutional ways to manage the 
various sources of information coming from exogenous and endogenous demanders. 
                                                 
1 It is often noted that the Senate conventionally operates through unanimous consent motions or cloture, 
emphasizing the negative policy power of individuals.  However, unanimous consent is not a requirement 
of the Senate and for a filibuster to succeed a coalition of sixty opposing members must not exist. In the 
truest sense, individual members may have more power in the Senate due to the consent, respect, or 
deference of a coalition of members. 
17 
 
infrastructure to handle specialized policy demands, but committees also provide the 
only infrastructure to collect and respond to the informational demands presented in the 
complex policy environment.  Committees serve the administrative purpose of 
managing such information flow.  Intuitively, we may believe that the environment 
surrounding policy decisions, or the problem space, is objective and easy to define yet 
the problem space “may be transformed by a decision maker in trying to solve the 
problem at hand in a way not expected by the objective observer (Jones 2001).”   
Committees and subcommittees have the ability to define the problem space in 
the policy environment.  Managing the abundance of information in the policy 
environment to shape a problem space that focuses on informational features that are 
deemed relevant to the policy problem and solution, and omitting the irrelevant features 
(Jones 2001).  I argue that committees and subcommittees, more than individual 
members, serve as the most capable institutional structure to manage the vast amount of 
information circulating in the policy environment that seeks to influence problem 
definitions and solutions.  The following section seeks to draw out this argument by 
examining the institutional characteristics making the committee and subcommittee 
system Congress’ infrastructure for information management. 
Committees as Management Infrastructure 
 Congress, like many public and private organizations, contains a structural 
hierarchy that serves to more efficiently meet the institution’s diverse needs and achieve 
its goals (O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2003; Meier and O’Toole Jr. 2002).  Congress’ 
committee system of legislative organization serves this purpose (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 
1974; Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 2007a, 2007b).  Unlike other organizations, 
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there are two primary macro-level institutional forces which the 
committee/subcommittee system serves simultaneously: the demands of the chamber 
(Fenno 1973; Krehbiel 1991) and the demands of the two major parties (Rohde 1991; 
Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  While the committees as a whole provide 
management capacity to the needs of the chamber (Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 
2007a, 2007b), the individual party coalitions within committees and subcommittees 
also serve the needs of the party caucus (Hurwitz, Noiles, and Rohde 2001).  Once 
again it is clear that the competing demands facing Congress should not be easily 
compartmentalized as some suggest (Maltzman 1998), but must be simultaneously 
responded to in many situations.  The committee system provides Congress with the 
infrastructure to manage the vast amount of competing information in the policy 
environment in order to define problem spaces for policy issues accomplish the goals of 
Congress by through interaction with the exceptionally broad and complex policy 
environment. 
Currently accepted explanations of legislative organization may be appealing in 
terms of individual member and party goals, but these perspectives miss a true “inside 
the beltway” perspective on congressional activity and the committee system.  Just like 
the factors and demands of the policy environment are dynamic, the needs of members 
and political parties are not static, and the committee system serves as the adaptive 
information processing system that must keep up with and manage the information flow 
in the policy debate.  Additionally, the existing argument that most embraces the idea of 
institutional needs relating to policymaking (Krehbiel 1991) neglects and openly rejects 
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the traditional demand side factors presented by other perspectives (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988; Cox and McCubbins 1993).   
The informational perspective of committees in Congress suggests that crafting 
good public policy means not responding to distributive demands and that party 
concerns are incidental to the policy process and simply included in the notion of 
member’s needs (Krehbiel 1991; Krehbiel 1993).  In interviews, committee staff and 
staff of individual members often identified purposeful roles for committees and 
committee activity in the policy process. One such role seems to be collecting 
information about the policy environment surrounding issues on the congressional 
agenda.  When asked about the purpose of committees, one committee policy staff 
member summed it up nicely, saying that one purpose of committee activity is to 
“manage the process of finding out how groups and parties are approaching a policy 
topic,” a view expressed by minority and majority staff in both personal and committee 
offices (Staff Interviews 2009).  Thus it seems clear that all committees and their 
subcommittees are dealing with “informational,” “distributive,” and “partisan” factors 
simultaneously as they are presented by the policy environment. Thus, the now 
commonly accepted notion that committees can be broadly placed into different 
typologies allowing them to conditionally meet different demands at different times 
with specific benefits or services (Maltzman 1998; Young and Heitshusen 2003) still 
leaves much nuance to be desired in terms of a truly general and practical explanation 
of the committee system.   General explanations claiming that specific committees serve 
purposes unique to the others may provide some simplicity but fundamentally throw the 
baby out with the bath water.  Across different policy issue jurisdictions, committees 
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and their subcommittees all provide Congress an institutional tool to manage the 
abundance of information in the policy environment. Managing the flow of information 
amongst actors and institutions in the policy environment allows committees and 
therefore the Congress to successfully structure the policy process.  This becomes 
especially clear when one compares the structure and activity of congressional 
committees with the role of structural hierarchies in facilitating success in public 
organizations as described by theories of public management within the public 
administration literature. 
Congressional policy outputs must consider and satisfy, to some degree, the 
particularistic needs of demanders such as organized constituencies or interest groups 
while also clear the institutional hurdles of generating winning coalitions within the 
major parties and the House and Senate chambers. Theories of public management 
suggest that the use of structural hierarchies, especially when such hierarchies can 
create stability, is key to generating success for the organization (O’Toole and Meier 
1999, 2003; Meier and O’Toole Jr. 2002).  The congressional system of legislative 
organization serves this exact purpose in the policy process through two levels of 
structural hierarchy.  Congressional committees were initiated and are maintained as 
tools for the chamber to manage the congressional workload by delegating 
policymaking responsibility for specific (although often broad) issue jurisdictions in 
order to more efficiently and effectively achieve institutional policymaking goals 
(Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Krehbiel 1991; Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 
2007a, 2007b).  Subcommittees exist to serve the individual full committees with the 
same purpose of responsibility delegation that committees provide the chamber 
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(Deering 1982; Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 2007a, 2007b).  As is established 
by theories of the policy process, being in controlling how the “problem space” is 
defined can ultimately determine whose agenda will succeed (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Jones 2001; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In adapting to the challenges posed by 
the complex nature of the policy environment, committees and subcommittees must 
accomplish tasks identified by scholars of public management that are key to 
organizational success.   Committees and subcommittees must “buffer” Congress “from 
environmental influences” and also “exploit opportunities in the” policymaking 
“environment” (O’Toole and Meier 1999).  Research on decision making suggests that 
an adaptive system, which I argue the Congress is, must process information effectively 
to organize and identify the information that is to be relevant to the problem space and 
the attributes that will receive attention (Jones 2001).  When committees do this, it can 
create winnable situation in the complex and multidimensional policy environment.  
When asked to describe the role of committees and subcommittees, one majority staff 
member emphatically noted that “we [committees] determine what goes in and what 
comes out of the process.  We decide what gets voted on by the [chamber]” (Staff 
Interviews 2009). This quote is representative of a clear consensus among interview 
respondents that legislation only moves with the consent of the relevant committees, 
otherwise legislative proposals are nothing more than political fodder (Staff Interviews 
2009). 
I argue that the committee system serves to manage the competing demands that 
bombard Capitol Hill from the encroaching information environment to maintain order 
in, and control over, the policy process.  As attacks from the information environment 
22 
 
encroach on Congress, the committee system provides Congress a large scale set of 
receptor sites than can not only absorb this information, but also can send information 
signals or feedback into the information environment, relieving pressure and increasing 
management and control capabilities within the national policy realm.  If this is 
managed effectively, the institution will react appropriately and assertively to achieve 
institutional goals.  In sense, if the committee system manages the information 
environment appropriately it should be able to take advantage of, or even create “policy 
windows” in the essence of Kingdon’s (1984) work.    
Within Congress, the committee system can filter the information environment, 
signaling to the internal environment and the external environment not only what issues 
are on the agenda, but also what perspectives will be deemed relevant for the policy 
discussion and which perspectives will be left out.    Thereby buffering the institution 
from the endogenous and exogenous demands of the policy environment and taking 
advantage of opportunities provided by the environment to achieve institutional goals. 
 This is illustrated in Figure One.  In Figure One, Congress sits at the center of 
informational demands within a complex and active policymaking environment facing 
exogenous and endogenous demands which encroach on the Capitol as information in 
various forms (as discussed above).  The committee system is able to serve as a buffer 
or filter, keeping some encroaching demands out and allowing other into the 
policymaking process.  As seen in Figure One, congressional committees provide the 
opportunity to receive, filter, and give feedback to the surrounding information 
environment.  As the barrage of information from the various competing demands bear 
down, committees and their offices serve as resources for mitigating and controlling the 
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onslaught – well beyond what individual member offices or the floor could handle.  
This is why they were created (Deering and Smith 1997), to serve as policy shops 
beyond the capacity of the institution otherwise.  An example of this is seen when not 
only the personal staffers of not only committee and subcommittee chairman but rank 
and file members direct groups or other agents seeking policy influence on a particular 
issue to committee staffers for meetings or communication (Staff Interviews 2009).  
During my time on the Hill as a committee staffer this was common practice.  Personal 
staffs would filter groups and constituents in our direction when they had policy 
concerns specific to our jurisdiction.  This tendency is not only a factor of policy 
capacity of course, but also the priorities of individual rank and file members.  Research 
demonstrates that individual member offices tend to prioritize access and attention to 
constituency requests above interest and advocacy groups (Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Chin, Bond and Geva 2000), however committee staffs respond frequently to group 
requests on behalf of personal offices (Staff Interviews 2009), ultimately filtering policy 
information flowing in from the surrounding environment.  Policy advisors, of which 
committee offices are filled, say they consider organized constituencies such as interest 
groups and/or advocacy research organizations as a source of the most trust-worthy and 
high quality information (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Staff Interviews 2009).   Thus this 
practice seems to fit into the theoretical mold I am proposing.  Additionally, personal 
staff would consult with our committee when their member wanted to introduce 
legislation under its jurisdiction, especially when they were truly seeking to move 
legislation as opposed to simply introducing it for messaging or credit claiming 
purposes, as members are known to do (Mayhew 1974).   
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Although I propose a common theoretical purpose for committees; each 
committee will face different levels of demands from the information environment at 
different times.  Thus the amount of activity spent by committees managing the 
information environment should vary systematically based on factors that theoretical 
and empirical research have demonstrated regarding demands on and influence in 
Congress.  The amount of time committees and subcommittees spend processing 
information from the policy environment will also depend on the goals being pursued.  
Is the purpose to fulfill committee goals, or goals of the institution, or both?  How 
controversial is the problem and the proposed solution?  How complex is the policy 
environment regarding the issue at hand? In other words, the goals of the organization 
and the nature of the environment it is facing will influence the when, where, and how 
much management activity takes place.  Yet much committee activity takes place 
behind the scenes, such as staff meetings and other office tasks and that are not 
empirically accessible.  Markups are also difficult to track as committees have different 
individual rules about recording votes, posting votes, and the accessibility of transcripts.  
Empirical data on congressional hearings however, is publicly available and constitutes 
the largest portion of on the record committee activity. 
Hearings as an Information Management Tool 
Hearings serve as the most public form of policy work.  Unlike markups or 
behind-closed-doors meetings involving members or staff, the record and transcript of 
committee and subcommittee hearings are easily available to the public (Heitshusen 
2007; Davis 2008).  Additionally, hearings are one of the few occasions where members 
of Congress are together in a room, listening to and/or participating in the discussion 
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regarding certain details of a policy issue for more than fifteen minutes at a time.  
Although the amount of attention received from, and influence a hearing may have, on 
individual members of Congress will certainly vary, hearings can certainly influence the 
public debate over an issue (Gandy 1982; Gerber and Jackson 1993).  Hearings are 
purposeful events, preceded by extensive time and preparation by committee and 
personal staff that can dominate staff working time (Staff Interviews 2009).  When 
asked about how the perspectives that will be displayed in hearings are determined, 
committee staff discussed the extensive time spent of background research and the 
exploration of competing perspectives being displayed by interest groups, congressional 
members, and other policy experts (Staff Interviews 2009). 
I would argue that seen from the view of staff and members in totality, hearings 
are the essence of committee work as they provide a public presentation of extensive 
background research on policy issues.  Multiple perspectives can be explored, 
questioned, and debated for hours, and sometimes days at a time.  Hearings can 
reinforce, change, and create anew the policy positions of members.  Hearings serve as 
an effective tool for the management of information in the complex environment of 
competing informational demands for two primary reasons:  they allow committees and 
subcommittees to visibly collect information, and they allow committees and 
subcommittees to signal to the exogenous and endogenous environments what issues 
and information are relevant or important. 
 Political scientists often consider congressional hearings to be “dog and pony 
shows” because they are to some extent pre-planned and scripted (Baumgartner, Jones 
and MacLeod 2000; Davidson and Oleszek 2004).  This however, is an inaccurate 
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perspective.  It is true that committee staff hand select witnesses with some expectation 
of the policy perspective they hold, and that witness testimonies must be submitted in 
advance, typically at least 24 hours before the hearing (Davis 2007a; Staff Interviews 
2009).  But, the questions members will ask witnesses and the corresponding witness 
responses are not scripted (Davis 2007b, 2007c, 2008; Palmer 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; 
Staff Interviews 2009).  Additionally, the extent to which members and staff read the 
material distributed prior to a hearing is inconsistent at best.  Hearings are informative 
for members, their staffs, and the chamber, whether directly as staffers of members who 
are not on the host committee often attend hearings, or indirectly as many members 
view committee members as the expert cues for their policy decisions (Davis 2007b, 
2007c, 2008; Palmer 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Staff Interviews 2009).  I argue that the 
planned nature of hearings does not make them “dog and pony shows,” but is instead 
the characteristic of hearings that makes them a way for Congress to use committees to 
manage and control the information flow within the complex policy environment by 
signaling what issues and what perspectives are important and deserving of Congress’ 
attention, while filtering out the others. 
 Any decision to take action, especially in the realm of public policy, carries with 
it an implicit or explicit value judgment: that this topic and/or perspective is worthy of 
consideration by formal government institutions (Heclo 1978; Bosso 1987; 
Baumgartner 1989; Hansen 1991; Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair and Woods 1991; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Wood 2006; Worsham 
2006).  This is indeed the case for congressional hearings.  A past communications 
study found that 85% of all media coverage of Congress, excluding campaigns, involves 
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hearings (Gandy 1982).  In my work and discussions with congressional this seemed to 
be expected, as hearings seem to be often intended to mobilize support through press 
coverage and attention for certain issues and perspectives by filtering those that are not 
displayed.  When asked specifically about the purpose of hearings, many staff members 
noted the signaling power committees have in the political environment.  One majority 
committee staff member noted that “some advocacy groups will not consider 
congressional attention to a policy issue or perspective to be serious until the right 
committee or subcommittee holds a hearing on the issue.  Hearings held by others are 
considered exploration, but not taken as a serious sign legislative action” (Staff 
Interviews 2009).  A minority staff member expressed a similar perspective claiming 
that “we [the minority] won’t take issues seriously unless the right people [majority 
chairmen] are moving” (Staff Interviews 2009). Thus, hearings not only inform the 
Congress, but signal to the exogenous actors in the policy environment which pieces of 
information have been deemed relevant and what policy issues and perspectives will be 
or are being considered. 
 Longitudinal trends also provide evidence that hearings function as a way for 
committees to publicly manage information flow.  Both anecdotally and systematically, 
scholars accept that the congressional workload has increased (Hall 1996), and that 
policy issues have grown increasingly complex over time (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Kingdon 1984; Hardin 1998, 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  As seen in 
Figure Two, the use of hearings has become increasingly common within Congress.  
Additionally, the use of subcommittees for hosting congressional hearings has increased 
as well (See Figure Three).  Just a quick look at these graphs shows the extensive 
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amount of time Congress spends on hearings.  Looking at Figure Two, the House tends 
to hold upwards of 1500 hearings in a given Congress, while the Senate tends to hold 
around 1000 hearings.  Assuming Congress spent an average of four days a week in 
session over 104 weeks (two years, the length of a Congress) that comes to an easy 
average of at least 2 hearings a day in each chamber of Congress.2
(Insert Figure Two About Here) 
  Considering the 
extensive time members spend on the floor and in caucus, hearings clearly make up an 
exceptional amount of congressional activity.  According to Figure Three, nearly 
seventy percent of this time is spent in subcommittee, while around forty percent of that 
time is spent in subcommittee in the Senate.  Even though there appears to be a slight 
drop-off in hearing activity during recent Congresses, especially in the Senate, this still 
represents an immense amount of time in hearings and an extensive use of 
subcommittees for hearings, especially considering the extensive time constraints facing 
members and staff (Hall 1996). 
(Insert Figure Three About Here) 
Hearings appear to not only be a theoretically sound place of action regarding 
the management of information by congressional committees, but also an empirically 
viable source for analysis of theoretical expectations regarding how, when and why 
committees manage information within the complex environment surrounding 
Congress.  Hearings are on the record policy activity.  Opinion, problem definitions, 
evidence, and solutions are discussed on the congressional record and often in front of 
television cameras.  When discussing the purpose of hearings, staff members frequently 
                                                 
2 Four days a week, across 52 weeks a year, for two years would add up to 416 working days per 
Congress.  This is a generous overestimation considering the Congress takes multiple month long 
recesses and often only works a 3 day week in Chamber. 
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noted the purposeful nature of expressing specific policy positions and solutions on the 
record, noting particularly the importance of anything on the policy agenda that is 
discussed on the record.  As one majority staff member stated, “hearings are an ‘on the 
record’ policy discussion in an ‘off the record city.’  Anything we [congressional actors] 
are willing to put on the record is significant” (Staff Interviews 2009).   
 Managing the flow of information within the policy debate through hearings 
allows successful committees to filter the complex policy environment in order to best 
pursue and achieve the goals of committees and the Congress.  Committee and 
subcommittees provide Congress the management infrastructure needed to perform 
such a large task.  The following section provides a concise overview of the theory 
developed above. 
Theory Overview 
 The United States Congress must contend with a vast and complex 
policymaking environment that presents a variety of informational demands that can 
threaten the cohesiveness of the process.  The committees system provides the only 
available infrastructure for Congress to manage the information flow.  I argue that 
through the strategic use of hearings, committees can successfully manage information 
flow in the complex policy environment.  Through this process committees are able to 
respond to competing demands simultaneously, all while pursuing the institutional goals 
of the committee and/or the Congress within the national policy debate. 
This theory of information management in Congress suggests that committees 
manage the wealth of information flow within and around the congressional 
policymaking environment through information signaling via congressional hearings.  
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The endogenous and exogenous demands converging on Congress are vast and 
complex, requiring the Congress to manage the information flow in order to avoid 
having the process be overwhelmed, especially if the Congress has a preferred solution 
that represents “good public policy.”  The abundance of information must be managed 
in order to avoid losing credibility within the policymaking process for appearing not to 
incorporate competing opinions in a representational democracy, and to keep the debate 
on Congress’ desired terms to avoid a hijacking of the process.  Because both 
exogenous and endogenous sources of information represent the various competing 
demands facing the institution, Congress must systematically respond to these factors to 
achieve success.  The committee system, delegated the responsibility of expertise and 
jurisdiction over “individual” policy issues and management of the legislative process, 
serves as the entities able to respond to these demands first.   
As the entity that most fully deals with policy issues on a constant basis, unlike 
personal offices, committees must maintain control over the policy environment in 
order to achieve policy goals.  Constantly aware, or made aware, of information 
circulating around the policy environment regarding policy’s issues of jurisdiction, 
committees must read and react to demands strategically in order to conduct work on its 
own terms.  Hearings provided committees the opportunity to publicly demonstrate that 
it is on top of an issue receiving robust attention or even break an issue receiving scant 
attention.  In a hearing, committees publicly display carefully chosen pieces of 
information.  Minority views are always incorporated, although less prominently, and 
the opinions and information displayed are diverse.  The diversity however, never 
represents all possible positions by demanders in the environment.  Hearings therefore, 
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signal to the exogenous and endogenous demanders what policy issues are on the 
agenda and what perspectives will be entertained for problem definition and solution.  
Additionally, this necessarily signals which perspectives and issues are excluded.  This 
behavior should be predictable based on existing congressional research identifying a 
variety of ways demands facing Congress, its members, and thus its committees 
increase and decrease. 
As information in the policy environment reveals the multitude, or lack of, 
competing demands a committee faces, it must necessarily increase, or decrease, its 
activity in managing the information.  Such demands can mostly fit under the broad 
categories of institutional, more macro-level, and representational, more micro-level, 
demands.  As such demands accumulate the complexity of the policy environment 
increases.   Thus, committees will become more active in the managing of information.  
A more complex environment with more demands requires increased responses to 
maintain structure and control.  The committee system provides the infrastructure to 
respond, negotiating the policy environment on Congress’ terms.  
My theory of information management in Congress provides testable hypotheses 
regarding institutional behavior when applied to committee activity.  This dissertation 
utilizes the theoretical framework presented above to examine when and why 
committees and subcommittees become most active in managing the information flow 
of the policy environment.  Through hearings, committees have the opportunity to 
manage the policy conversation to navigate the murky waters that are national 
policymaking.  The following section provides a broad overview of this dissertation. 
Organization of Dissertation 
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This dissertation explores how the House and Senate committee systems, 
committees and subcommittees, respond to competing institutional and representational 
demands facing the institution and its members through managing information flow 
with four empirical tests of my theory presented above across three chapters.   Chapter 2 
examines when and why do committees publicly manage information, along with when 
and why do committees delegate the management of information to subcommittees.  
Chapter 3 explores which subcommittees are most likely to conduct information 
management activities and why.  Chapter 4 looks at how the information management 
activity of committees and subcommittees facilitate policy success.  Finally, the 
concluding chapter discusses the implications of findings regarding the broad themes 
that manifest throughout this project. 
Chapter 2 examines the argument that committees will systematically respond to 
the surrounding environment when specific demands increase.  In analyzing committee 
hearing data from the 104th-108th Congresses, I find that both increasing institutional 
and representational demands predict higher levels of information management by 
committees.  Additionally, these same demands also increase the likelihood that a 
committee will utilize its subcommittees more often in this process.  Notably, it is 
within subcommittee activity where interesting differences between the House and 
Senate begin to appear and will be discusses throughout each analysis.  The findings 
demonstrate that committees act to simultaneously address challenges and demands 
encroaching from a variety sources such as organized constituencies, partisan concerns 
and institutional needs.  This is distinct from the common approach to legislative 
organization arguing that committee activity serves distinct distributive, informative, or 
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partisan needs at different times, in different committees.  The examination of 
subcommittee activity yields similar findings.   
Using subcommittee level analysis, Chapter 3 examines when subcommittees 
are most likely to be active in the information management process.  The findings 
suggest that subcommittees respond to the same institutional and representational 
demands as their parent committees.  This demonstrates that subcommittees truly 
represent a structural hierarchy under committees to assist in the management of 
information and the structuring of the policy process.  Subcommittee influence seems 
more predictable than the small amount of existing research suggests.   
Moving deeper into explaining the effects of information management on 
policymaking and legislative success, the final empirical chapter examines how 
information management activity by subcommittees influences committee policy 
outcomes.  Based on theories in public management, committees provide Congress, and 
subcommittees provide committees, the resources necessary to facilitate policy success.  
Through the examination of committee jurisdictions, bill passage, and lawmaking 
Chapter 4 provides support for the expectation developed by my theory of information 
management in Congress.  Based on these findings, it appears that information 
management through structural hierarchies does in fact promote policy success for 
committees. Along with empirical findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3, there appears 
to be consistent support for my theory of information management in Congress. 
In concluding the dissertation I discuss two broader themes:  the committee 
system’s ability to respond to competing demands simultaneously and the policy 
relevance of committee, and especially subcommittee, activity that is ignored by more 
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traditional studies of legislative organization.  Regarding these issues, I argue that most 
committees must respond to a bevy of institutional and representational demands 
throughout the policy process to maintain control over the policy agenda in a hostile 
environment.  Additionally, I argue that subcommittees play a key role in the 
policymaking process by providing management resources that can structure and 
stabilize information flow, allowing committees to maintain control of the policy 











   
  
U.S. House  and Senate 




i.e. Party Needs, 
Member Goals,  
Institutional  
Pressures Exogenous Demands 
i.e. Organized Constituencies, 
Critical Events, Public Attention 
Exogenous Demands Information Management by 
Committees and Subcommittees 
36 
 

















































































































































































Chapter 2:  Committee Information Management Activity 
 
 In order to empirically examine and test the proposed theory of information 
management in congressional policymaking proposed in the preceding chapter, one 
must trace and test the theory throughout the long story that is the policy process.  From 
the background-planning and mobilization, stages to the implementation and evaluation 
of policy, the policymaking process is an arduous empirical reality.  To fully understand 
and examine how the committee system provides Congress with an infrastructure to 
manage information in order to make public policy we must test the theory at different 
points. Two questions must first be asked.  What factors relate to increases in 
information management activity by congressional committees?  And when are full 
committees more likely to delegate information management activity to its’ structural 
hierarchy of subcommittees?  Addressing these questions first will help to understand 
what environmental factors make information management activity more likely, and 
paint a picture of when and why a committee is willing to yield this responsibility to its 
hierarchical subunits, subcommittees.  This chapter addresses these research questions. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Congress developed its committee system in order to 
cope with the various simultaneous and competing demands it faces as the home of 
national policymaking (Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 2007a, 2007b).  My theory 
of information management suggests that as Congress is bombarded with various forms 
of information, the committee system provides Congress the resources to manage 
information flow and centralize the policymaking debate, when successful.  Committees 
are able to condense the demands facing the respective 435 individual members of the 
House and 100 members of the Senate, and the institution at large, into a manageable 
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institutional process.  Through the infrastructure to manage information that committees 
provide, these competing demands are juggled simultaneously to bring order and 
structure to a process that may otherwise dissolve chaotically under diverse pressures.  
As Figure One illustrated; the information management provided by committees 
serves a filtering and signaling purpose.  Such activity sorts the information in the 
surrounding policy environment and sends signals back to the surrounding environment, 
as well as those inside the institution, regarding what policy topics are on the policy 
agenda and what perspectives on policy action related to those topics will be deemed a 
relevant part of the policymaking process.  In general, if my theory of information 
management in Congressional policymaking holds, there should be systematic variation 
in the ups and downs of information management activity by committees directly 
related to the demands individual committees face.  The following section discusses the 
factors known to influence the policy process and generates hypotheses regarding how 
these factors influence which committees are more likely to publicly manage 
information via congressional hearings. 
Managing Simultaneous, Competing Informational Demands 
 Often discussed in terms of electoral concerns for individual members, parties, 
and occasionally goals of the institution as a whole; Congress faces a variety of 
competing demands.  As disaggregated subunits of the individual chambers and 
specialized aggregations of individual members; committees face these same demands 
in different combinations and weights.  Existing scholarship in the subfields of both 
congressional institutions and representation provide many expectations regarding how 
such demands influence member decision making.  Because hearings can provide a 
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unique mechanism for responding to various demands at the same time, one should 
expect this activity to systematically vary along with the level of demand generated by 
different sources.  Generally such demands facing Congress and its members can be 
placed in two categories:  Representational and Institutional. 
Representational Demands 
 The representational demands facing members, and thereby the institution, 
concern the democratic-representational relationship between a member’s electoral 
constituency, or in the case of the institution, the nation as a whole.  A foundational 
question in representational scholarship focuses on defining what exactly constitutes a 
member’s “constituency” and in turn which “constituency” political representatives are 
beholden to (Pennock 1952).  Perspectives have ranged from the notion that political 
representatives should make decision based on what they think is best (Burke 1774; 
Eulau et al. 1959), to decisions that fall in line with the immediate electoral 
constituency’s preferences (Pitkin 1967; Wahlke 1971), or should fall in line with what 
the overall country’s preferences (Burke 1774; Weissberg 1978).  In terms of 
congressional representation, micro level studies focus on member responsiveness and 
provision for electoral constituencies, while macro-institutional perspectives focus on 
overall policy change and national policy preference (Mackuen, Erikson and Stimson 
2002).  Committees exist to address the needs of the institution at large to respond to 
national demands, yet as aggregates of individual members, committees must deal with 
micro- and macro-level demands. 
 Possibly the largest portion of literature on legislative organization argues that 
committees serve as a tool for individual members to satisfy particular electoral 
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constituencies with policies that provide substantive benefits to these “demand side” 
actors (Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Adler 
and Lapinski 1997).  Empirical evidence suggests that in some cases members seek to 
obtain membership on committees with jurisdictions over an issue of particular 
importance to their geographic constituency (Adler and Lapinski 1997), acquire 
earmarks for their constituents (Evans 2004), and “vote their district” (Ansolabehere, 
Brady and Fiorina 1992) in order increase electoral security.  However, little work 
explores how committees deal with aggregations of these demands. 
 In reality, although “pork barrel” politics, earmark distribution, and “log-rolling” 
for votes could occur within the committee system, arguing that this is the purpose of 
committees appears to be an over-simplification of the system’s purpose.  Obviously 
not all members can or will receive the particularistic benefits they want or at all times; 
not to mention members (such as Senator Coburn, Oklahoma) who are infamous for 
their unwillingness to pursue particularistic benefits.  Of course members seek to be 
active in policymaking that earns them kudos from their constituency (Mayhew 1974; 
Adler and Lapinski 1999), but committee activity provides members another way to 
log-roll or credit claim or demonstrate democratic responsibility in policymaking.  By 
displaying perspectives or asking questions from, or that are representative of, their 
constituency’s view point on the record, members can point to earnest representation of 
their constituency (Krehbiel 1991; Esterling 2007).   Committees use hearings to 
manage such informational demands.   
 Interest groups place comparable demands on members and the institution.  In 
fact, interest groups can be accurately described as organized constituencies (Hardin 
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2002; Esterling 2007).  Advocates, lobbyists, and policy groups all flood the halls of 
Congress with information promoting various causes, policies, and policy goals (Hall 
and Deardorff 2006). Often the concerns and wishes of these groups seem to play a role 
in the process and are even used to subsidize congressional staffs with resources such as 
policy research or polling (Hall and Deardorff 2006).  Such organized constituencies 
desire that “their issues” make the policy agenda and that their positions regarding 
problem definition and solution be included in the policy discussion.  As committees 
manage these various influxes of information, they are able to signal to these groups 
whether they will be accommodated or not.  Additionally, through the information 
management that culminates in hearings; multiple groups are able to be satisfied (or 
dissatisfied) at one time as opposed to dealing with each organized constituency 
individually.  Therefore, as committees face higher levels of demand by organized 
constituency interests, one should expect that the level of information activity would 
naturally increase.   This leads to my first hypothesis regarding the two research 
questions presented above: 
 Hypothesis 1:  Committees facing higher levels of organized constituency 
demand will be more active in the management of information than other committees.  
Additionally, due to the increased demand on limited full committee time, higher levels 
of organized constituent demand will also relate greater delegation of information 
management responsibility to subcommittees. 
 Particularistic constituencies are not the only concern of members from an 
institutional perspective.  Crafting good public policy that represents the will of the 
nation is also important from an individual, institutional, and electoral perspective 
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(Mayhew 1974; Krehbiel 1991; Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995). Certain classic 
theories of representation suggest that political representatives do not necessarily 
consider what is best for their geographic constituency but what is best for the 
constituency of the entire institution (Eulau et al. 1959).  In the case of Congress, that 
constituency would be the United States of America at large.  Empirical work suggests 
that at least from an institutional perspective, this may very well be the case.  Macro-
level analyses suggest that policy changes and policymaking appear to mirror changes 
in and the structure of public opinion (Monroe 1979; Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 
1995; Mackuen, Erikson and Stimson 2002).  Empirical work also shows that focusing 
events or general increases in media attention to an issue result in greater amounts of 
congressional activity on an issue or topic (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  From an 
informational demand standpoint, this suggests that as the public becomes more 
interested in an issue or as issues gain national attention, committees dealing with such 
issues will face a greater need to manage information flow in the policy environment.  
This leads to a second hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2:  As issues become increasingly salient, information management 
activity regarding the issue will increase.  Additionally, increasing salience will also 
relate to higher levels of delegation by full committees to subcommittees due to 
resource strain.   
 Beyond representational demands, committees must also fill the congressional 
need to cope with an overwhelming workload (Fenno 1973).  The bi-cameral institution 
of 535 members produces an enormous amount of legislation that must either be 
ignored or considered.  Additionally, parties have become an institutionalized influence 
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in the policy process with unique goals and demands.  These factors create a set of 
institutional demands that committees must also manage. 
Institutional Demands 
 For decades outsiders have become increasingly aware that members of 
Congress (and their staff) face an exceptionally full schedule with an immense 
workload (Fenno 1973; Hall 1996).  More recent scholarship adds emphasis on the need 
for parties to influence the policy agenda and outcomes (Cox and McCubbins 2005), 
which also produces institutional demands.  From a policymaking standpoint, the same 
can be said for the institution.  In fact, the diversity and density of the policy demands 
the Congress faces is a commonly accepted reasoning for why the institution developed 
the committee system (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Deering 1982; Krehbiel 1991; 
Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 2007a, 2007b).  Indeed, there is too much 
legislation introduced and too many policy issues to address for each member to be well 
versed on all topics and the institution able to address each proposal (Krehbiel 1991; 
Krutz 2005). The extensiveness of information demands created by the necessity to deal 
with nearly countless policy issues and thousands of introduced pieces of legislation 
must be managed somehow; committees provide the capacity to manage this 
information. 
 In terms of policymaking; the committee system is the central working place. 
All bills are referred to a committee.  Committees are home to a wealth of policy 
expertise and research collection.  Committees often dominate bill drafting and 
management, as well as providing services to member offices regarding legislative 
language or policy education (Schneider 2007a, 2007b).  For example, when asked 
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about the role and purpose of congressional committees, one high ranking member of 
leadership staff pointedly stated that “committees do the policy” (Staff Interviews 
2009). Thus the legislative process necessitates increases in the information 
management activity of committees for members and the institution at large.  Increases 
in legislation or policy issues on the agenda create increases in policy activity both 
inside and outside of Congress, thus increasing the informational demands facing the 
institution.  This suggests that as the legislative demands a committee faces increase, 
there will be a greater need for the internal and external signaling produced by the 
information management process; producing a third hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 3:  As the amount of legislation referred to a committee increases, 
so will its information management activity.  Increases in legislative responsibility will 
also increase the need for full committees to delegate information management to 
subcommittees as well. 
 Sheer legislative demands not only influence the need for committees to manage 
information, but the diversity of those demands does as well.  Not only are committees 
working to satisfy the needs of the chamber (Fenno 1973; Krehbiel 1991), but 
individual members who makeup committees have an interest in answering to the 
demands of the two major parties as well (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 
2005).  While the committees as a whole provide management capacity to the needs of 
the chamber (Deering 1982; Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 2007a, 2007b), the 
individual party coalitions within committees and subcommittees also work to serve the 
needs of the party caucus (Rohde 1991; Hurwitz, Noiles and Rohde 2001).  These 
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separate, yet simultaneous institutional demands present distinct challenges for 
committees. 
 The foundation of the traditional informational view of legislative organization 
argues that legislative bodies create trustworthy sub-units to work on specific policy 
issues in order to reduce policy uncertainty via the creation of expertise (Krehbiel 1991; 
Battista 2009).   Under this model, the institution creates committees that are 
representative of the parent chamber (Krehbiel 1991; Battista 2009).   Thus, as the 
median voter of a committee or subcommittee is more similar to the median voter of the 
parent chamber, a committee is more likely to provide legitimate informational benefits 
to the chamber (Krehbiel 1991; Battista 2009).  This provides a fourth hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 4:  Committees that are more ideologically similar to the parent 
chamber will be more active in publicly managing information.  Similarly, 
subcommittees which are more ideologically similar to the parent committee will be 
more active in managing information for committees. 
 In terms of party coalitions within committees seeking to respond to party 
demands, it is unclear how this could influence the management of information.  
Theories that emphasize the need for parties to maintain discipline and ideological 
agreement in order to preserve electoral and legislative success (Rohde 1991; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005) suggest that homogenous party coalitions would be more likely 
to be active managing information in order to control the agenda and advertise party 
views.  In terms of signaling, homogenous party coalitions would reflect more common 
views within the committee allowing for greater control over the policy positions 
entering into the public debate.  However, the suggestion that committees and 
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subcommittees facilitate the incorporation of competing interests and perspectives into 
the process (Fenno 1962; Jones 1962) generates a different expectation.  Under this 
model, committees with ideological diversity within its membership should be more 
active managing information flow due to the increased demands of incorporation.  This 
suggests a basic fifth hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 5:  The ideological diversity of party coalitions within committees 
and subcommittees is related to the amount of information management activity 
conducted by a committee, and the amount delegated to subcommittees. 
 To test these hypotheses, I examine how the hearing activity of committees in 
both the House and Senate are impacted by competing representational and institutional 
demands across four Congresses.  The following sections describe and present the 
statistical tests. 
Data and Methods 
 In order to empirically test these hypotheses, I utilize an original dataset 
consisting of all congressional hearing activity from the 105th through the 108th 
Congress to conduct two separate statistical analyses for both the House and Senate.  
The dataset was compiled utilizing a variety of primary and secondary sources to create 
committee level aggregations in order to operationalize the competing demands 
described above.  The following sections discuss variable inclusion and measurement. 
Dependent Variables:  Public Information Collection and Display 
 The dependent variables for the analysis are the amount of committee hearing 
activity and the amount of subcommittee hearing activity, respectively, for each 
committee, within each chamber.  Committee hearing activity is measured as the 
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percentage of all congressional hearings held under the guise of individual committees 
for each Congress, including hearings held by full committees and their respective 
subcommittees.   Subcommittee activity is measured as the percent of committee hearing 
activity that takes place at the subcommittee level, during each Congress.3
As seen in Tables One and Two, from the 105th through the 108th Congresses, 
individual committees, on average during each Congress, conducted slightly more than 
five-percent of all hearings in both the House and Senate.  No House committee 
accounted for more than eighteen-percent, and no Senate committee accounting for 
more than fourteen-percent of hearings in an individual Congress.  Meanwhile, in the 
House, subcommittees hosted an average of more than sixty-one percent, and no more 
than ninety-nine percent of hearings under an individual committee.  In the Senate, 
subcommittees hosted considerably less hearings, averaging only slightly more than 
twenty-seven percent of hearings under individual committees, with a maximum of 
ninety-five percent.   
  As described 
in the opening chapter, hearings provide committees the opportunity to structure the 
information incorporated into policymaking debates by strategically choosing what 
information to display and what to exclude (Staff Interviews 2009).   
(Insert Table One About Here) 
(Insert Table Two About Here) 
Independent and Control Variables 
 The independent variables included in this analysis attempt to capture the 
competing representational and institutional demands that increase the complexity of 
                                                 
3 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science 
Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the 
University of Washington and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State University. Neither NSF nor the original 
collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. 
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the policymaking environment.  Table One and Table Two present the descriptive 
statistics for the House and Senate models, respectively.   
In terms of representational demands, organized constituency influence is 
captured as the sum total of all PAC contributions4 received by members of each 
committee during the given two-year election cycle of the corresponding Congress.5
The second representational demand is the political salience of policy issues 
addressed by committees.  Issue salience is measured as the proportion of total 
hearings, within each chamber, dedicated to individual topics.  Issue topics are 
identified as within the Policy Agendas Project twenty-one category issue codes, 
assigned to each hearing.  To produce an aggregate measure for each committee, I 
calculate the average issue salience of all hearings held by each committee.  Hypothesis 
2 predicts that increases in the salience of issues addressed by committees will relate to 
increases in committee and subcommittee hearing activity. 
  To 
ease interpretation, the total is divided by one-thousand.  Hypothesis 1 suggests that 
increased PAC contributions will relate to increases in hearing activity, and an increase 
in subcommittee activity. 
Turning to institutional demands, the legislative workload of a committee is 
measured as the number of bills referred to the committee in a given Congress.  The 
number of bill referrals received by each committee was collected through The Library 
of Congress website, accessible at www.thomas.gov.  Hypothesis 3 predicts that 
                                                 
4 Data for PAC contributions received by individual members during each election cycle were purchased 
from the Data Store at OpenSecrets.org.   
5 Committee membership information is acquired from Charles Stewart III and Jonathan 
Woon.  Congressional Committee Assignments, 103rd to 110th Congresses, 1993--2007:  House and 
Senate, July 12, 2005 (http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#2). 
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increases in a committee’s legislative workload will relate to increases in committee and 
subcommittee hearing activity. 
Hypothesis 4, based on the informational perspective of legislative organization, 
suggests that committees which are more ideologically similar to the parent chamber, 
and subcommittees that are more ideologically similar to the parent committee, will 
hold more hearings.  To measure ideological distance, I utilize Poole and Rosenthal’s 
(NOMINATE 2008) DW-Nominate6 scores.  For the models of committee hearing 
activity, I calculate the absolute distance between the chamber median voter and the 
full-committee median voter.  For subcommittee hearing activity models, the absolute 
distance between the full-committee median voter and the average of all sub-committee 
median voters is used.7
As the final direct test of a hypothesis discussed above, the ideological diversity 
of party coalitions within committees is captured as the ideological heterogeneity of 
each party coalition.  Ideological heterogeneity is measured as the standard deviation of 
member DW-nominate scores, which range from extreme liberal (1) to extremely 
conservative (-1), for each party coalition, within each committee.  Higher values 
signify a more diverse party coalition, while lower values signals a more ideologically 
homogenous coalition.  Hypothesis 5 predicts a significant relationship for this variable, 
however without specification to direction. 
  The values can range from zero to one, with higher values 
representing a greater ideological difference between members.  Because Hypothesis 4 
predicts increases in hearing activity to corresponding with smaller ideological distance, 
I expect a negative relationship to the dependent variable.  
                                                 
6 Data acquired from www.voteview.com.  
7 Subcommittee membership information is taken from CQ’s Politics in America for the 105th, 106th, 
107th and 108th Congresses (197-2003). 
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In addition to the independent variables included to directly test the five primary 
hypotheses presented above, a number of variables are included that may relate to 
committee hearing activity in order to provide statistical control: the spread of issues 
addressed by committee hearings, the majority/minority party ratio on the committee, 
the “type” of committee, the presence of divided government, total number of hearings 
held by all committees in the chamber, and number of hearings held by individual 
committees. 
The issue spread of committee hearing activity is included because committees 
are not limited by jurisdiction, or any other written rule regarding what issues they may 
address in a hearing.  This measure is calculated using a Herfindahl index capturing the 
spread of policy issues covered by committee hearings.  The Herfindahl index is 
calculated as the squared sum of the proportion of hearings for each policy topic held by 
an individual committee.  The index captures how spread out or how concentrated a 
committees hearing activity is, in terms of policy issues, as identified by the Policy 
Agendas Project.  Higher values represent concentration on fewer issues, while lower 
values represent a greater spread of attention.   
Party ratio is a simple measure to control for committees that are “stacked” 
from a partisan perspective, as this may influence the structure of policy debates.  The 
partisan balance of each individual committee is calculated by dividing the number of 
minority party members by the number of majority party members, yielding values that 
may range from zero (representing the presence of zero minority members) to one 




Committee type is included to control for the persistence of committee 
typologies within studies of legislative organization to label committees to match the 
tripartite goal structure of members within three categories:  Constituency, Prestige, and 
Policy (Fenno 1974; Mayhew 1974).  Because there is such a vast acceptance of these 
committee labels within empirical studies of House committees, I control for this norm.  
Dummy variables are included in the House analyses for the committees traditionally 
viewed as prestige committees (Ways and Means; Budget; and Appropriations) and 
constituency committees (Agriculture; Armed Services; Resources; Public Works and 
Transportation; and Science).   
 Due to the lack of Senate studies examining legislative organization, the smaller 
number of committees, and the greater overlap of committee jurisdiction, no such 
controls are included in the Senate analyses.   
To control for inter-institutional factors, the partisan relationship between the 
President and Congress is included in the analyses.  Because hearings are a commonly 
accepted part of the agenda setting process in political science (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993) and within Congress (Staff Interviews 2009), and empirical evidence suggests a 
larger agenda during divided government (Shipan 2006), a measure of divided party 
government between the President and Congress is included.  Divided government is 
measure as one when the President and the chamber are of opposing parties, and zero 
otherwise.  
In order to control for possible effects endogenous to the nature of congressional 
activity, the total hearings held by each chamber within an individual Congress is 
controlled for.  As the total number of hearings held by Congressional institutions 
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increases, the likelihood that committees and subcommittees will host more hearings 
necessarily increases. This also introduces statistical control for any variance specific to 
individual Congresses, not accounted for by other measures.   
Additionally, due to the time constraints of congressional members (Hall 1996), 
a greater number of hearings held under one committee may necessarily increase that 
committees use of its subcommittees.  Therefore, the total number of committee 
hearings is controlled for in the subcommittee hearing activity models. 
Method 
 Due to the continuous nature of the dependent variable used in each analysis, the 
statistical method utilized is OLS regression.  To control for potential heteroskedasticity 
problems, and ensure conservative estimations, robust standard errors are applied.  
Analysis and Results 
 As noted above, four models were conducted to analyze the relationship 
between exogenous and endogenous demand factors on the occurrence of committee 
and subcommittee hearings.  For each chamber, the House and Senate, one model was 
conducted utilizing the percent of all chamber hearings held by each committee as the 
dependent variable, and the other examining the percentage of committee hearings 
conducted at the subcommittee level as the dependent variable.  This allows for the 
examination of both levels of delegation within the congressional policymaking 
process:  the chamber to committees and committees to subcommittees.  As seen in 
Table Three each House model was statistically significant with one accounting for 
fifty-nine percent of all variation (% of all hearings) and the other accounting for sixty-
eight percent (% hearings at subcommittee level).  In the Senate, the models did not 
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perform as well, but were still strong, achieving statistical significance and predicting 
approximately fifty-percent of all variation correctly in both models (See Table Four).  
The following sections will review the results of the House and Senate models 
respectively. 
(Insert Table Three about here) 
(Insert Table Four about here) 
Information Management Activity in the House 
 The analyses of overall committee hearing activity and subcommittee hearing 
activity produces support my theory of information management in Congress presented 
in Chapter 1.  According to the House analyses, committee and subcommittee hearing 
activity is related to the representational and institutional demands committees face.  
However, there appears to be a genuine difference in how such informational demands 
relate to committee activity overall and subcommittee activity within committees. 
While both overall committee, and subcommittee activity relate to representational and 
institutional demands, the nature of those relationships is different. 
 In terms of overall committee activity, empirical analysis of hearing activity 
provides support for hypotheses two (issue salience), three (legislative workload), four 
(ideological distance), and five (party heterogeneity).  As expected, committees that 
handle more politically salient issues, receive more bill referrals, and are more 
ideologically similar to the chamber conduct more information management activity 
relative to other committees.  The significant relationship between the heterogeneity of 
ideology within Republican party coalitions (the House majority during the time period 
observed in the data) confirms and informs hypothesis five.  With the expected direction 
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of the relationship unclear, the positive relationship signals that committee activity 
allows for the incorporation of different perspectives that may otherwise be silenced as 
previous work suggests (Fenno 1962; Jones 1962).  The implications of this evidence 
are contrary to more recent work suggesting that committee activity in the House seeks 
to work on behalf of, and display the unified political views and goals of the majority 
party (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Baughman 2006).   
 The data suggests that parties may respond to the institutional needs created by 
diverse political perspectives by allowing members to display such perspectives on the 
record in hearings.  Based on the existence and enforcement of strong parties in the 
contemporary House (Rohde 1991), one may not expect parties to allow internal 
dissention into the public debate.  According to Cox and McCubbins (2005), the party 
institutions desire to maintain the validity and strength of the “party brand.”  However, 
others argue that parties exist because of the ideological similarities of individuals and 
must allow some degree of freedom to those individuals (Krehbiel 1993).  Although at 
first glance, allowing the public display of competing views may seem counter to this 
goal, if party members have political interests or perspectives different from the party 
more broadly, it may be in the best interest of the “party brand” to allow members the 
opportunity to give those issues or interests congressional attention thus preserving the 
peace within the party.  Within committees, subcommittees appear to give committees 
the ability to respond to demands differently.   
 The analysis of House subcommittee activity provides support for hypotheses 
one (organized interest influence) and three (legislative workload).  Similar to 
committee activity overall, subcommittees are more involved in the management of 
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information when the parent committee receives an increasing number of bill referrals.  
However, unlike the results examining overall committee activity, there is a significant 
and positive relationship between total PAC contributions received by committee 
members and hearing activity at the subcommittee level.  Research suggests that 
organized interests can influence committee activity (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hardin 
1998, 2002; Heitshusen 2000; Esterling 2007).  This analysis provides support for this 
perspective.  Additionally, interviews with committee staff consistently revealed a view 
that full committee hearings are utilized for discussion of a higher profile, while 
subcommittee hearings provide an opportunity to dig into the specifics of problem 
definition and solutions (Staff Interviews 2009).  Because organized interest groups are 
often more interested in the specifics of policy solutions that simply garnering 
congressional attention (Hall and Deardorff 2006), it seems appropriate that increasing 
demand from organized interests within committees would relate to increases in activity 
at the subcommittee level.  Beyond the empirical evidence provided regarding the 
primary hypotheses, the role of committee type is also worthy of note. 
 A vast amount of research on legislative organization in Congress describes 
committees in the House as falling into three primary typologies: constituency, prestige 
and policy.  Constituency committees respond to the electoral needs of members 
relating to the provision of particularized benefits.  Prestige committees respond to the 
needs of parties to control the policy process and give members prominence through 
institutional influence.  Policy committees serve to provide policy expertise on complex 
issues.  In order to test for differences across committees, dummy variables were 
included to control for committee type.  In the analysis, constituency committees and 
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prestige committees were no more or less likely to be involved in the management of 
information than policy committees.  This seems to support one of the overall 
arguments of this project.  All committees serve to respond to the variety of 
representational and institutional demands facing Congress simultaneously, not 
separately.   
 Based on this analysis of hearing activity in the House, empirical evidence 
seems to support my theory of information management in Congress.  Empirical 
analyses of Senate activity provide similar support, however with some differences 
unique to the upper chamber. 
Information Management Activity in the Senate 
 Similar to the House analyses, the analyses of overall committee and 
subcommittee activity in the Senate provide general support for my theory of 
information management in Congress.  Also similar to the House analyses, while 
overall committee and subcommittee activity are related to variations in the 
representational and institutional demands facing Senate committees, there are 
differences in how these relationship manifest within the levels of the committee 
system.   
 The analysis of overall Senate committee activity provides support for 
hypotheses two (issue salience), three (legislative workload), and five (party 
heterogeneity).  Regarding subcommittee activity in the Senate, the empirical analysis 
supports hypothesis one, as in the House, but results regarding hypothesis three and five 
provide implications unique to the Senate.  As in the House, Senate committees 
handling issues of greater political salience and receiving greater numbers of bill 
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referrals host greater numbers of congressional hearings.  The theory of information 
management expects such representational and institutional demands to generate 
increases in information management activity naturally through greater attention to 
issues from the exogenous and endogenous sources of demand in the complex policy 
environment.  Senate results regarding the heterogeneity of party coalitions provide 
unique results as compared to the House data.   
 While the increases in party heterogeneity in the House related to greater levels 
of hearing activity, increases in the homogeneity of majority party coalitions relate to 
increases in hearing activity in the Senate.  Although the influence of strong parties is 
most commonly attributed to politics in the House, recent scholarship suggests 
partisanship has gained greater influence in the contemporary Senate as well (Monroe, 
Roberts and Smith 2008).  From the 105th through the 108th Congress, committees with 
more homogenous majority party coalitions held significantly more hearings than other 
committees.  Based on the traditional view that the Senate plays a more prestigious and 
influential role in national policy making than the House (Matthews 1960), in this era of 
partisan dominance, it may be paramount for parties in the Senate to reveal a united 
front.  Because the size of the chamber dictates that Senate membership have less 
capacity to deal with the same amount of issues and perspectives as the House, it seems 
important that the majority party in the Senate reveal unified views as it manages 
information by sending signals inside and outside of the chamber.  At the subcommittee 
level, evidence also appears to support the idea of strong parties in the Senate (Monroe, 
Roberts and Smith 2008). 
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 Unlike the House, where the ideological diversity of party coalitions within 
committees seems to bare no relationship to information management activity, Senate 
committees with more homogenous minority party coalitions demonstrate greater 
amounts of subcommittee activity.  This may reveal a continuation of the Senate norm 
that all Senators be treated equal (Matthews 1960).  As opposed to being potentially 
silenced in the House (Cox and McCubbins 2005), strong Senate minorities may be able 
to force committees to take up policy issues in a public forum. Although such debates 
may be relegated to the subcommittee level, any attention would be better than no 
attention for political actors seeking a mark on the political record.  This provides 
interesting evidence regarding the role of party institutions influencing the management 
of information in Congress.  Beyond the role of parties, there is also an interesting 
difference in how the legislative workload influences activity at the subcommittee level.  
 The theory of information management suggests that committees with a greater 
legislative workload will necessarily delegate more activity to subcommittees as a 
response to the necessary resource and time constraints of a bounded institution.  
However, this does not appear to be the case in the Senate as increases in bill referrals 
received by a committee significantly relates to decreases in subcommittee activity.  
This may be a result of traditional differences in the legislative process between 
chambers.  According to committee staff, Senate committees do not typically allow 
subcommittees to markup or manage legislation.  This norm, coupled with the smaller 
membership of the chamber, could cause committees that believe legislative action on 
an issue to be imminent to keep all discussion at the full committee level.  If the full 
committee will ultimately have to act on legislation, it should be more likely to include 
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the full membership in discussions that may influence the tenor of the overall policy 
conversation.  Although this finding is contrary to the initial theoretical expectations, 
considering the differing institutional circumstances between the House and Senate it 
does not appear contrary to my theory of information management in Congress. 
 Empirical analyses of both the House and Senate appear to provide broad 
support for my theory of information management in Congress.  Overall in both 
chambers, committee and subcommittee activity appear to be directly related to the 
representational and institutional demands facing committees.  The following section 
discusses more broadly the possible conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis 
and next steps that will be taken to further understand the management of information in 
Congress. 
Conclusion 
 Based on the analysis of House and Senate committee hearing activity across 
four Congresses, the management of information by committees and subcommittees 
appears to be directly related to variations in the representational and institutional 
demands facing the committee system.  As expected, committees manage information 
on the public record in response to changing demands that surface throughout the 
complex policy environment.  While analyses of both the House and Senate provide 
support for the theory of information management, there appear to be distinct 
institutional differences in how the chambers behave.  Additionally, as my interviews 
with staff suggested, there seems to be a clear variation in how committees respond to 
these demands broadly and how committees utilize subcommittees in response the same 
demands (Staff Interviews 2009).  These differences highlight the importance for 
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congressional research to examine both chambers, and to avoid treating subcommittee 
behavior generically as committee behavior. 
 Although representational demands appear to influence the House and Senate 
similarly, Senate committees appear to respond to institutional demands much 
differently than House committees.  In terms of partisan institutional factors, 
information management in the House appears to serve to incorporate a diversity of 
perspectives (Fenno 1962; Jones 1962), yet information management in the Senate 
appears to work under a strong party model most commonly attributed to the House 
(Cox and McCubbins 2005; Monroe, Roberts and Smith 2008).  Institutional differences 
in the legislative process also create differences in how subcommittees are utilized in 
the information management process across chambers.  Too often, research examining 
the congressional committee system proposes overarching explanations while only 
looking at the House.  Differences arising in this analysis highlight the importance for 
congressional scholars to examine both chambers.  A similar point can be made for the 
need to examine the role of subcommittees within, as opposed to an assumed part of, 
the committee system. 
 In both the House and Senate, subcommittees appear to provide committees a 
way to manage information in the policy process as demands that may be viewed as 
“under the radar” increase.  The natural limits of members and committees (Hall 1996) 
dictate that if the demands committees face cross a certain threshold, subcommittees 
will provide the capacity to respond to such demands (Deering and Smith 1997; 
Schneider 2007a; Schneider 2007b).  Based on this analysis, it appears that 
subcommittees clearly provide the committee system a structural hierarchy (O’Toole 
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and Meier 1999) to utilize in pursuit of policy goals in a complex environment.  The 
rare, but existing, research on subcommittees in Congress suggests a varying role across 
committees (Hall and Evans 1990), indeed this appears to be the case.  While traditional 
scholarship on the committee system simply discusses the system at-large, implicitly 
assuming that subcommittees play no unique role, evidence presented here and the 
theory of information management more broadly suggest that this is not the case.   
 The following chapter continues to emphasize these themes.  In order to learn 
more about the role of subcommittee in the management of information, chapter three 
addresses the question of which subcommittees are more likely to be utilized by the 
parent committee and why?  A theoretical discussion applying my theory of information 
management in Congress and a subcommittee level analysis of hearing activity are used 
to address the research question.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics – House Committees, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
Dependent Variables   Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
# Committee Hearings  92.46  69.66  0  301 
Percent of All    5.13  3.83  0  17.24 
     Congressional Hearings 
# Full Committee Hearings   21.17  18.65  0  98 
Percent Committee Hearings 61.26  31.32  0  99.05 
     Held by Subcommittees 
Independent Variables 
PAC Contributions          16887.74          8058.97          3331.84       41261.61 
Issue Salience   5.19  2.13  0  11.04 
Ideological Distance –  
     Committee – Floor Med.  0.09  0.07  0.00  0.25 
     Subcomm-Full Med.  0.08  0.05  0.01  0.24 
Party Heterogeneity –   
     Democrats    0.15  0.03  0.02  0.21 
     Republicans   0.15  0.04  0.09  0.26 
Workload    399.58  323.61  2  1000 
Information Spread   31.59  24.37  0  100 
Controls 
Party Ratio    0.80  0.14  0.40  1.10 
Divided Government  0.49  0.50  0  1 
# Total Hearings, Chamber  1800.35 120.63  1694  1993 
Committee Type –  
     Policy    0.31  0.46  0  1 
     Constituency   0.26  0.44  0  1 
     Prestige    0.15  0.36  0  1 
105th Congress   0.24  0.43  0  1 
106th Congress   0.24  0.43  0  1 
107th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 
108th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics – Senate Committees, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
Dependent Variables   Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
# Committee Hearings  55.24  40.29  0  164 
Percent of All    5.18  3.74  0  13.40 
     Congressional Hearings 
# Full Committee Hearings  33.84  23.79  0  82 
Percent Committee Hearings 27.53  26.73  0  94.60 
     Held by Subcommittees 
Independent Variables 
PAC Contributions           9414.83          3558.43          1875.00          
20943.29 
Issue Salience   6.52  2.66  0  13.73 
Ideological Distance –  
     Committee – Floor Med.  0.10  0.08  0  0.30
  
     Subcomm-Full Med.  0.10  0.06  0  0.24 
Party Heterogeneity – 
     Democrats    0.14  0.05  0.05  0.31 
     Republicans   0.18  0.04  0.11  0.28 
Workload    203.61  224.18  1  1000 
Information Spread   30.74  21.81  0  100 
Controls 
Party Ratio    0.88  0.12  0.54  1.14 
Divided Government  0.50  0.50  0  1 
# Total Hearings, Chamber  1064.75 151.03  889  1248 
105th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 
106th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 
107th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 





Table 3. Analysis of House Committee Hearings, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
    Dependent            % of All        % Committee 
Variable        Hearings   Hearings at Sub. 
Independent Variables 
Representational Demands 
PAC Contributions    -0.00    0.001* 
      (0.00)    (0.000) 
Issue Salience     0.64*    1.41 
      (0.21)    (1.60) 
Institutional Demands 
Workload     0.00*    0.01* 
      (0.00)    (0.01) 
Ideological Distance –  
     Committee – Floor Med.   -16.82*    - 
      (7.75)    - 
     Subcommittee – Full    -    -54.45 
      -    (48.71) 
Party Heterogeneity – 
     Democrats     -9.99    -9.26  
      (10.80)    (81.35) 
     Republicans    21.10*    -64.49 
      (10.04)    (57.41) 
Controls 
Information Spread    -0.08*    -0.30* 
      (0.02)    (0.13) 
Party Ratio     0.43    36.52  
      (2.33)    (23.01) 
Divided Government    0.35    13.65 
      (1.36)    (10.33) 
# Total Hearings, Chamber   0.00    -0.03 
      (0.01)    (0.04) 
# Full Committee Hearings   -    0.13* 
      -    (0.04) 
Committee Type –  
     Constituency    0.21    5.35 
           (0.81)    (5.09) 
     Prestige     1.49    3.73 
      (1.29)    (5.73) 
Constant     -0.50    55.69 
      (8.57)    (76.82) 
N =      78    68 
R-Squared =     0.59    0.68 
F =      9.56*    12.74* 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
* = p < 0 .05 
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Table 4. Analysis of Senate Committee Hearings, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
Dependent     % of All  % Committee  
Variables     Hearings  Hearings at Sub. 
Independent Variables 
Representational Demands 
PAC Contributions    0.00   0.002* 
      (0.00)   (0.00) 
Issue Salience     0.61*   -0.91  
  
      (0.16)   (1.63) 
Institutional Demands 
Workload     0.01*   -0.04* 
      (0.00)   (0.01) 
Ideological Distance –  
     Committee – Floor Med.   -0.93   - 
      (4.22)   - 
     Subcommittee – Full       87.38   
         (53.18) 
Party Heterogeneity –    
     Democrats     -3.99   -143.50* 
      (6.96)   (63.35) 
     Republicans    -20.36*   -36.27 
      (9.14)   (89.66) 
Controls 
Information Spread    -0.04*   0.02 
      (0.02)   (0.02) 
Party Ratio     0.63   -29.82  
      (5.10)   (33.59) 
Divided Government    0.20   -1.29 
      (1.45)   (7.96) 
# Total Hearings, Chamber   0.00   0.00 
      (0.00)   (0.02) 
# Full Committee Hearings   -   0.19* 
      -   (0.10) 
Constant     2.89   70.86 
      (4.95)   (40.23) 
N =      76   48 
R-Squared =     0.48   0.54 
F =      7.18*   5.77* 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 




Chapter 3:  Subcommittee Information Management Activity 
 
The vast body of congressional research on the committee system, the dearth of 
information available regarding the role of subcommittees is surprising.  While the text-
book understanding explains that subcommittees exist to help committees manage the 
congressional workload (Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 2007a; Schneider 2007b), 
it does little to explain why some are more active than others, and when they are more 
likely to be active in the policy process.  As shown in the two previous chapters, 
specific demands influence which committees are prone to be more active at managing 
information in the policy environment than others.  Although text-book explanations of 
the purpose and need for subcommittees is helpful at a basic level of institutional 
understanding, it is necessary to go further and explore the variation in activity that 
exists across individual subcommittees.   
The two previous chapters show how individual committee activity varies along 
with the diversity of demands a committee faces.  Because increasing diversity of 
demands is evidence of the need for committees to become active in managing 
information flow within the policy environment, such factors increase committee 
hearing activity.  Also shown in Chapter 2, increasing demands systematically influence 
when committees are more or less prone to delegate information management activity to 
subcommittees instead of maintaining the activity at the full committee level.  This 
chapter explores the question of when individual subcommittees are more likely to 
publicly manage information flow in the policy process by moving the unit of analysis 
down a level, from committee to subcommittee.  To address this question, I will first 
discuss the existing understanding of subcommittees in congressional studies.  Next, I 
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will apply that understanding to my theory of information management in Congress to 
generate testable expectations regarding individual subcommittee activity.  Finally, 
utilizing a regression analysis of House and Senate subcommittee activity, I explain 
variations in subcommittee activity within the chambers and compare the differences 
across chambers.  
Subcommittees in Congressional Studies 
 While institutional studies of Congress remain one of the vastest subfields in 
political science, subcommittees have received much less attention.  Existing work 
ranges from a text-book perspective (Deering 1982; Deering and Smith 1997; Oleszeck 
1997), to explorations seeking to understand variations in purpose and power (Fenno 
1962; Jones 1962; Hall 1987; Hall and Evans 1990), as well as changes in purpose and 
power during dynamic periods in the evolution of congressional institutions (Rohde 
1974; Haeberle 1978; Baughman 2006).  Considering the existing text-book explanation 
of subcommittee development, one might consider explanations of committees more 
generally to be a default, mutual understanding of subcommittees as well.  However, 
subcommittees are genuinely individual institutional units, regardless of the fact that 
subcommittee positions and work are ultimately subject to the authority of the full 
committee.  Committees are respected as gatekeepers of the legislative process (Cox 
and McCubbins 1993, 2005), even though committee work in the House is ultimately 
subject to the combination of the Rules Committee and the floor in the House, and the 
individual traditions of committee and floor procedure in the Senate.  Hearings 
however, occur under the autonomy of committees and subcommittees. As Figure Two 
shows, subcommittees possess a prominent role in the management of information in 
69 
 
the policy process by playing host to a large portion of congressional hearing activity.  
Although the specific percentage of hearing activity conducted by subcommittees varies 
over time, subcommittees consistently host a large percentage of congressional 
hearings.  Despite this empirical fact, there exists noted ambiguity regarding variation in 
the role of subcommittees explored by existing research that begs further explanation.   
 Some explanations of subcommittees in Congress add depth to the text-book 
explanation that subcommittees exist to expand the capability of full committees to 
handle the ever growing congressional workload (Deering and Smith 1997; Schneider 
2007a; Schneider 2007b).  Since the congressional reforms of the 1970s, the importance 
of subcommittees and the notion of “subcommittee government” in Congress became 
prominent (Rohde 1974; Deering 1982; Hall and Evans 1990), yet the existence of 
empirical evidence and explanation for this is lacking.  Hall and Evans (1990) argued 
that although interview evidence and markup data support the notion of subcommittee 
influence, they highlight the need for a more nuanced explanation of why subcommittee 
influence varies across committees and within the legislative process.  The statistical 
analysis presented in Chapter 2 highlights this variation.   
 Looking at Figure Three, subcommittees played host to approximately seventy 
percent of all House hearings and approximately forty percent of all Senate hearings 
from the 105th through the 108th Congress.  Yet during this same time period 
subcommittee hearing activity as a percentage of overall committee activity ranges from 
zero to more than ninety-nine percent in the House and from zero to more than ninety-
four percent in the Senate across individual committees (See Tables One and Two).  As 
Hall and Evans (1990) noted, there is substantial variation in subcommittee activity, and 
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as a result influence, across committees within the system.  Certainly this is partly due 
to variations in legislative workload, as seen in Tables Three and Four, however I argue 
that this is also a response to variation in the representational and institutional demands 
facing committees and subcommittees. 
 Jones (1962) found that subcommittees also serve to incorporate a wider variety 
of interests or perspectives thereby mediating conflict in the legislative process.  This 
shows that subcommittees provide an infrastructure to manage and respond to demands 
surfacing from source both exogenous and endogenous to the Congress.  Although this 
analysis examined a much larger committee system of the pre-reform era, the essence of 
Jones’ (1962) argument seems relevant.  As discussed in Chapter 1, Congress and its 
committees face a cacophony of voices and interests seeking access to the policy 
process.  The countless array of interested voices create an environment loaded with 
information that has the potential to overwhelm the congressional policy making 
process.  Jones (1962) implies that the expanded infrastructure provided by 
subcommittees serves to manage the information environment, mediating conflict to 
stabilize the legislative process.  Although the committee system has evolved with the 
institution during the 1970s reforms and the restructuring of Congress after the 
Republican takeover of 1994 (Rohde 1974; Baughman 2006), this principal seems 
transferable to current circumstances. 
 With the “Republican Revolution,” some saw the power of subcommittees 
established by the “Subcommittee Bill of Rights” (Rohde 1974) to be ending, or at least 
changing (Baughman 2006).  The increasing homogeneity of political parties generated 
a centralization of party power that began to break down some of the institutions and 
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traditions of the existing system, such as placing term limits on committee chairman and 
overthrowing the “seniority rule” in committee and subcommittee chair appointments in 
favor of party loyalty concerns (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  Thus, some suggest 
that subcommittees are utilized to enforce negative agenda power in the legislative 
process on behalf of the majority party, especially in the House. This fits well with the 
procedural-cartel view of committee activity (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  But it 
also fits with well with the traditional management activity described by earlier work 
(Fenno 1962; Deering 1982).  The problem with these explanations is they describe the 
work of subcommittee activity as explicit negative majority power where hearings and 
markups are used to kill minority proposals.  Interviews with congressional staff seem 
to counter this perspective as committee rules for referring bills to subcommittees are 
determined by individual committees (Staff Interviews 2009).  On multiple occasions, 
staff members scoffed at the idea that any form of public committee activity would be 
spent on policies or perspectives that the committee was against (Staff Interviews 
2009).  As one policy director said sarcastically, “why would we give the air to breathe?  
If we are against it, it just doesn’t go anywhere to begin with” (Staff Interviews 2009). 
Therefore the death by inaction that most bills meet (Krutz 2005) does not necessarily 
mean that the committee or party explicitly sought to “kill” the legislation. 
 Contrary to research arguing that hearings and other subcommittee activity are 
used to kill minority legislative and policy perspectives, committee staffers regularly 
mentioned that discrediting or challenging minority party proposals would not be the 
primary purpose of hearing activity (Staff Interviews 2009).  Staffers consistently stated 
that the majority would almost never be willing to give a minority perspective a position 
72 
 
of primacy in public forum of a hearing or a bill the air of a markup, instead committees 
would work on behalf of policies and issues that the committee, and often the majority 
party, desire to seek action upon (Staff Interviews 2009).  This view was expressed by 
current majority staffers, minority staffers, and staff members that have been in both 
positions at during their careers.  Although this may be contrary to the most recent work 
on subcommittees, it fits well with the proposed theory of information management in 
that committees seek to structure and control the policy process by keeping the flow of 
information in the policy debate on desired terms.  By what committees and 
subcommittees take action on, and do not take action on, by the perspectives included 
and not included in hearings, information is filtered to establish a particular public 
record within the cacophonous off-the-record environment. As one committee staff 
member put it:  “Hearings must be taken seriously by insiders and outsiders.  In an off-
the-record-city, hearings reveal what information members and staff want on-the-
record” (Staff Interviews 2009).  This highlights the strategic efforts of committees to 
structure the flow of information in the policy debate and reveals the importance of 
understanding what factors influence which subcommittees are active in this process. 
 The use, role and power of subcommittees as presented by Jones (1962) as well 
as Hall and Evans (1990) provides a glimpse into the current use, power and role of 
subcommittee activity, even as the institutional structure has evolved since the era of 
subcommittee government (Deering 1982; Baughman 2006).  The following section 
seeks to merge existing knowledge about the role of subcommittees with my theory of 
information management to generate testable hypotheses exploring a more nuanced 
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explanation of subcommittee power and use as requested by the work Hall and Evans 
(1990).  
Information Management and Subcommittee Activity  
Based on arguments in theories of public management (O’Toole and Meier 
1999, 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2002), my theory of information management 
presented in Chapter 1 highlights the infrastructure that the committee system provides 
Congress, and the infrastructure that subcommittees provide full committees, to 
potentially manage the complex and competitive environment surrounding the policy 
process.  With the competing representational and institutional demands facing the 
House and Senate, as well as their committees and membership, subcommittees provide 
full committees a structural hierarchy capable of increasing institutional capacity to 
manage the policy environment to achieve desired policy goals.  Subcommittees will 
increase the ability of full committees to meet chamber and committee goals.  However, 
just as with any hierarchy, subcommittees also have the potential to undermine 
institutional goals if they take subversive action, intentionally or unintentionally.  With 
the basic understanding of potential subcommittee roles in mind, this section utilizes my 
theory of information management in Congress to generate testable hypotheses 
addressing the question of which subcommittees are likely to be most active and why.   
While subcommittees play host to a large portion of committee hearing activity 
in both the House and Senate (a large majority of activity in the House), congressional 
research has yet to explore when and why committees delegate work to subcommittees, 
and show which subcommittees are likely to receive delegation.  Analyses presented in 
Chapter 2 shows that all committees do not utilize the structural hierarchy of 
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subcommittees at uniform rates.  Congressional staffers consistently note that variation 
in subcommittee activity, power, and autonomy across committees and subcommittees 
individually exists (Staff Interviews 2009).  While existing work provides prospective 
explanations for the role, purpose, and use of subcommittees it also highlights the need 
for more detailed explanation of variation (Hall and Evans 1990).  Drawing on these 
observations and the empirical evidence generated in Chapter 2, one should be able to 
generate testable hypotheses regarding why certain subcommittees will be more active 
in the management of information than others. 
At the heart of my theory of information management in Congress is the need 
for committees and their subcommittees to filter the various demands in the information 
environment desiring entry and influence.  Managing the flow of information allows 
committees to keep the flow of information in the policy debate on desired terms.  As 
one staffer noted, hearings provide committees the opportunity to get selected 
information “out there, in the aether” (Staff Interviews 2009).  Others noted the need for 
committees and subcommittees to “manage the policy debate effectively” in order to 
successfully move on desired policy issues (Staff Interviews 2009).  With the variation 
in subcommittee activity across committees noted above, the question of which 
subcommittees are most active and why begs exploration.  Theories in public 
management suggest that the use of structural hierarchies may be predictable based on 
the characteristics of the structural hierarchy and the environmental demands facing an 
institution.   
Theories in public management argue that successful managers facilitate 
personnel stability and trust within structural hierarchies in order to promote 
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organizational success (O’Toole and Meier 2002).  The congressional environment 
possesses certain characteristics that may signal the existence of these traits within the 
committee system.  In the committee system, membership is often stable as members 
seek to solidify careers within policy domains of interest to themselves and/or their 
constituents (Copeland 1987; Frisch and Kelly 2006).  Through networking and 
experience, members within committees and subcommittees can become increasingly 
familiar with each other and therefore more likely to work together in the policy process 
(Williams 2009).  Thus one may expect that committees may delegate more hearing 
activity to subcommittees with membership holding greater trust for, and experience 
with each other.  Assuming that trust and stability increase over time together (Williams 
2009) yields a first testable hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1:  Subcommittees consisting of memberships with more years of 
committee seniority are more likely to be active in managing information flow. 
The traditional, informational perspective of legislative organization also argues 
that the Congress is more likely to accept policy and policy expertise presented by 
committees that are trustworthy (Krehbiel 1991).  Based on median voter theory, this 
perspective argues that institutional subunits that are more ideologically representative 
of the chamber at-large would be more likely to produce the “expertise” needed to 
facilitate good public policy (Krehbiel 1991).  Although the ideological difference 
between a subcommittee and the parent committee bore no significant influence in the 
analyses of subcommittee activity in Chapter 2, it seems reasonable to expect a 
subcommittee that is more ideologically similar to the floor to be more active in 
managing information for committees.  As discussed in Chapter 1 the ability for 
76 
 
committees to successfully manage information in the policy process can structure the 
broader policy debate on desired terms (Walker 1977; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
Control of the agenda and the policy debate is paramount in “winning” legislative and 
political battles (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; King 
1994).  Thus, subcommittees that are viewed as more likely to produce trustworthy 
policy information may be more active in the hearing process. This yields a second 
hypothesis to be tested in this chapter: 
Hypothesis 2:  Subcommittees that are more ideologically representative of the 
floor will be increasingly active in managing information flow in the policy 
environment.  
Along with the ability of management to facilitate and utilize trust and stability 
within structural hierarchies, theories in public management also emphasize the need for 
a successful institution to buffer itself from the surrounding environment while also 
exploiting opportunities within that environment (O’Toole and Meier 1999).  My theory 
of information management in Congress characterizes the endogenous and exogenous 
environmental pressures facing the policy environment as competing demands 
emanating from an array of sources.  As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, these demands 
can be separated into representational and institutional demands.  Similar to the 
expectations for committees, pressures from such demands should result in an 
increasing need for individual subcommittees to increase the use of individual 
subcommittees for information management.    
On the representational side of Congress, two prominent competing demands in 
the policy environment are organized constituencies as well as the given level of public 
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attention issues receive.  Organized constituencies play a substantive and influential role 
in American politics (Heclo 1978; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Peterson 1992; Wright 1996; Baumgartner and Leetch 1998).  Individuals and 
organizations join together to influence the policy process in a variety of ways, one of 
which involves the demonstration of a sizable amount of individuals sharing a concern 
and by strategically making financial contributions individual member’s of Congress.  
PACs serve as an accurate empirical example of this behavior.  PACs collect individual 
monetary contributions under a single umbrella to contribute to individual members of 
Congress.  PACs do not simply give randomly as they target specific members with 
specific interests and institutional positioning (Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; Hojnacki 
and Kimball 1998).  Additionally, organized interests provide information subsidies to 
members of Congress through research, polling, legislative drafts and other forms of 
information (Hall and Deerdorf 2006).  Thus as the amount of PAC contributions 
received by members of a subcommittee increases during a given election cycle, that 
subcommittee will be more likely to be active (Hardin 2002; Esterling 2007) in 
managing the information in the policy environment to structure and respond to these 
demands.  This leads to a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  As the total amount of PAC contributions received by the 
membership of a subcommittee increases during an election cycle, the subcommittee 
will be more active in the management of information during the given Congress.8
                                                 
8 I use a gross measure of PAC contributions for two reasons.  First, hearing activity is no limited by 
jurisdiction.  Therefore groups can potentially influence committees who are not primarily responsible for 
an issue to host a hearing on any given topic.  Second, according to Esterling (2007), PAC contributions 
separated by economic sector or industry focused on particular policy issues tend to correlate highly with 
gross contributions received by members.  Based on these points, I chose a gross measure to me most 




Unorganized representational pressures can also increase demands from the 
information environment on the Congress.  As issues become more salient within public 
opinion and media coverage, demanders begin pressing Congress by pressing 
information into the policy process from various angles such as mass e-mailings, phone 
calls, media coverage and the like (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hall and Deardorff 
2006).  As this information floods the Capitol promoting different positions, 
perspectives and solutions it in the best interests of the Congress to manage these 
pressure to maintain control over the policy environment by demonstrating that it is 
attending to the prominent policy issues of the day.  Because time is limited for 
members of Congress and their staff (Hall 1990), the increasing salience of issues 
relevant to individual subcommittees may increase the amount information management 
activity a subcommittee must conduct. This leads to a fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  As the political salience of issues relevant to a subcommittee 
increases, the subcommittee will be increasingly active in the management of 
information. 
Along with these representational demands, institutional demands also create 
pressures with the information environment encroaching on congressional 
policymaking.  Institutional demands can arise from a variety of sources:  the legislative 
process, individual members, parties and in the case of subcommittees – parent 
committees.  Similar to the committee level analyses in Chapter 2, I expect these factors 
to be influential at the subcommittee level. 
In terms of the legislative process, one should expect similar factors that 
influence the prevalence of full committee activity to be transferable to the 
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subcommittee level.  As seen in Chapter 2, subcommittees are more active when the 
parent committee receives a greater number of bill referrals.  Considering the extreme 
amount of introduced legislation in the Unite States Congress (Krutz 2005), and the 
time pressures facing members and their offices (Hall 1996), it is not surprising that 
subcommittees pick up the slack for committees facing the largest workloads.  Still, 
committees adopt individualized committee rules which include referral procedure 
within committees.  This means subcommittee referral is not a uniform practice in its 
occurrence or structure, therefore comparing activity based on subcommittee referrals 
would be problematic and therefore is not explored in this chapter.  However, similar to 
the committee analyses in Chapter 2 the demands created by the ideological diversity of 
party coalitions, and spread of issues relevant to subcommittees is discussed. 
In Chapter 2, party heterogeneity was discussed an institutional demand that 
could generate pressure based on previous work arguing committees and subcommittees 
allow Congress to incorporate multiple, and competing perspectives in the policy debate 
(Fenno 1962; Jones 1962).  In the House, evidence suggests that committees with 
increasingly diverse majority coalitions are more likely to be active in the public 
management of information.  Although this is counterintuitive to the contemporary view 
of parties seeking to present a unified front on policy issues in public discourse (Rohde 
1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005), it seems reasonable if accommodating a diversity of 
issues preserves legislative unity through incorporation (Jones 1962).  Meanwhile there 
was no significant relationship between committee party coalitions and subcommittee 
activity.  In the Senate, evidence suggests that homogenous majorities relate to greater 
overall committee activity, while homogenous minorities are related to increases in 
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subcommittee activity.  The institutional differences that may account for these findings 
were discussed.  However, based on the variety of reasonable expectations, the fifth 
hypothesis follows: 
Hypothesis 5:  The ideological diversity of party coalitions within 
subcommittees will be significantly related to the amount of information management 
activity conducted by a subcommittee. 
Finally, the last empirical prediction to be tested in this chapter is based on the 
findings for a control variable in Chapter 2.  In both the House and Senate, the analyses 
in Chapter 2 demonstrate that committees attending to more political issues are more 
likely to be active in the hearing process.  Additionally, in the House, committees 
tending to more issues are more likely to delegate information management activity to 
subcommittees.  Similarly, subcommittees that deal with more policy issues should be 
more likely to hold more hearings.  Thus, the sixth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6:  Subcommittees pursuing a large number of policy issues will 
hold significantly more hearings. 
In order to test these empirical expectations regarding the influences predicting 
when subcommittees are active in the management of information in the policy 
environment, I statistically analyze subcommittee level hearing and membership data of 
the House and Senate from the 105th-108th Congresses.  Discussion of the Data and 
Analyses are presented in the following sections. 
Data and Methods 
In order to empirically examine the question of when individual subcommittees 
are more likely to be active in the management of information, I test the above 
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hypotheses utilizing data regarding subcommittee hearing activity from the 105th 
through 108th Congresses.  Identical analyses in terms of variable measurement and 
inclusion are conducted for the House of Representatives and the Senate separately.  
The dataset was compiled utilizing a variety of primary and secondary sources to create 
subcommittee level measurements for each variable.  Due to the continuous nature of 
the Dependent Variable discussed below, OLS regression with robust standard errors is 
the statistical method of choice for the analyses.  The following section details data 
collection and measurement.   
Dependent Variable:  Information Management by Subcommittees 
As argued in Chapter 1, hearing activity is the primary informational 
battleground of the congressional policy-making process.  To measure information 
management by subcommittees, I calculate the percentage of an individual committee’s 
hearings held by each individual subcommittee.  For example, if a committee hosts 10 
hearings, and five of those hearings are hosted by different, individual subcommittees, 
then the value of the Dependent Variable assigned to each of those five subcommittees 
would be ten percent (i.e. 1 divided by 10, multiplied by 100).  Because subcommittees 
are an institutional subunit of full committees, it is important to measure subcommittee 
activity relative to other subcommittees of the same committee as opposed to all 
subcommittees.  Capturing subcommittee information management activity as a 
percentage of the overall information management activity conducted by a committee 
accomplishes this goal.9
                                                 
9 Only subcommittees that were recorded as hosting at least one hearing during each Congress were 
included in this analysis.  On occasion, certain subcommittees that are in the record according to CQ 
Almanacs during this time period were not noted as holding hearings during this time.  Similarly, the 
Policy Agendas Project designated subcommittees that are not listed in the CQ Almanac for those years.  
  Higher values of the measure indicate greater use of the 
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subcommittee by the full committee for information management activity.  As seen in 
Table Five, individual subcommittees hold an average of 13.4% of committee hearings 
in the House ranging from little more than 1% to more than 42%.  In the Senate, 
individual subcommittees hosted an average of little more than 8% of committee 
hearings, ranging from a low of less than 1% to a high of more than 44% (See Table 6). 
(Insert Table 5 About Here) 
(Insert Table 6 About Here) 
Independent Variables:  Primary Tests and Controls 
  Theories in public management suggest that organizations can generate success 
through facilitating network stability and trust within an institutional hierarchy, and 
responding effectively to threats and opportunities presented by the surrounding 
environment (O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2002).  In applying these expectations to the 
committee system with a theory of information management, six testable hypotheses, 
presented above, regarding factors that may predict subcommittee information 
management behavior are tested utilizing the following variables.  Summary statistics 
for all variables included are included in Tables 5 (House) and 6 (Senate). 
To test Hypothesis 1 (network or personnel stability) and 2 (policy trust) I utilize 
two measures to capture each of the identified organizational characteristics.  In order to 
capture personnel stability, I calculate the average term served (year for the Senate) on 
the committee of the individual membership for each subcommittee.  Data for this 
measure are taken from Charles Stewart and Jonathon Woon’s Congressional 
Committee Assignments Data 1993-2007 available at “Charles Stewart’s Congressional 
                                                                                                                                               
I sought the original data to match the coding of subcommittees with the subcommittees on record, but 




In order to capture whether or not trust for the structural hierarchy influences 
subcommittee activity, I measure the ideological distance from the floor median voter 
(pivot in the Senate) and the subcommittee median voter (Krehbiel 1991, 1998).  
According to information theories of legislative organization, subunits that are 
ideologically representative of the floor are more likely to produce trustworthy policy 
expertise (Krehbiel 1991) which should encourage activity.  Smaller values of this 
measure signal ideological closeness to or representativeness of the chamber.  This 
measure of policy trust is utilized to directly test the negative relationship predicted by 
Hypothesis 2.  
  This measure captures the essential relationship-networking factor of 
time (Williams 2009) for members of subcommittees and directly tests the positive 
relationship predicted by Hypothesis 1.  In the On average, House subcommittee 
members were on more than their third term and Senate subcommittee members were in 
almost their ninth year.  
Hypotheses three through six provide a test how the representational demands 
and institutional demands facing subcommittees in the complex policy environment 
influence information management activity.  These variables are measured at the 
subcommittee level with calculations similar to those measured at the full committee 
level in Chapter 2.  One variable is calculated to test each of the two representational 
demand hypotheses, and each of the two institutional demand hypotheses listed above. 
To test the expected positive relationship between increased organized interest demands 
as discussed in Hypothesis 3, I calculate the total PAC contributions received by all 
                                                 
10 Stewart III, Charles and Jonathan Woon.  Congressional Committee Assignments, 103rd-110th 




members of the individual subcommittee during the two year election cycle of each 
Congress.11
Turning to hypotheses concerning institutional demands, one variable is 
included to examine party demands while the other examines the policy demands facing 
each subcommittee.  To test the relationship predicted by Hypothesis 5, the ideological 
heterogeneity of the Republican and Democratic coalitions of each subcommittee is 
measured as the standard deviation of the coalition member’s DW-NOMINATE scores.  
Higher values for this measure signal greater ideological diversity among a party’s 
subcommittee members, while lower values signal ideological homogeneity.   
  Also identical to the calculations in for the full committee analysis in 
Chapter 2, political salience of issues dealt with by the subcommittee are calculated at 
the average proportion of the overall congressional hearing agenda made up for issues 
addressed by the subcommittee.  Issue topics are identified using the twenty-one issue 
codes assigned to each hearing by the Policy Agendas Project.  This measure tests the 
positive relationship predicted by Hypothesis 4. 
In terms of the institutional demands facing subcommittees due to 
responsibilities in the policy process, the spread of issues a subcommittee handled in a 
given Congress is calculated for each subcommittee using a Herfindahl index capturing 
the spread of policy issues covered by a subcommittee’s hearings.  Lower values 
represent a greater spread of issues tended to, while higher values demonstrate a 
concentration of attention to fewer issues.  This measure directly tests the positive 
relationship predicted by Hypothesis 6.  To increase statistical control for the structured 
equation, four control variables not relating to specific hypotheses are also included. 
                                                 
11 The data used for this measure were purchased from the Data Store at OpenSecrets.org . 
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Control variables included in the analysis serve to capture potential factors 
specific to individual committees or individual Congresses that may account for 
variations in hearing activity that do not directly address my primary hypotheses.  To 
control for factors specific to overall committee activity, the number of hearings held by 
the parent committee and its subunits overall is included.  From the 105th through the 
108th Congress, House committees held an average of approximately 125 hearings per 
Congress while Senate committees averaged approximately 79 hearings per Congress.   
To control for variation attributable to the context of a specific Congress, a 
dummy variable is included to designate the 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses, utilizing 
the 108th as the baseline Congress.  Approximately 25% of all subcommittee hearings 
included in both the House and Senate models.   
Analysis and Results 
 As noted above two OLS models with robust standard errors, one for the House 
and one for Senate, were conducted to analyze relationships between characteristics of 
the structural hierarchy, representational demands, and institutional demands on 
information management activity by subcommittees.  Each statistical analysis achieved 
overall statistical significance.  The following section reviews the statistical results for 
both the House and Senate models.  Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the House and 
Senate models, respectively. 
(Insert Table 7 About Here) 
(Insert Table 8 About Here) 
Information Management in House and Senate Subcommittees 
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 For the House, the statistical analysis of subcommittee hearing activity provides 
support for Hypotheses 3 (organized interest influence), 4 (political salience), 5 (party 
coalition heterogeneity) and 6 (issue spread) while yielding evidence to support the null 
of Hypotheses 1 (personnel stability) and 2 (political trust).  The Senate analysis 
provides support for Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 while supporting the null of Hypotheses 1, 
2 and 3.  While the models present similar findings, differences regarding the influence 
of organized interests and party homogeneity deserve discussion.  Before addressing 
chamber differences, I review the basic findings of the models.   
 Regarding the characteristics of the structural hierarchy, neither the average 
committee seniority of subcommittee members, nor the ideological distance12
 In both the House and Senate, subcommittees handling issues of higher political 
salience conduct more information management activity for the parent committee.  This 
demonstrates that as the institutional need for action on prominent policy issues.  
Subcommittees serve to assist the committee system in responding to these demands.  
 between 
the subcommittee and the chamber bore a significant impact on information 
management activity by individual subcommittees.  While theories of public 
management identify the need for personnel stability and trust within structural 
hierarchies in order to promote organizational success (O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2002), 
these factors do not necessarily predict when information management activity will take 
place in congressional subcommittees.  The hypotheses regarding representational 
demands however, received at least partial support.   
                                                 
12 Models were conducted including different measures of political trust within the structural hierarchy, to 
no avail.  The ideological distance between full and subcommittee median, full and subcommittee chairs, 
full committee medians and subcommittee chairs, subcommittee chairs and the floor median were all 
explored.  None of which provided a different result.  Because the subunit median as compared to the 
floor median is convention (Krehbiel 1991), that is the operationalization presented. 
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This finding is consistent with the analysis of committee activity overall, presented in 
Chapter 2.  Subcommittees appear to be responding to the policy demands presented by 
handling more issues for the parent committee.  As in Chapter 2, the issue spread of 
subcommittee attention is a significant predictor of subcommittee activity in both the 
House and Senate.  Thus subcommittees addressing more issues are also more likely to 
be active in managing the flow of information.  Similar to the results presented in 
Chapter 2 regarding subcommittee activity are the results regarding the influence of 
organized interests. 
 Analysis of House subcommittees found organized interest influence, measured 
as PAC contributions, to be a significant and positive predictor of subcommittee 
information management activity.  This was also a significant predictor of 
subcommittee activity within committees overall, as discussed in Chapter 2.  The 
difference in this case, is that subcommittees made up of members receiving greater 
amounts of PAC contributions are relied on by committees for greater levels of 
information management.  As discussed in Chapter 2, interviews with congressional 
staff consider subcommittee hearings to be more involved in the specifics of problem 
definition and solution than full committee hearings (Staff Interviews 2009).  
Subcommittees and committees whose membership seem beholden to organized interest 
influence due to campaign contributions will face a greater demand for the exchange of 
information in the policy environment (Leyden 1995; Heitshusen 2000), and thus be 
more active managing that information in the policy debate.  Also similar to the 
analyses in Chapter 2, this is not the case for Senate subcommittees.   
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 Based on the Chapter 2 models, and the analysis presented here, it seems that 
PAC contributions do influence the management of information in the Senate to the 
same extent which they do the House.  Research suggests that organized constituencies 
may target senators differently than they do members of the House.  At the margins, the 
committee assignments of individual senators seems to not impact campaign 
contributions in the Senate as much as in the House, possibly due to the greater 
individual power of members of the Senate on the floor and within the chamber more 
broadly compared to the House (Grier, Munger, Torrent 1990).  Such differences could 
lead to differing empirical relationships in need of deep theoretical exploration and 
empirical analysis.  Further analysis will have to examine this relationship more closely.  
The role of party demands also appears to play a different role in subcommittees across 
chambers.   
 Also similar to the chamber differences presented in Chapter 2, the ideological 
heterogeneity of party coalitions within subcommittees has a different influence across 
chambers.  In both the House and Senate the ideological diversity of the Democrats (the 
minority party) is a significant predictor of hearing activity, however in different 
directions.  In the House, a more diverse Democratic coalition significantly predicts 
greater subcommittee activity yet in the Senate a more homogenous Democratic 
coalitions predict greater levels of subcommittee activity.  This may be attributable to 
the differences in the institutional norms of behavior in each chamber shining through.  
The House, especially since the Republican revolution, is known as a place where the 
majority party is strategic and dominant in the policy process (Rohde 1991; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005; Baughman 2006).  In the House, the Republicans (as the 
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majority during the time frame observed) may have strategically conducted hearings in 
subcommittees where Democrats may face internal conflict over problem definition and 
policy solutions in order to demonstrate a stronger “party brand” in the overall policy 
debate (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  Meanwhile in the Senate, known for its respect of 
individual members and super-majoritarian rules, hearing activity being related to a 
more homogenous minority may be a sign of a unified minority standing up for its 
institutional rights and generating enough stir in the policy environment that the 
majority accommodated them with subcommittee hearings.  While this stands as mere 
speculation, current research is noting a growing role of parties in the Senate (Monroe, 
Roberts and Smith 2008) that is not necessarily producing the same observable impacts 
as in the House.   Further research need to explore this dynamic. 
 These results support the basic premise of my theory of information 
management in Congress, as subcommittees become more active in the management of 
information in the policy environment as the demands subcommittees face increase.  
The following section discusses the implications of the analyses and addresses 
conclusions more broadly.  
Conclusion 
 The limited amount of congressional research examining the role and purpose of 
subcommittees highlights the need for scholarly explanation of variation of 
subcommittee role and influence across committees (Hall and Evans 1990).  This 
chapter examined the question of when subcommittees are more likely to be active in 
the management of information in Congress.  Considering the prominent role 
subcommittees play in the hearing process, addressing this question helps to shed light 
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on the role of subcommittees within the committee system.  Building on empirical 
evidence from Chapter 2, analyses of congressional hearings at the subcommittee level 
add additional support to the arguments behind my theory of information management 
in Congress.   
 Subcommittees seem to play a role for responding to multiple, competing 
demands that simultaneously emanate from the complex policy environment.  
Subcommittees appear to become more active in managing the flow of information 
coming in and out of the policy environment as representational and institutional 
demands facing committees (Chapter 2) and individual subcommittees increase.  From 
this analysis we see that individual committees and subcommittees should not be 
characterized as simply responding to a specific type of representational or institutional 
demands, as is the tradition, but the committee system actually serves as a management 
infrastructure that allows committees to respond to and accommodate the multiple 
demands they face simultaneously.  
 My theory of information management presented in Chapter 1 predicts that 
committees and subcommittees will be more active in the hearing process as 
representational and institutional demands increase.  Increase demands signal increasing 
complexity in the surrounding policy environment, and due to the key role of 
information in contemporary American politics (Baumgartner and Jones 2005; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006), it is paramount for committees and subcommittees to manage the flow 
of information in and out of the Congress as skillfully as possible.  Evidence suggests 
that hearings serve this purpose, while committees and subcommittees fulfill the role of 
91 
 
information managers.  The question that now remains is what impact does information 
management activity have on the legislative process? 
 Theories in public management predict that successful management increases 
the likelihood of goal achievement for organizations (O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2003; 
Meier and O’Toole Jr. 2002).  However, explanations of how committees and 
subcommittees manage this information are scant.  Theories of the policy process 
demonstrate that through attention shifts, evidenced by increases in hearings on a 
particular topic, policy change occurs (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  Yet this reveals 
little about how and why the Congress and its committees utilize the structural 
hierarchies within the institution to achieve legislative and policy success.  In order to 
answer that question of how information management activity within the committee 
system leads to congressional and committee success, one must first do two things.  We 
must define “success” in the policy process for congressional committees and evaluated 
how committees utilize the management resources available to them to work toward this 
success.  Utilizing my theory of information management in Congress, the following 




Table 5.  Summary Statistics – House Subcommittees, 105th-108th Congresses 
(1997-2004) 
 
Dependent Variable   Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Percent Committee Hearings 13.43  7.41  1.37  42.31 
     Held by Subcommittee 
Independent Variables 
Avg. Committee Seniority  3.74  1.24  1  8.29 
Ideological Distance –  
     Subcommittee-Floor Med. 0.12  0.09  0.00  0.45 
PAC Contributions (10,000)        611.90          413.51          127.97         2518.73 
Issue Salience   5.07  2.66  0  11.26 
Party Heterogeneity –   
     Democrats    0.22  0.52  0  0.34 
     Republicans   0.26  0.04  0.10  0.43 
Issue Spread    44.43  29.42  0  100 
Controls 
# Total Hearings, Committee      124.91  64.64  3  301 
105th Congress   0.24  0.43  0  1 
106th Congress   0.25  0.43  0  1 
107th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 
108th Congress   0.25  0.44  0  1 
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Table 6.  Summary Statistics – Senate Subcommittees, 105th-108th Congresses 
(1997-2004) 
 
Dependent Variable   Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Percent Committee Hearings 8.33  6.79  0.76  44.44 
     Held by Subcommittee 
Independent Variables 
Avg. Committee Seniority  8.83  3.57  1  18.37 
Ideological Distance –  
     Subcommittee-Pivot  0.41  0.16  0.01  0.87 
PAC Contributions (10,000)        538.70          294.12          5.68         1562.76 
Issue Salience   5.11  3.34  0  17.72 
Party Heterogeneity –   
     Democrats    0.23  0.52  0  0.38 
     Republicans   0.24  0.05  0.11  0.38 
Issue Spread    47.54  32.91  0  100 
Controls 
# Total Hearings, Committee      78.55  32.92  13  164 
105th Congress   0.24  0.43  0  1 
106th Congress   0.27  0.44  0  1 
107th Congress   0.26  0.44  0  1 
108th Congress   0.24  0.43  0  1 
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Table 7. Analysis of House Subcommittee Hearings, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
    Dependent                % Committee 
   Variable     Hearings Held by Subcommittee 
Independent Variables 
Hierarchy Characteristics 
Avg. Committee Seniority     -0.19 
        (0.34) 
Ideological Distance –       
     Subcommittee – Floor Med.    1.07 
        (5.27) 
Representational Demands 
PAC Contributions      0.0048* 
        (0.0012) 
Issue Salience      0.79* 
        (0.16) 
Institutional Demands 
Party Heterogeneity –     
     Democrats       20.75* 
        (6.94) 
     Republicans      -2.90 
        (9.57) 
Issue Spread       -0.06* 
        (0.02) 
Controls 
Total Hearings, Committee     -0.32* 
        (0.01) 
105th Congress      3.38* 
        (1.08) 
106th Congress      2.82* 
        (1.10) 
107th Congress      0.00 
        (0.96) 
Constant       9.16* 
        (3.00) 
N =        332 
R-Squared =       0.16 
F =        6.78* 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
* = p < 0 .05 
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Table 8. Analysis of Senate Subcommittee Hearings, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
    Dependent                % Committee 
   Variable     Hearings Held by Subcommittee 
Independent Variables 
Hierarchy Characteristics 
Avg. Committee Seniority     -0.06 
        (0.14) 
Ideological Distance –  
     Subcommittee – Floor Med.    -2.71 
        (3.46) 
Representational Demands 
PAC Contributions      0.002 
        (0.002) 
Issue Salience      0.83* 
        (0.19) 
Institutional Demands 
Party Heterogeneity –      
     Democrats       -20.99* 
        (6.84) 
     Republicans      3.67 
        (8.05) 
Issue Spread       -0.54* 
        (0.02) 
Controls 
Total Hearings, Committee     -0.30* 
        (0.02) 
105th Congress      0.12 
        (1.36) 
106th Congress      0.53 
        (1.32) 
107th Congress      -0.84 
        (1.27) 
Constant       13.89* 
        (3.02) 
N =        238 
R-Squared =       0.15 
F =        4.52* 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 





Chapter 4:  Managing Information for Policy Success 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 move beyond traditional analysis of congressional committee 
formation and membership to describe how factors in the policy environment influence 
committee and subcommittee activity in the hearing process.  The empirical findings 
that factors emanating from the complex policy environment seem to structure the 
display, and therefore management, of information in the policy process suggests that 
committees and their subcommittees respond to demands more fluidly than the three 
common explanations of committee behavior - distributive, partisan, and informational 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 
1989, 1990, 1997; Krehbiel 1991; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 
2005; Battista 2009) – suggest.   While the analyses in Chapters 2 and move toward the 
creation of expectations regarding the tangible influence of committees and 
subcommittees on public policy, the chapters only describe the factors within the policy 
environment that appear to drive the management of policy information by committees 
and subcommittees.  Based on my theory of information management in Congress 
presented in Chapter 1, committee and subcommittee responses to the policy 
environment should not only be reactions to multiple demands, but strategic or 
purposeful actions geared toward achieving policy goals. 
Traditional perspectives on congressional committees and subcommittees 
suggest that the committee system works toward policy goals of congressional actors 
that are “superior” to the committee.  Implicitly and explicitly, prominent research on 
congressional committees portrays individual committees as agents of individuals and 
institutions within the legislative process (Mayhew 1974; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 
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2005; Maltzman 1998; Krehbiel 1991).  From an empirical perspective, this creates 
difficulties testing the accuracy of these perspectives.  Often, studies seek to verify the 
explanations for the purpose and development of these institutions with individual 
actions such as voting (Hurwitz, Noiles and Rohde 2001), or scholars are forced to 
make leaps regarding the symbolic nature of institutional actions that may or may not be 
accurate (Krehbiel 1991).  Unfortunately, there is little understanding of how and why 
committees take action to manage the legislative process where committees are 
considered the principal actor, not the agent.  Although committees in Congress exist as 
a piece of an institutional hierarchy where responsibilities in the legislative process are 
delegated, I argue that to understand how committees manage the legislative process for 
the individual chambers we must examine how committees act to achieve committee 
goals in the legislative process.   
I argue that within the legislative process, committees serve as their own 
principals and act to manage the legislative process in ways that achieve committee 
goals.  The design of legislative organization in Congress delegates the power to 
manage specified (or sometimes not so specified) portions of the legislative process to 
committees (Deering and Smith 1997).  Yet, this power is not always well defined and 
produces an environment where committees compete for legislative power (Jones, 
Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; King 1994, 1997; Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 
2000).  Therefore, committees have an interest in not only managing the legislative 
process in ways that achieve institutional goals, but also in ways that sustain, grow, and 
execute power in the policy process.  Successful committees will manage the 
surrounding environment (Ellis 2009) to achieve committee goals.  This paper addresses 
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the research question of how the management of information flow in the policy 
environment influences committee success.  I argue that successful committees utilize 
structural hierarchies and internal networks to manage the competitive information 
environment (Ellis 2009), generating success.   
In the following sections, I begin by laying out an argument establishing the 
premise that committees can be seen not only as agent, but as principal actors in pursuit 
of policy goals.  Next I utilize my theory of information management in Congress 
presented in Chapter 1, with specific application of theories of public management to 
the management of information flow in the policy environment, to generate testable 
hypotheses regarding information management and committee success in the policy 
environment.  In order to empirically examine the primary hypotheses developed, 
analysis of House and Senate committee data concerning legislative jurisdiction and 
legislative success is conducted.  In conclusion, I argue that subcommittees can serve as 
a primary tool of management for committees to navigate the complex and competitive 
policy environment to achieve committee goals in both chambers of the United States 
Congress. 
Committees as Principals  
 The individual chambers of Congress re-assign, re-structure, and create 
legislative committees at the beginning of each Congress.  The individual membership 
of each committee is decided by the individual party caucuses and approved by the floor 
(Deering and Smith 1997).  Initiated to help the Congress efficiently manage the 
dynamic legislative workload through specialization due to limited time and resources 
(Deering and Smith 1997), the committee system is most often studied and discussed as 
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agents of their creators – the members, the floor, and the parties (Shepsle and Weingast 
1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990, 1997; 
Krehbiel 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Maltzman 
1998).  Yet the jurisdictional powers and first mover position given to committees by 
the chambers have value to the committees and their members through the ability to 
influence, inform, and drive the policy process. As the first mover in the legislative 
process, it seems reasonable that committees would develop their own agendas 
regarding what policy issues and/or pieces of legislation deserve committee, and 
therefore congressional, attention and action.  Legislation referred to committees has no 
guarantee of moving any further in the legislative process.  In fact an overwhelming 
majority of introduced legislation see no attention beyond referral (Krutz 2005).  
Because attention can often result in policy actions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005), committees and inherently their membership, should value the 
power that is their policy jurisdiction and legislative powers.  Additionally, committees 
may take an entrepreneurial approach to generating and moving legislation to create or 
change public policy, much like individual members (Wawro 2001).  Thus it would be 
in the interest of committees to act in their own interest to execute and maintain that 
power. 
 Two bodies of research articulate the competitive nature of committees 
regarding the distribution of power over legislative jurisdictions.  One focuses on policy 
change through the creation and destruction of policy subsystems (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993), while the other focuses on informal competitions or “turf wars” (King 
1997) between committees over legislative jurisdiction in areas of overlap that create 
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legislative tension.  Although addressed in different fashions, both of these bodies of 
work are complimentary regarding the role and action of committees in this area of the 
policymaking process.   
Historically, committees have been a primary participant in the creation of 
“issue monopolies,” or “issue networks,” that possess the power to dominate particular, 
issue-centered portions of the policy making process (Heclo 1978; Hansen 1991; 
Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair and Woods 1991; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).   Committees, along with other actors in the policy 
process, band together and ultimately make policy change an “insider’s game” within 
particular issue areas.  When attention to an issue, and conflict regarding the policy 
issue arise, issue monopolies can be broken down if the actors are unable to 
successfully respond to outside challenges and maintain influence (Heclo 1978; Hansen 
1991; Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair and Woods 1991; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  Committees outside of the issue monopoly often 
play a key role in breaking down the dominant subsystem (Jones, Baumgartner and 
Talbert 1993).   
Such action is often the result of a committee seeking to expand its influence 
into the jurisdiction of another committee, increasing its own jurisdictional reach as 
well as defending against the challenges of other committees (King 1994, 1997; 
Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000).  In this instance, a committee is acting to 
extend the reach power in the legislative system.  Typically, the principal seeking 
benefit from this action will be the committee itself, and the member’s of which it is 
composed, not necessarily the floor or a party.  For example, if a member of the House 
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seeks to have influence over issues involving higher education, he or she will likely 
pursue placement on the House Committee on Education and Labor, as it holds primary 
jurisdiction over the issue.13
To survive the competitive legislative environment where this type of behavior 
is common place,
  If the Committee on Financial Services began to take 
action on legislation or hold hearings concerning student lending and aid, it is likely that 
the Committee on Education and Labor will respond by taking action of its own to 
signal to the parliamentarian, members, and the other committees that it is not simply 
going to watch idly by as other legislators pursue action on an issue under its possession 
(King 1995, 1997; Staff Interviews 2009).  In these circumstances, committees are 
agents of their own principal, and subcommittees may also serve as agents of the full 
committee.   
14
Managing for Policy Making Success in Committee 
 committees must manage the environment properly to achieve 
success in the policy process.  If they do not, committees may lose influence over 
certain areas of the policy process, or fail to have committee policy initiatives pass the 
floor of the chamber or become law.    The following section discusses the competitive, 
information-rich, environment congressional committees face and explores the 
implications of public management theory regarding how committees can be successful 
in this environment considering their structure and resources (O’Toole Jr. and Meier 
1999, 2003; Meier and O’Toole Jr. 2002; Ellis 2009). 
                                                 
13 Although self-selection is not necessarily the most prominent factor for committee placement, it is a 
component of the process (Frisch and Kelly 2004).  The example is used for effect. 
14 As a part of committee staff, committees will hire multiple, full time legislative counsels to keep tabs 




 As noted above, committees function in a very competitive policymaking 
environment.  Not only do committees compete for influence over individual policy 
arenas, other internal and external demanders also battle for influence over the 
legislative process and attempt to feed information into and around the system.  
Competing information regarding policy problems, solutions, and definition serve as 
common weapons in the battle for influence within the legislative process.  Hearings 
serve as the primary launching pad for committees to fire their shots (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995; MacLeod 2002; Hardin 2002; Adler 
2002; Sheingate 2006; Worsham 2006).  Via the hearing process, Congress’ 
committees, which can be described as parallel information processing subunits, 
compete for influence over particular policy issue areas (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
King 1994, 1997).   
At times, competition over legislative jurisdictions between committees occurs 
due to, or can result in, single issue areas that overlap the jurisdiction of multiple 
committees which simultaneously creates efficiency problems for the institution (Adler 
and Wilkerson 2008), and power struggles for policy influence as committees find it 
difficult to maintain an issue monopoly under these policy conditions (Heclo 1978; 
Bosso 1987; Baumgartner 1989; Hansen 1991; Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair and Woods 
1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Wood 2006; 
Worsham 2006).  Scholars note that the most valuable resource a committee posses is 
its legislative jurisdiction.  In an information environment presenting numerous 
demands and challenges for committees (Ellis 2009), a committee’s ability to manage 
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this environment will be critical to its success at maintaining or gaining influence over 
policy issues. 
While there seems to be a scholarly consensus that information display via the 
hearing process and other forms of committee action can influence committee 
jurisdictions, essentially zero research exists concerning the influence of congressional 
hearings and information on policy formulation and adoption in Congress.  In fact, most 
studies of bill success examine the influence of member and bill level characteristics, 
but exclude hearing activity, information, as an explanatory variable (Matthews 1960; 
Frantzich 1979; Moore and Thomas 1990; Hibbing 1991; Jeydel and Taylor 2003; 
Anderson et al. 2003; Krutz 2005; Hasecke and Mycoff 2007).  However, if information 
contributes to the shape of problem definition and problem solutions (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), it seems reasonable to expect information to 
also influence a committee’s ability to have policy proposals adopted by the chamber 
and/become law. 
 Research demonstrates that a committee can gain influence and jurisdiction over 
new policy issues, or policy issues previously outside of its reach, through legislative 
(King 1997) and non-legislative activity (Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000).  Yet, 
the question of how committees manage this competitive environment to facilitate 
committee success in the policy environment remains open.  Existing theories of public 
management can inform what resources and actions are available to committees in the 
policy-making environment to achieve success.  O’Toole Jr. and Meier (1999) 
demonstrate that successful management leads to organizational success by “1) creating 
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structure for the organization and thus system stability, 2) buffering the organization 
from environmental influences and 3) exploiting opportunities in the environment.”   
The task facing successful committees seems analogous.  A successful 
committee would shield itself from intrusions by other committees into its legislative 
jurisdiction while exploiting opportunities to gain concentrated influence over new 
policy areas (Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995).  This creates a stable policymaking 
environment for the committee through concentrated influence over particular issues, 
and at the same time proves stability to the chamber at large (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993).  Establishing such stability within the complex policy environment may then 
facilitate greater success for committees’ legislative proposals in the policy process.  
According to theories of public management, the use of structural hierarchies and the 
existence of network stability are two primary management tools available for help in 
generating the ultimate success of organizations in competing environments.  Two 
facets of the committees system provide committee such management tools: 
subcommittees and membership stability.   
In terms of a structural hierarchy allowing for the delegation of responsibilities, 
subcommittees can provide full committees with this potential management resource for 
the delegation of policy work.   Although only minimal scholarly attention to and no 
consensus regarding the role and influence of subcommittees in the policy making 
process exists (Jones 1962; Hall and Evans 1990; Baughman 2006), it is empirical fact 
that subcommittees are very active within the congressional policymaking process.  As 
Figure Three shows, subcommittees host a significant portion of congressional hearings 
in both chambers.  
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Because hearings provide Congress a way to manage the vast demands of the 
complex information environment (Ellis 2009), the prevalence of subcommittee use for 
this purpose demonstrates that subcommittees serve some role, however unclear, in the 
policy process.  Additionally, although overall use of subcommittees throughout the 
Congress appears consistent overtime, excluding the recent dip in the Senate between 
the 102nd and 103rd Congresses (Figure Three), the use of subcommittees across 
committees varies greatly.15  From the 105th to 108th Congresses, the range of hearings 
hosted by subcommittees ranged from 0% to 99% in the House and from 0% to 95% in 
the Senate.16
Hypothesis 1:  Committees working with more highly competitive and 
disorganized policy jurisdictions will utilize subcommittees more frequently than other 
committees. 
  Based on the expectation derived from public management theory and the 
empirical evidence regarding subcommittee use presented in Chapter 3, I expect that a 
committee operating in more complex legislative environment will utilize their 
subcommittees more frequently in order to establish influence over and stability within 
the flow of information surrounding policy areas of interest.  This yields the first 
primary hypotheses of this chapter: 
In addition to helping committees manage information flow within more 
complex policy jurisdictions, the use of structural hierarchies should also facilitate 
policy success.  Subcommittees provide an extended infrastructure to allow committees 
                                                 
15 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the 
support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the 
Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the University of Washington and/or the Department of 
Political Science at Penn State University.  Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any 




to manage the flow of information in the policy environment in pursuit of committee 
interests in the policy process.  If this is the case, committees that utilize their 
subcommittees more frequently should ultimately find greater levels of success in 
managing the policy environment than other committees.  Therefore, committees that 
utilize their subcommittees to greater degree should find greater levels of legislative 
success relative to other committees.  This expectation is the basis of a second primary 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  Increasing levels of subcommittee hearing activity within a 
committee will be significantly related to higher levels of committee policy success in 
the legislative process. 
While I expect subcommittees to serve as a primary tool for committees to 
manage increasingly complex policy environments, the complexity of the policy 
environment should inherently create difficulties in the legislative arena.  As described 
in theories of public management, the environmental factors can create barriers to 
success which institutions must manage effectively in order to succeed (O’Toole Jr. and 
Meier 1999).  An increasingly complex policy environment may increase the difficulty 
of success in the legislative arena for congressional committees.  If this is the case, 
committees with an agenda involving policy issues tied up in more complex, 
competitive, or disorganized jurisdictional dynamics may encounter failure in the policy 
process more regularly than committees operating in policy environments that resemble 
issue monopolies.  This notion produces a third primary hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3:  Committees dealing with more competitive, complex, and 
disorganized policy jurisdictions will be significantly less successful in the policy 
environment relative to other committees. 
Membership stability is another resource that is common for committees, but 
varies across committees.  In public management terms, network or personnel stability 
is an important factor in achieving and maintaining organization success (O’Toole and 
Meier 2002).  In the committee system, membership is commonly stable as members 
seek to solidify careers within policy domains of interest to themselves or constituents 
(Copeland 1987).  When committee membership is consistent and members accrue 
seniority together it seems stability could develop within the network of members and 
staff as they grow accustomed to working together in the policy process overtime.  
Based on the expectation derived from public management theory, I expect that 
committees with higher levels of “network stability” will experience greater levels of 
success in the policy environment.  This yields a fourth primary hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  Committees composed of more stable membership will be more 
successful in the policy environment than others. 
In order to empirically test the expectations presented above, the following 
sections present statistical analyses of committee success in both the House and Senate. 
Data and Methods 
 In order to empirically examine the question of how committees manage the 
policy environment to generate committee success, I test the above theory and 
hypotheses utilizing data regarding committee activity and success from the 105th 
through the 108th Congresses.  Identical analyses in terms of variable measurement and 
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inclusion are conducted for the House of Representatives and the Senate separately.  
The dataset was compiled utilizing a variety of primary and secondary sources to create 
committee level measurements for the theoretically relevant phenomena.  Due to the 
continuous nature of the Dependent Variables discussed below, OLS regression is the 
statistical method of choice for the analyses.  The following section presents the 
variable measurement and inclusion. 
Dependent Variable:  Measuring Committee Success 
 In this analysis, I conduct statistical analysis of factors influence three different 
possible conceptions of committee success: jurisdictional entropy, legislative success in 
chamber, and policy success in government.  The following sections describe 
summarize the measurement of each individual dependent variable. 
Committee Jurisdictional Entropy 
 I base the chosen measurement of committee success on the rational assumption 
that government actors seek to control the policy making process (Downs 1957) and 
hold concentrated power over decision making (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  I argue that greater levels of concentration of policy 
issues within a committee’s legislative jurisdiction best represents committee success in 
managing its jurisdiction.  The concept of legislative jurisdiction concentration is 
measured as the Entropy of policy subtopics within a committee’s legislative 
jurisdiction (Sheingate 2006; Adler and Wilkerson 2008).  Entropy is an increasingly 
common measure utilized to capture committee jurisdiction in congressional 
scholarship (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; Sheingate 2006; Adler and 
Wilkerson 2008).  Entropy statistically captures the two primary concepts expressed 
within the jurisdiction of a committee: the level of concentration over individual policy 
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issues possessed by a committee, and the complexity of control over issues in terms of 
diversity among issues and the number of committees (Sheingate 2006).  Increases in 
committee Entropy therefore represent a greater level of uncertainty in terms of which 
committees have control over which policy issues. 
 Mathematically, Entropy is defined as the probability that a legislative hearing 
on a particular policy subtopic17 is held by a given committee, divided by the natural 
log of one divided by the same probability, summed across subtopics for each 
individual committee and multiplied by 100.18
(Insert Table 9 About Here) 
  Higher values represent greater 
disorganization of complexity within a committee’s legislative jurisdiction, while lower 
values represent greater organization within the committee’s legislative jurisdiction 
which I argue to represent power and success in terms of policy jurisdiction.  From the 
105th through the 108th Congress, committee entropy ranged from 0 to 1040.36 in the 
House, and from 0 to 359.65 in the Senate (See Tables 9 and 10).   
(Insert Table 10 About Here) 
Committee Policy Success in Chamber19
 In order to measure the policy success of a given congressional committee 
within its chamber, I calculate the percentage of a committee’s legislative agenda that is 
passed by a floor vote within the chamber.  I define the legislative agenda of a 
committee as any bill reported to the floor by a committee because such bills have 
received the approval of at least a majority vote of a committee’s membership to 
 
                                                 
17 Issue subtopics are defined and provided within the Policy Agendas Project data utilized for this 
analysis. 
18 100 ∗ ∑ Pr(𝑥𝑥) ∗ ln⁡( 1
Pr (𝑥𝑥)
)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖=1  
19 Data for this measure was collected via the Library of Congress and is publicly available at 
www.thomas.gov.   
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proceed within the legislative process.  This measure is calculated by dividing the 
number of bills reported by each individual committee that are passed by the floor of 
the chamber divided by the total number of bills reported by the given committee, 
multiplied by 100.  The percentage of reported bills passed ranges from 37.5 to 100 
percent in the House and from 0 to 100% in the Senate from the 105th-108th Congresses.   
Committee Lawmaking Success20
 In order to capture committee policy success in lawmaking I calculate the 
percentage of bills reported by a committee that ultimately are signed into law.  
Similarly to the measurement of committee policy success within chamber, policy 
success in lawmaking is measured as the percentage of reported bills that ultimately 
become law.  This measure is calculated by dividing the total number of bills signed 
into law that were reported by a given committee by the total number of bills reported 
by that committee and passed on the floor of the chamber.  From the 105th through the 
108th Congress, committee policy success in government ranged from 0 to 90 percent in 
the House and from 0 to 100 percent in the Senate (See Tables 9 and 10). 
 
 The following section describes and summarizes that independent variables 
included in the analyses of the dependent variables. 
Independent Variables:  Primary Tests and Controls 
 In order to test the four primary expectations presented by Hypotheses 1 through 
4, three separate analyses were conducted. I create and utilize variables to capture the 
notions of structural hierarchy usage and network stability for all three analyses, and 
utilize the dependent variable of jurisdictional entropy as an independent variable in 
two of the three analyses.  Other independent variables are included in this analysis to 




provide control for theoretically relevant phenomena and findings presented in existing 
research.  Below I describe the measurement and expectations for all independent 
variables.  Statistical description is available in Tables 9 and 10. 
As stated in Hypothesis 1, I expect that committees dealing with more 
disorganized policy jurisdictions will utilize structural hierarchies, subcommittees, more 
frequently relative to other committees.  Hypothesis 2 moves on to predict that the same 
use of structural hierarchies will lead to higher levels of committee policy success.  To 
test these expectations, I operationalize the concept structural hierarchy use by 
calculating the percentage of committee hearings hosted by subcommittees for each full 
committee. For example if the Armed Services Committee held 10 hearings, and nine of 
them were hosted by subcommittees of the Armed Services Committee, then the value 
for this variable for the Armed Services committee observation would equal 90 percent.  
Again, this measure provides a direct test of the first of two primary hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1 is tested in the analysis of jurisdictional entropy and Hypothesis 2 is 
tested in the analysis of policy success within chamber and policy success in lawmaking.   
Hypothesis 3 presents an expectation regarding the influence of jurisdictional 
entropy, the dependent variable of the first analysis, on committee policy success.  
Specifically, Hypothesis 3 predicts that more disorganized committee jurisdictions will 
relate negatively to the policy success of a given committee relative to other 
committees.  This hypothesis is tested in the analysis of policy success within chamber 
and policy success in lawmaking by simply including the measure utilized as the 
dependent variable capturing jurisdictional entropy as an independent variable in these 
analyses.   
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The fourth primary hypothesis stated that committees with greater levels of 
network stability should experience greater levels of success in the policy environment.  
To empirically capture the management resource of network stability, I calculate the 
average committee seniority for each full committee’s membership.  Based on existing 
studies demonstrating the stability of committee assignments over time (Copeland 
1987) and the importance of internal networking to legislative activity (Williams 2009), 
measuring this as the average seniority on a given committee of its membership is 
appropriate.  This variable provides a direct test of the second primary expectation 
derived from applying new public management concepts to committee success in 
Congress.  The following variables are included to capture other theoretically relevant 
influences on committee success.   
Based on existing knowledge of subsystem and issue monopoly breakdown and 
jurisdictional turf wars, a statistical model of committee success must account for 
certain factors within the policy environment surrounding committees.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that one factor leading to the breakdown of issue monopolies and 
policy subsystems is non-legislative intrusions into a committee’s legislative 
jurisdiction by other committees (Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Talbert, Jones 
and Baumgartner 1995; King 1997; Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000).  Such 
environmental attacks are measured as the percentage of non-legislative hearings held 
by other committees on issues within a committee’s legislative jurisdiction. 
Additionally, existing research demonstrates that as issues become more salient 
in the policy environment and in public discussion, the likelihood of other committees 
intruding on issues under another’s jurisdiction increases (Baumgartner and Jones 
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1993).  Jurisdiction salience is calculated as the average proportion of articles published 
in the New York Times regarding the policy issues under a committee’s legislative 
jurisdiction during the Congress of the observation.  I expect that both environmental 
attacks and jurisdiction salience relate to decreases in committee success.  Other 
variables may also impact committee success in the policy environment.  
Both committee workload and interest group influence may impact a 
committee’s decision to pursue specific issue areas.  Because the referral of bills to a 
committee is one of the primary ways the parliamentarian establishes precedent for 
legislative jurisdiction (King 1997), the number of bills referred to a committee may 
influence its ability to generate success.  Similarly, the demands and influence of 
private interests may also effect the decisions and success of a committee (Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Hardin 1998).  This is measured as the amount of PAC contributions 
received by the two separate major party coalitions within each committee (in 
$10,000s).  Based on existing literature, it seems that increases or decreases in both 
factors could produce greater concentration or spread of legislative jurisdiction, as seen 
in the empirical analyses presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  Ideological factors may also 
play a role in committee success. 
Committees that are more ideologically similar to the floor, or cohesive within 
their membership, may see greater levels of success than other committees.  For 
example, informational explanations of committee structure suggest that the ideological 
distance between a committee and the floor will increase the likelihood that the 
institution at large considers the committee’s work to represent trustworthy expertise 




The following section presents and discusses each of the three House and Senate 
analyses. 
 scores of the committee chairman and the floor median in the House 
and the distance between the committee chairman and the floor pivot in the Senate.  The 
ideological cohesion of party contingents within a committee’s membership may also 
have similar effects.  Party Homogeneity within committees may increase the likelihood 
of success by increasing trust and stability based on similar motivations (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988).  This variable is calculated as the standard deviation of DW-Nominate 
scores within each party’s contingent on each committee. 
Analysis and Discussion 
 In this section, the analyses of committee jurisdictional entropy, committee 
policy success in chamber, and committee policy success in lawmaking for both the 
House and Senate are presented.  The analysis and discussion is presented in three 
separate sections which include comparison of House and Senate analysis results for 
each dependent variable. 
House and Senate Committee Jurisdictional Entropy  
 In the analysis of committee jurisdictional entropy, as seen in Table 11, 
hypotheses one and four are tested in terms of factors influencing the complexity and 
organization of committee policy jurisdictions.  The House analysis, in which the OLS 
model performs particularly well (see Table 11) provides support for Hypothesis 1, but 
presents findings that are surprisingly contrary to Hypothesis 4.  Additionally, the 
significant relationships of many control variables provide substantive implications for 
                                                 
21 Data acquired from www.voteview.com . 
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my theory of information management in Congress presented in Chapter 1.  The Senate 
analysis however yields effectively limited substantive findings although the OLS 
model as a whole performs well (see Table 11). 
(Insert Table 11 About Here) 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, evidence from the House analysis suggests that 
increasing use of the structural hierarchy provided to committees by subcommittees is 
significantly related to committees being burdened with legislative jurisdictions that are 
more competitive, complex, and disorganized.  It seems to support the idea developed 
form my theory of information management in Congress that suggests subcommittees 
provide individual committees with an important tool for managing information in the 
complex policy environment.  The control variables for this analysis also support the 
expectations for information management activity developed within my theory 
presented in Chapter 1.   
 Also in the House, there is evidence for the expected increases in environmental 
attacks by other committees within a committee’s jurisdiction, increases in jurisdiction 
salience of individual committees, and increases in a committee’s legislative workload 
significantly relating to higher levels of disorganization with an individual committee’s 
legislative jurisdiction.  Congruent with the theoretical expectations developed in 
Chapter 1 and empirical findings presented in both Chapters 2 and 3, such 
environmental factors increase the competitiveness and complexity of the policy 
environment.  Such increases in competition and complexity appear related to the use of 
information management tools by congressional committees in order to pursue success 
in such a dynamic environment.  
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 Regarding interest group influence on committee jurisdiction, evidence suggests 
that for committees with higher levels of PAC contributions to the majority party in the 
House (the Republican Party for the time period analyzed).  Cox and McCubbins (2005) 
suggest that the House committee system and the rules of the House provide the 
majority party with the opportunity to stack the policy process in its favor.  The 
decrease in disorganization of committee legislative jurisdiction for committees with 
heavy PAC investment in the majority shows support for this party dominant theory.  In 
order to increase the party’s ability to stabilize the policy process and succeed within 
given issue areas the majority party (which ultimately controls the referral process and 
therefore potentially jurisdictional issues) may simplify the policy environment 
surrounding given issues.  Considering the time period, this concept may also provide a 
reasonable explanation for the surprisingly negative and significant relationship 
between network stability and jurisdictional entropy that turned Hypothesis 4 upside 
down in the House analysis. 
 During the time period analyzed, lower levels of committee seniority for 
committee members significantly relate to increases to greater disorganization, or 
jurisdictional entropy relative to other committees (see Table 11).  Due to the 
Republican takeover of Congress that occurred during the 104th Congress, alterations 
were made in the norms of behavior of, and membership of the House committee 
system to favor the new majority party and its leadership (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 
Baughman 2006). Thus, if committee memberships were altered at the insistence of 
party leaders in order to pursue party goals more effectively, committees with lower 
levels of seniority (more new members, new chairs, etc.) may be granted a greater 
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concentration of authority over policy issues of interest to the majority party, resulting 
in lower levels of jurisdictional entropy.  Overall, analysis of committee jurisdictional 
entropy in the House appears to provide strong support for my theory of information 
management in Congress, including the important role of subcommittees in this process.  
Unfortunately, analysis of Senate committees yielded minimal substantive findings. 
 With the exception of legislative workload, no variable included in the Senate 
analysis was even significantly related to the jurisdictional entropy of Senate 
committees.  Interestingly, the significant and negative relationship between workload 
and jurisdictional disorganization repeats an interesting difference between House and 
Senate analyses that also emerged in Chapters 2 and 3.  Increasing legislative workloads 
in the Senate appear to bring decreases in complexity and increases in the organization 
and stability of the policy environment, while increasing legislative workloads in the 
House increase complexity within the policy environment.  As discussed in earlier 
chapters, interviews with committee staff in the Senate (as well as with House staff with 
Senate experience) suggest that this may be a factor of economies of scale.  Due to 
smaller memberships within committees and for the chamber overall, the Senate may be 
prone to increasing its efficiency when workload is high, because higher workloads may 
signify genuine needs for Senatorial action (Staff Interviews 2009).  Because the nature 
of Senate terms is different than the “constant campaigns” of House members, increases 
in workload may not simply be strategic representational maneuvers for senators as 
some argue they are for representatives in the House.  For this reason, an increased 
workload may come with increasing credibility from a policy perspective in the Senate, 
118 
 
relative to the House.  Further research should explore this consistent and interesting 
dichotomy.   
 If only in the House, analysis of committee legislative jurisdictions appears to 
support the role of information management in the policy process, particularly the role 
of subcommittees as a tool to manage the complex policy environment.  The following 
section presents and discusses the findings for the analysis of committee bill passage 
within the House and Senate. 
House and Senate Committee Policy Success in Chamber 
 In both the House and Senate analysis of committee policy success in chamber 
seen in Table 12, the OLS models perform well.  Both models also yield substantive 
support for the theoretical expectations of the theory of information management when 
applied to the passage of reported bills on the floor of both chambers.  These models 
directly test the second, third, and fourth hypotheses; yielding affirmative support for 
each (Hypothesis 4 in the House, and Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the Senate).   
(Insert Table 12 About Here) 
 The House analysis (see Table 12) reveals statistically significant relationships 
between network stability and workload on committee bill passage on the House floor.  
The positive relationship for network stability demonstrates that committees whose 
membership possesses more experience working on the given committee are more 
successful gaining passage for reported legislation on the floor of the chamber.  This 
provides empirical evidence that may confirm the expectation derived from public 
management theory that more stable institutions will be more successful (O’Toole Jr. 
and Meier 1999).  Krehbiel’s (1991) informational theory of committee organization 
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may also speak in support of this relationship, as Krehbiel argues that congressional 
chambers will be more likely to trust legislation created by expert members.  One clear 
way to demonstrate expertise or intimacy with a policy issue is by working on the topic 
for an extended time.  Thus, membership stability may in fact be a significant 
management tool for committees within the policy environment.  Other variables 
included to examine primary hypotheses provided null findings within the House data, 
however one control variable produced a significant relationship. 
 The legislative workload of House committees is negatively related to the 
percentage of committee bills that achieve passage on the House floor.  This finding 
may not have substantive implications regarding the policy process in the House beyond 
issues of capacity and economies of scale.  For example, a committee that may be more 
productive than average simply with a large agenda and due to the limits of time and the 
majority’s legislative agenda the committees may have difficulty gaining floor attention 
for a large percentage of its reported bills. The Senate analysis also provides substantive 
findings implicating support for the theory of information management. 
 In the Senate, empirical evidence supports the expectation that hierarchy use  
and  jurisdictional entropy should impact a committee’s ability to pass legislation on the 
floor.  As expected, Senate committees which utilize subcommittees at greater rates 
than other committees also find greater success getting reported legislation passed.  The 
positive relationship between hierarchy use and committee bill passage suggests that 
subcommittees indeed provide an important management tool for committees 
navigating the policy process.  Even though increasing jurisdictional entropy limits the 
ability for committees to gain passage for reported legislation due to increasing the 
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complexity of a committee’s policy environment, managing information flow seems to 
allow committees to navigate potential difficulties.  Much like front runners in 
campaigns seeking to flood the information environment with consistent messages to 
achieve success (Haynes, Flowers and Gurian 2002; Flowers, Haynes and Crespin 
2003), committees can utilize subcommittee hearings to do the same in the policy 
environment.  These findings seem to support the expectations of my theory of 
information management in Congress presented in Chapter 1.  Similar to previous 
Senate analyses, there is also an unexpected finding within the control variables of the 
analysis. 
 As seen in Table 12, committees dealing with policy issues of a higher national 
salience are more likely to have reported legislation passed in the Senate relative to 
other committees.  Although increasing salience may generate a more complex political 
environment for a policy issue, Senate committees appear to get policy goals 
accomplished at a higher rate under such circumstances.  Because the Senate is limited 
in its time by fewer members needing to address similar numbers of issues, the national 
salience of a political issue may increase the likelihood that the Senate chamber feels 
obligated to address the problem.  Time and resources are more limited in the Senate 
than the House simply by definition.  Thus increasing urgency and attention to policy 
issues may create institutions focus in the Senate.  Although this explanation seems 
reasonable, this may be another difference between the House and Senate policymaking 
environments that is worthy of further consideration in drawing conclusions about my 
theory of information management in Congress. 
121 
 
 The following section presents and discusses the analysis of committee success 
at having reported legislation not only passed in chamber, but ultimately becomes law. 
House and Senate Committee Lawmaking Success  
 In tandem, analysis of both House and Senate committee lawmaking provide 
strong support for my theory of information management in Congress, especially 
regarding the role of subcommittees as predicted in Hypothesis 2.  As seen in Table 13, 
both the House and Senate models perform strongly while presenting slightly different 
substantive findings.   
(Insert Table 13 About Here) 
 In both chambers, committees that utilize the structural hierarchy of 
subcommittees more frequently, seem to be more successful in ushering committee 
proposals through the legislative process and ultimately creating law (see Table 13).  As 
discussed above, it seems that subcommittees provide committees with a delegated 
structure to host hearings and have influence and control over the flow of information in 
the policy debate in order to gain advantages in the policy environment.  I argue that 
this concept is similar to that imposed by successful political campaigns seeking to 
manipulate the political messaging through the repeated and consistent release of 
strategically selected information and positions (Haynes, Flowers and Gurian 2002; 
Flowers, Haynes and Crespin 2003).  Further findings have implications for differences 
in the role of party between the House and Senate.   
 Similar to the findings in the House regarding jurisdictional entropy, network 
stability of Senate committees is negatively related to the rate at which committee 
policy proposals are made law.  As discussed earlier, the time period examined in this 
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analysis directly follows the Republican takeover of Congress during the 104th 
Congress.  Although the effect of this institutional change on the Senate has not been 
explored in as much depth as the House (Baughman 2006; Monroe, Roberts and Smith 
2008), it seems reasonable that committee positions of interest to party leadership were 
altered in order to achieve policy goals.  In both models however, there appears to be 
support for the idea that more moderate committees from an ideological standpoint may 
be more successful in the lawmaking process. 
 As seen in Table 13, House committees whose chairman are more ideologically 
similar to the House median voter are ultimately successful at a higher rate in the 
lawmaking process than committees with more ideologically distinct chairman.  In 
Senate, committees with more diverse Republican coalitions (the majority party of the 
chamber for more than three-quarters of the time period analyzed) convert committee 
proposals to law at a higher rate than more ideologically homogenous committees, 
which within the Republican party should mean more ideologically extreme Republican 
committee coalitions (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Wiseman and Wright 2007).  These 
finding may imply that political moderation is a more successful strategy for lawmaking 
than fighting policy battles at the extremes of political ideology. 
 Two other control variables also demonstrated a significant influence on 
committee lawmaking.  In the House, as seen in earlier analyses as well, committees 
dealing with issues of a higher national salience are less likely to be successful in the 
lawmaking process.  And in the Senate, committees who face higher levels of intrusion 
by other committees into their policy issues of jurisdiction see committee proposals 
become law at lower rates.  Considering higher levels of issue salience and 
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environmental attacks both characteristic of increasingly complex policy environments 
it seems to be expected that such factors would limit committee success.   
 Overall, statistical analysis of House and Senate committee policy success 
appears to confirm the expectations derived from my theory of information 
management in Congress presented in Chapter 1.  Via the hearing process, 
subcommittees are utilized by the committee system to manage the policy environment 
and produce success for the committee’s policy agenda.  The following section attempts 
to draw more succinct conclusions by reaching across all three analyses and the initial 
theoretic expectations to draw conclusions regarding how committees manage the 
policy environment to generate success. 
Conclusion 
  While there is no dearth of literature discussing the committee system, this body 
of work often ignores how exactly committees accomplish their goals and tasks of 
policy making.  Rather, scholars have chosen to focus on the motivations for committee 
formation and the individual actions of members within committees.   Attempting to 
add depth to the substantive understanding of committees, subcommittees and policy 
making, this chapter addresses the question of how committees manage the 
complexities of the policy environment to achieve policy success.  Similarly to the 
substantive implications of Chapters 2 and 3, the empirical tests of my theory of 
information management in Congress appear to provide support for propositions made 
regarding how committees manage for success within the vast and complex 
congressional policymaking environment.   
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 In a political atmosphere where individual members, parties, committees and 
subcommittees, as well as actors and influences exogenous to the Congress jockey for 
power and control within the policy process, committees must utilize the managerial 
tools at their disposal in order to successfully execute their policy agenda.  Seemingly 
assumed away due to the accepted view of committees as the de facto workhorse of the 
legislative system, the particular actions and institutional behavior that separates 
successful committees from unsuccessful committees is seldom explored.  Via the 
analysis of House and Senate committees across the four Congress between 1996 and 
2004, evidence suggests that subcommittees serve as a managerial tool for committees 
seeking to successfully maneuver the complexities of the vast national policymaking 
environment. 
 In today’s age of information and around-the-clock news media, it seems more 
important than ever that political actors seeking to achieve policy goals must be able to 
lead and structure the flow of information in the policy debate to generate success.  
Theories of public management suggest that organizations pursuing success in complex 
and competitive environments must effectively utilize structural hierarchies and 
facilitate network stability in order to attain goals.  Empirical analysis of the 
policymaking process in the United States Congress suggests that committees must do 
the same.  
 The design of the committee system provides committees with the capability to 
develop effective hierarchies to manage the policy environment and maintain or create 
stable networks through traditional organization and the power of parties.  As revealed 
in the analysis of committee success presented in this chapter, it appears that the ability 
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for committees to manage the policy environment via these two key factors is a 
prominent predictor of a committee’s ability to generate policy success.  Be it the 
pursuit of jurisdictional powers or legislative success, committees that utilize the 
availability of subcommittee hearings to manage the flow of policy information, and 
committees that can produce a stable policy network, are successful at the highest rates. 
 While scholars have often taken the position that different “types” of 
committees will function differently, or that some subcommittees may play a greater 
role in the policy process than other, this often falls short of acknowledging a 
systematic way that successful committees do business.  However, it appears that when 
committees utilize subcommittees more often, they are able to succeed in the policy 
environment.  Due to the delegation of expertise that is inherent in the design of 
legislative organization, this should not be surprising. 
 Committee reports, which accompany legislation to the floor, present a record of 
evidence regarding the policy problem being addressed and the solution being 
advanced.  Such records document previous attempts to address the policy problem, 
move on a give solution, hold hearings to investigate the problem or related legislation, 
markups of such legislation, and statements of recommended action.  Subcommittees 
provide committees with the infrastructure to build this sort of informational record 
more quickly and effectively.  The data presented in this chapter may suggest that such 
use of subcommittees is the exact type of managerial activity that can increase policy 
success for congressional committees. 
 Additionally, when committees are able to develop stable networks of 
policymakers, whether through contiguous service together or specific organization 
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facilitated by partisan influence, developing a consistent record of evidence becomes 
less challenging. As suggested by theories of public management, stable internal 
networks allow organizations to effectively achieve goals due to advantages of trust and 
continuity.  It appears that when committees manage the policy environment in similar 
fashions, success becomes more frequent. 
 The national policymaking environment presents a variety of challenges for 
policy makers to overcome in order to advance legislation and generate policy change.  
When committees are able to manage the policy process in a way that allows them to 
structure the flow of information in the policy debate to build a record favorable to 
committee goals, success in the policy arena can be achieved more effectively.  
Generally, the findings presented in this chapter appear to support the propositions 




Table 9.  Summary Statistics – House Committees, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
Dependent Variables   Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Jurisdictional Entropy   175.35  184.27  0                  1040.36 
% of Reported Bills Passed  74.11  12.83  37.50  100 
% of Passed Bills Made Law 41.23  21.15  0  90 
Independent Variables 
Hierarchy Use   63.71  29.37  0  99.05 
Network Stability   3.55  0.96  1  5.76 
Controls 
Environmental Attacks  84.58  16.94  26.32  100 
Issue Salience   5.66  4.78  1.27  23.19 
Workload    412.88  322.54  11  1000 
PAC Investment ($ in 10,000s)  
 Democrats   756.92  347.95  70.22           1570.23
  
 Republicans   975.05  464.45  250.22         2555.94 
Ideological Distance 
 Chair-Floor   0.25  0.15  0.01  0.71 
Party Homogeneity 
 Democrats   0.15  0.03  0.02  0.21 
 Republicans   0.15  0.04  0.09  0.26 
N = 75  
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Table 10.  Summary Statistics – Senate Committees, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-
2004) 
 
Dependent Variables   Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Jurisdictional Entropy  67.88  97.49  0         359.65 
% of Reported Bills Passed  48.37  25.94  0  100 
% of Passed Bills Made Law 36.45  27.18  0  100 
Independent Variables 
Hierarchy Use   28.28  26.69  0  94.60 
Network Stability   8.54  2.24  3.35  14.72 
Controls 
Environmental Attacks  86.21  17.29  6.25  100 
Issue Salience   5.49  4.63  0  21.88 
Workload    206.96  226.27  1  1000 
PAC Investment ($ in 10,000s) 
 Democrats   398.41  225.18  38.73           990.09 
 Republicans   543.91  249.49  129.24         1285.05 
Ideological Distance 
 Chair-Pivot   0.61  0.20  0.07  1.13 
Party Homogeneity 
 Democrats   0.23  0.03  0.16  0.30 
 Republicans   0.24  0.03  0.17  0.29 
N = 74 
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Table 11. Analysis of Committee Jurisdictional Entropy, 105th-108th Congresses 
(1997-2004) 
 
Independent Variables    House    Senate 
Hierarchy Use    2.67*    0.28 
                 (0.76)    (0.53)   
Network Stability    -45.62*   3.95 
      (18.63)    (5.47) 
Controls 
Environmental Attacks   2.02*    -0.75 
      (0.66)    (0.81) 
Issue Salience    6.38*    1.72 
      (3.79)    (2.28) 
Workload     0.32*    -0.16* 
      (0.10)    (0.04) 
PAC Investment 
 Democrats    0.02    0.09 
      (0.08)    (0.06) 
 Republicans    -0.12*    0.06 
      (0.06)    (0.05) 
Ideological Dist.     
 Chair-Floor    47.12 
      (110.81) 
 Chair-Pivot        -29.52 
          (45.56) 
Party Homogeneity  
 Democrats    333.08    -487.35
      (481.44)   (314.00) 
 Republicans    -334.93   185.29 
      (629.08)   (427.40) 
 
Constant     -82.20    131.05 
      (140.47)   (116.30) 
N =      75    74 
R-Squared =     0.50    0.24 
F =      6.63*    3.38* 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
* = p < 0 .05 
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Table 12. Analysis of Committee Bill Passage, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-2004) 
 
Independent Variables         House    Senate 
Jurisdictional Entropy   0.01    -0.29* 
      (0.01)    (0.03) 
Hierarchy Use    0.07    0.44* 
      (0.09)    (0.12) 
Network Stability    3.32*    0.35 
      (0.96)    (1.40) 
Controls 
Environmental Attacks   -0.07    -0.17 
      (0.11)    (0.11) 
Issue Salience    -0.04    1.92* 
      (0.27)    (0.69) 
Workload     -0.22*    -0.00 
      (0.01)     (0.01) 
PAC Investment 
 Democrats    -0.01    -0.02 
      (0.01)          (0.01) 
Republicans    0.00    -0.02 
      (0.01)    (0.01) 
Ideological Dist.     
 Chair-Floor    3.49    
      (9.70) 
 Chair-Pivot        -6.19 
          (11.89) 
Party Homogeneity  
 Democrats    -4.05    32.69 
      (66.84)    (79.06) 
 Republicans    -36.32    129.71 
      (629.08)   (101.24) 
 
Constant     84.65*    19.44 
      (17.93)    (36.38) 
N =      75    74 
R-Squared =     0.23    0.37 
F =      3.07*    4.06* 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
* = p < 0 .05 
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Table 13. Analysis of Committee Lawmaking, 105th-108th Congresses (1997-2004) 
 
Independent Variables                     House    Senate 
Jurisdictional Entropy   0.00    -0.05 
(0.01)       (0.03) 
Hierarchy Use    0.27*    0.41* 
      (0.14)    (0.11) 
Network Stability    1.86    -3.57* 
      (3.68)    (1.08) 
Controls 
Environmental Attacks   -0.05    -0.37* 
      (0.14)    (0.16) 
Issue Salience    -1.58*    -0.16 
      (0.52)    (0.65) 
Workload     -0.01    0.01 
      (0.01)                              (0.01) 
PAC Investment     
 Democrats    0.00    -0.01 
      (0.01)                (0.01) 
 Republicans    -0.01    -0.01 
      (0.01)           (0.01) 
Ideological Dist.     
 Chair-Floor    -23.17*    
      (12.87)     
 Chair-Pivot        -17.99 
          (14.20) 
Party Homogeneity  
 Democrats    97.90    -91.30 
      (110.43)   (69.59) 
 Republicans    154.34*   -303.90* 
      (79.73)    (98.13) 
 
Constant     7.46    200.73* 
      (22.74)    (25.96) 
N =      75    74 
R-Squared =     0.28    0.41 
F =      2.29*    13.43* 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
* = p < 0 .05 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation I examine the institutional role of committees and 
subcommittees in managing the flow of information in the congressional policy process.  
By presenting a theory of information management in Congress, I argue that 
committees serve to simultaneously manage the competing demands generated by the 
complex policymaking environment.  Committees can maintain structure in the policy 
environment by controlling the flow of information in the policy debate, primarily 
through hearings.  Subcommittees can provide committees with the structural hierarchy 
necessary to manage the flow of information in a complex and competitive 
environment.  Through the hearing process and delegation to subcommittees, it appears 
that committees can structure the flow of information in order to increase policy 
success.  Hearings provide committees with a highly visible and credible forum to filter, 
address or not address, and reveal or not reveal information within the policy debate.  In 
a resource and time constrained environment like Congress (and organizations more 
broadly), subcommittees provide increased resources within a structured hierarchy to 
manage the challenges of the policy environment in pursuit of policy success.  
Examinations of the contemporary Congress have a habit of suggesting that the 
role and influence of committees and subcommittees in the post-reform era, especially 
in the House since the Republican takeover in 1994, has diminished greatly (Rohde 
1991; Evans and Oleszek 1997; Sinclair 1997; Baughman 2006).  This body of work 
suggests that party leaders manipulate the policy process behind the scenes.  Tweaking 
legislation off of the floor in order to make it more passable and making closed door 
promises while logrolling for votes.  Though no one can deny this occurs, to argue that 
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it has diminished the role of the committee system is quite an overstatement.  Analyses 
presented in this dissertation demonstrate that committees and subcommittees assist in 
managing the competing demands facing the institution and can facilitate a more 
manageable policy environment.  Interviews with leadership staff confirmed the 
expectation of a different Congress, but a Congress that still leans heavily on 
committees.  As one high ranking staff member within the House leadership put it, in 
reference to the textbook Congress, “it was gone after the Republican takeover” (Staff 
Interviews 2009).  Yet this member of leadership staff also noted the power and 
importance of committees that remains, stating that although there has been a “dramatic 
shift of control over ultimate decisions” during this heavily partisan era, the 
“manag[ement] of the process is still left to committees” (Staff Interviews 2009).  
Heavy lifting is still expected of committees, “large agenda items, the president’s 
agenda, [and] major reauthorizations are still under [the control of] 
committees…Chairman coordinate with leadership, but are still expected to do the 
policy[making]…leadership’s concern is bill production” and the committee “chairmen 
know what is expected of them” (Staff Interviews 2009).  This interview seemed to 
confirm my assessment that although the parties are more powerful, and reward success 
and punish failure heavily, the committees system is still required to do that heavy 
lifting that is navigating the policy environment to move legislation through the 
chamber.  The question that remained was not one of whether or not committees still 
mattered.  But instead, recognizing that committees are still very important to the policy 
process, I sought to ask how committees influence the policy making process.  I argue 
that committees manage the policy process by managing the flow of information in the 
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policy debate in response to a vast policy environment vast with competing demands 
and perspectives. 
 In order to address how and why committees and subcommittees manage 
information in the congressional policy process, this dissertation applied my theory of 
information management presented in Chapter 1 to generate empirical analyses 
addressing four primary research questions: 1) Which committees are most active in the 
management of information management through hearings? 2) Which committees 
utilize subcommittees more frequently in this process? 3) Which subcommittees are 
more active in the management of information? And 4) do subcommittees serve to 
facilitate committee success in the policy process?  To test the theoretical explanation 
applied to these phenomena, I analyzed House and Senate committee and subcommittee 
data regarding congressional hearings and legislative activity from the 105th through the 
108th Congresses.   
In each chapter, there appeared to be empirical support for two primary 
conclusions. First, committees appear to respond to a variety of representational and 
institutional demands simultaneously.  This suggests that committee activity within 
Congress can be discussed in general terms regarding its role in the policy process 
across committees, as opposed to the traditional tripartite typology of committee 
organization.  Second, subcommittees appear to serve an important role in managing 
information in response to specific demands facing Congress that committees serve to 
manage.  However, the effective use of subcommittees by committees appears to not 
only assist committees in serving the management needs of the Congress but also 
appears to facilitate success for committees in the policy process. This appears to 
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support the suggestion presented by my theory of information management in Congress 
that the management of information within the complex and competitive policy 
environment can facilitate policy success through the stabilizing and structuring the 
policy debate. 
The following sections seek to more broadly explore the implications of the 
primary conclusions to this research to Congressional policymaking and the current 
state of congressional scholarship.  Additionally worthy of discussion are the consistent 
empirical differences between the House and Senate surfacing in the data, across 
chapters.  Not only are these differences worth discussing for understanding how the 
institutional differences between the chambers manifest in a tangible sense, but this may 
also provide traction for the exploration of House versus Senate competition in the 
control of the information agenda and the policy process.  Finally, this dissertation finds 
general support for the idea that subcommittees serve as a structural hierarchy of full 
committees which serve to assist full committees in more effectively achieving policy 
goals.  However, subcommittees and full committees do not necessarily share the same 
policy perspective on issues.  In fact, there can be conflict between committee and 
subcommittee leadership that may create tensions or competition between the 
institutional subunits.  The final section discusses the implications for future research in 
this area. 
Managing the Policy Environment 
 The generally accepted tripartite typology of congressional committees suggests 
that due to structured differences in the policy jurisdictions and institutional role and 
structure of committees create a system where different “types” of committees provide 
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members the benefit of a path to achieve distinct goals (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; 
Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krehbiel 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Adler 
and Lapinsky 1997).  In general research that challenges these perspectives, as opposed 
to seeking to provide evidence for one or the other, argue for a conditional relationship 
between representational, informational, and partisan factors that determines the 
specific goal driven purpose a committee pursues (Hall and Groffman 1990; Maltzman 
1998; Young and Heitshusen 2003).  This can serve as a convenient explanation from a 
strict rational choice perspective based on the idea that members have specific goals 
(Mayhew 1974) and the committee system serves to facilitate members’ ability to 
achieve such goals (Krehbiel 1991), therefore committees distinctly pursue distinct 
goals.  However, the division of committees into distinct groups based on the nature of 
the policy issues under jurisdiction or institutional role of a committee seems to neglect 
the institutional uniformities of the policy process across committees. 
 Studies of public policy note that achieving policy change or creation requires a 
variety of factors to gel in just the right way, as just the right time (Kingdon 1984; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  As discussed in Chapter 1, the national policy making 
environment consists of numerous influences emerging from a number of interested 
(and in some cases uninterested) sources.  Many of these sources are actors seeking to 
influence the ultimate outcomes of the policy process, creating an atmosphere of 
competing demands that any committees must deal with at any given time.  Generally, 
as first movers in the legislative process, committees must deal with these demands in 
order to achieve policy goals.  Studies demonstrating the possibility for any issues to 
rise or shrink in salience at any given time (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 
137 
 
1993) highlights the possibility that all committees must manage a variety of competing 
representational and institutional demands simultaneously in order to serve the purpose 
of moving the legislative agenda and structuring the process.  As managers of the 
legislative process, committees must manage these competing factors to generate 
success or face losing out on policy goals due to missed timing, negative attention, or a 
variety of other deal breakers (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  Because 
the flow of information in a policy debate can often determine the ultimate positioning 
of, and opportunity created by, the exogenous and endogenous demanders who are 
active in the policy environment, committees can manage the policy process by 
managing information flow. 
 If committees indeed must manage the flow if information in the policy debate 
in structured response to such competing demands to generate policy success, then one 
should expect to see empirical trends of committee response to such representational 
and institutional demands.  As discussed in Chapter 1, congressional hearings can serve 
as a primary response to such demands as they display and create structured information 
flow around policy issues, often promoting (and therefore at the same time choosing not 
to promote) certain perspectives prevalent in the complex policy environment.  
Empirical analyses of full committee and subcommittee hearing activity in Chapters 2 
and 3 appears to support the theoretical expectation that committees and subcommittees 
respond to such demands within policy environment by managing the flow of 
information in the policy debate.  As the representational and institutional demands 
facing committees increase, so does the display of information through hearings by 
committees and subcommittees. Thus it appears that committees and subcommittees 
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become more active managers of information in the policy debate when the policy 
environment presents the most complexity.  The importance of information 
management is highlighted however by the empirical differences between the factors 
related to the increase of information management activity and the actual policy success 
of committees. 
 The analysis presented in Chapter 4 supports the expectation that information 
management activity by committees would improve the likelihood of committee policy 
success.  While the same institutional factors and representational factors that increase 
demands in the policy environment also relate to policy success, committees taking 
action to manage information flow is also related to policy success.  Considering the 
major body of work emphasizing the importance of attention to issues facilitating policy 
change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), these findings 
bring greater detail to the picture of policymaking in Congress and have implications 
for further paths of inquiry needed to understand the complexity behind what makes 
successful information management and the importance of the right kind of attention to 
an issue at the right time for committees to be successful (Kingdon 1984).   
 Theories of the policy process can be criticized for relying too much on 
exogenous events or determinants to create attention to topics (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993), or seemingly random variation in institutional and political contexts to dictate 
the chances for policy success (Kingdon 1984), empirical support for a theory of 
information management in Congress suggests that committees and subcommittees are 
able to interact with the policy environment, possibly manipulating the structure and 
content of the policy debate to generate success.  In studies of political representation a 
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similar concept has been introduced regarding the ability of political actors to shape 
public opinion to that of the elite actors in order to create the desired perception of a 
prospective policy (Page and Shapiro 1992).  This opens the question of how 
specifically committees utilize management resources to interact with the policy 
environment to create (or lose) winning scenarios.   
 Future research in this area should examine the specific nature of the 
information revealed (and ignored) during committee and subcommittee hearings.  
Examining how this may impact the flow of information in the process to create (or 
deteriorate) favorable policy environments for committees goals.  This should involve 
not only examining the type of information and witnesses chosen by committees 
(Esterling 2007), but also examining committee rules in terms of the allocation or 
witnesses, the organizational structure of hearings, and committee procedure in 
arranging hearings. The structure of timing in terms of congressional hearings, bill 
introduction, and shifts in public attention should also be investigated.  Does increasing 
or decreasing the speed of the process facilitate or hinder committee success?  
Additionally one could examine bill reports, digging deeper into not only the amount of 
time a committees spends working a specific policy issue through the process, but 
exploring the number of hearings and content of those hearings listed within bill reports 
and how the content and size of the record accompanying public policy may influence 
its ultimate success or failure in the process. 
 Not only does evidence supporting the theory of information management have 
implications for institutional theories and understandings of policymaking and change, 
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but it also suggests a need for further understandings of the role of subcommittees in the 
House and Senate, a prominently ignored institution of the United States Congress. 
Subcommittees in Congress 
 Subcommittees are a longstanding part of the United States Congress’ system of 
legislative organization (Polsby 1968; Rohde 1974; Deering and Smith 1993), seeing 
ebbs and flows in institutional power throughout congressional history (Haeberle 1978; 
Davidson 1981).  However the role of subcommittees is arguably one of the most 
neglected areas of congressional research.  Although it seems appropriate to view 
subcommittee as agents of full committees from a traditional principal-agent 
perspective (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Wrighton and Peterson 2003), 
subcommittee action and influence deserve substantive investigation and understanding 
considering the vast amount policymaking activity that occurs at the subcommittee 
level.  Yet historically little research has explored the role and influence on 
subcommittees in the policy making (Jones 1962; Hall and Evans 1990), and research 
has been exceptionally sparse on the role of subcommittees in the contemporary, 
heavily partisan Congress since the Republican takeover of 1994 (Baughman 2006).  In 
this dissertation via empirical analysis of the theory of information management, I 
attempt to build a deeper understanding of the role of subcommittees in the policy 
process.   
 Theoretical argument and empirical evidence presented in this dissertation 
suggests that subcommittees play a critical role in the policy success of committees in 
Congress.  Previous research suggests that the role and influence of subcommittees may 
not be generalizable across subcommittees as well as committees (Hall and Evans 
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1990), evidence presented in the empirical analyses of committee and subcommittees 
activity suggest that subcommittees significantly and systematically contribute to the 
management of information in response to the demands presented within the complex 
policy environment.  Additionally, the use of subcommittees to manage information in 
the policy process significantly relates to increases in the policy success of 
congressional committees.  The most interesting part of these findings however, is that 
the empirical evidence is provided by data from the 105th through 108th Congresses.  
The scant research conducted on subcommittee suggested that Republican alterations to 
the institutional norms and order of the Congress, especially the Houses, predicted a 
decline in the power of subcommittees (Evans and Oleszek 1997; Baughman 2006).  
Yet even during this time period, well after the years of “subcommittee government” 
and the demise of the traditional institutions of the Congress was predicted, 
subcommittee activity still seems to play a key role in the policy success, at least at the 
committee level, and policy passage and lawmaking more broadly. 
 While the theory and findings presented in the preceding chapter help to explain 
the factors related to, and results of subcommittee hearing activity in Congress, the 
details of some questions remain unanswered.  For example, does organization or and 
information presented by subcommittees differ from that of full committees?  When 
asked in interviews about the difference between full committees and their 
subcommittees, congressional staff consistently suggested that full committee hearings 
tend to establish broad themes regarding policy problems, perspectives, and solutions 
while subcommittees tend to take on the role of private investigator by more deeply 
investigating particular policy solutions (Staff Interviews 2009).  Both majority and 
142 
 
minority staff often noted that full committees seek to bring attention to issues desired 
to be on the agenda while the true details of policy problems and vetting prospective 
solutions is left to subcommittee time (Staff Interviews 2009).  Empirical investigation 
of this suggestion would require comparison of committee rules for subcommittee 
hearings and the guts of full committee and subcommittee hearings, such as the type of 
information presented by witnesses and the nature of questions asked by congressional 
members.  Additionally, bill and issue level analysis of committee and subcommittee 
activity over time would also shed light on how exactly information management 
activity contributes to policy successes in Congress.  While this sort of investigation 
would expose detailed explanations of the full committee – subcommittee relationship 
from a principal-agent perspective (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991), the question of what 
happens in the case of full committee and subcommittee conflict remains open. 
 Staff often noted that some subcommittees of some committees have more 
influence than others (Staff Interviews 2009).  In the House, staff often noted that full 
committee chairmen would limit the authority and autonomy of subcommittee chairs 
who have a high potential for “going off the deep end” in terms of maintaining the line 
for party goals on particular policy issues (Staff Interviews 2009).  In the Senate, staff 
noted the importance of personal trust between of full committee and subcommittee 
chairs, often relating to the subcommittee chairs level of expertise, or experience on 
given topics (Staff Interviews 2009).  The data examined in this dissertation fail to 
capture this dynamic of possible conflict between the principal and the agent.  Analysis 
of bills success at the subcommittee level, similar to the committee level analysis 
143 
 
presented in Chapter 4, could shed light on this question as it would detail how specific 
subcommittee traits impact the legislative process.  
 While the theory and analysis presented in this dissertation seem to firmly 
establish the importance of understanding how subcommittees impact the policy 
process, many questions are left open.  In both the House and Senate, subcommittees 
appear to play a vital role.  However, across each empirical model presented in chapters 
two, three, and four, distinct differences in how the complexities of the policy 
environment impact House and Senate surface.  These differences suggest institutional 
variation in the role of legislative organization across chambers and potentially shed 
light on the nature of inter-chamber conflict over final legislation.  The following 
section examines such inter-chamber issues. 
House and Senate Differences 
 Due to the extensive institutional and procedural differences between the House 
of Representatives and the Senate (Oleszek 2001), scholarship examining the United 
States Congress most often examines the two chambers individually.  Unfortunately, 
this tradition necessarily creates gaps in our knowledge regarding similarities between 
the institutions.  Also, Senate research does not always seek to ask the same questions 
addressed in House research, and vice versa.  The literature examining legislative 
organization in Congress is an example of this tendency.  Nearly all scholarship on 
congressional committees and legislative organization has examined the House of 
Representatives to the exclusion of the Senate.  Due to the inherent neglect of the 
Senate by examination of legislative organization and activity, it is unclear if we should 
expect the commonly known differences between the chambers to manifest as 
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differences in committee activity, or if we should assume that the committee systems in 
each chamber are similar enough to operate in effectively the same fashion.  While this 
produces an intellectual need for current and future scholars to satisfy, it also creates 
difficulties in hypothesizing about committee activity and its impact.  I encountered this 
problem often as I conducted the empirical analyses presented in the second, third, and 
fourth chapters of this dissertation. Though I briefly addressed the numerous empirical 
differences that manifested between the two chambers, I seek to discuss these 
differences and possible explanations further in this section.  For clarity, I discuss these 
chamber differences across three topics: party and ideology, representation, and 
institutional organization. 
Party and Ideology in House and Senate Policymaking 
  While the role of party and ideology is commonly viewed as the driving force 
of policymaking in the contemporary House of Representatives (Rohde 1991; Cox and 
McCubbins 2005), the notion of party influences in the Senate is “something of an 
oxymoron” (Monroe, Roberts, and Rohde 2008).  The traditional neglect of potential 
partisan influence in the Senate is primarily due to chamber rules that limit direct 
influence of political parties, especially when compared to the majoritarian nature of the 
House.  Examples of this are many.  The filibuster can be utilized to prevent a 
legislative vote unless 60 percent of Senate members support the termination of debate.  
There is no Rules Committee in the Senate to allow the majority party to limit the terms 
of floor debate, as in the House.  Not only does this allow for a potentially unlimited 
number of amendments to legislation on the Senate floor, the Senate lacks a 
“germaneness” rule for amendments as well.  Thus, amendments dealing with 
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controversial or difficult issues may be made to legislation on the floor regardless of 
policy issue or jurisdictional origin, naturally limiting the structuring power of 
committees and often making bill passage politically difficult.  Such formal limitations 
on party power in the Senate are clear, and therefore necessarily limited compared to 
the House, but understanding the nuanced the role of parties and ideology in the Senate 
seems important and is growing as a point of scholarship in congressional studies 
(Monroe, Roberts and Rohde 2008).  Based on the empirical analyses presented in the 
preceding chapters, there is an evident influence of party and ideology in the Senate that 
manifests differently than in the House. 
 In terms of legislative organization in the House, two opposing positions have 
long dominated the debate regarding the role of party and ideology.  Krehbiel (1991, 
1993, 1998) argues that party effects are nothing more than aggregated similarities in 
the ideological preferences of congressional members and therefore the formal parties 
offset each other; therefore policy decisions ultimately come down to congruence in 
members’ preferences, not partisan influence.  From this perspective, Krehbiel (1991, 
1998) suggests that committees will be more active and successful when they represent 
the median voter in the House or the “pivotal22
                                                 
22 As noted above, the filibuster allows Senators the ability to prevent a legislative vote unless 60 percent 
(60 or the 100 Senators) of the Senate agrees to end debate and vote.  In congruence with the median 
voter in the House, who is the final vote needed to pass legislation with majoritarian rules, the “pivotal” 
vote in the Senate is the 60th vote needed to stop a filibuster due to the Senate’s supermajoritarian rules. 
” voter in the Senate.  Partisan theorists 
disagree with the notion that parties simply are an indirect product of member 
preferences, but instead view parties as formally powerful institutions, especially in the 
legislative organization of the House (Rohde 1991, 1994; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 
2005).  This camp argues that the majority party, especially in the House, can control 
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the legislative process through manipulation of bill content through its majority on 
committees and through procedural control of the legislative agenda.  Scholars suggest 
that committees are agents of the parties, and that increased ideologically homogeneity 
does not create parties; it empowers them (Rohde 1991, 1994; Cox and McCubbins 
1993, 2005).  This body of work suggests that committees should be more active and 
successful when they party makeup is homogenous ideologically.  Additionally, 
partisan theorists imply that the ideological makeup of the minority party should be 
inconsequential to the legislative process, although the minority party itself may be 
stronger as its members become more homogenous.  With this in mind, it seems we are 
currently treading in murky waters when it comes to hypothesizing about how party 
effects may or may not manifest in the Senate. 
 In terms of Krehbiel’s (1991, 1993, 1998) expectations, my analysis of 
committee hearing activity and committee lawmaking success provide evidence for a 
median voter effect in the House of Representatives.  Meanwhile, there is no evidence 
of an ideological influence in the Senate in terms of the ideological positioning of 
committees to that of the key member of the chamber.  While this supports the notion 
that building winning coalitions in the House may require catering to individual 
member preferences more than party desires, it is important to note that over time, party 
members in Congress have become increasing homogenous ideologically and therefore 
the median House voter has moved increasingly close to the median member of the 
majority party (Wiseman and Wright 2007).  Additionally, the median voter in the 
House will always be the member of the majority party considering the fact that being 
the majority necessarily requires that party to include fifty-percent-plus-one members of 
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the chamber.  Such institutional dynamics dictate that catering to the desires of a 
minimum winning coalition means catering to members of the majority party.  Thus, it 
is as easy to argue that this is evidence of policy being impacted by the ideology of the 
median voter as it is to argue that this is evidence of policy being crafted in the best 
interest of the majority party.  The absence of this effect in the Senate, where political 
parties are expected to be inherently weak compared to individual members, casts doubt 
on the true impact of the median or pivotal vote on Senate policy making, as well as 
Krehbiel’s (1993) view of party efffects.   
 The Senate is the exact place where a relationship between ideological 
differences between key voters and committees should impact policymaking activity 
and success. Due to the lack of party empowering rules and the individualized nature of 
the chamber (Matthews 1960; Monroe, Roberts and Rohde 2008), Krehbiel’s (1998) 
argument seems particularly compelling.  However evidence from the empirical 
analyses presented above call this expectation into question.  In the numerous statistical 
analyses presented in the three preceding chapters, not once did the ideological 
relationship between a committee and the key member of the chamber ever attain 
statistical significance.  It bore no significant impact on committee hearing activity, 
committee delegation to subcommittees, subcommittee activity, or any measure of 
committee policy success.  This presents a dubious challenge for Krehbiel’s (1993) 
suggestion that congressional activity and policy making is a consistent result of 
aggregated preferences.   The precise preferences that should matter based on his 
argument fail to present a significant impact on committee activity and policymaking.  
Results regarding the role of party homogeneity within committees presented in the 
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preceding chapters also challenge Krehbiel’s (1993) expectation that preferences matter 
regardless of parties, but also challenge the conventional thinking of party scholars. 
 In relation to committee and subcommittee activity, as well as committee 
success in the policymaking arena, there are consistent findings across the statistical 
analyses presented in the preceding chapters that seem counterintuitive to current 
expectations related to the influence of parties in the House and in the Senate.  As noted 
above, party scholars suggest that increases in the ideology of party members should 
increase the power of parties in the legislative process (Rohde 1991, 1994; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005), especially in the House.  This suggests that committees will be 
more active in structuring the policy debate and more successful in moving and passing 
legislation when they contain more tightly knit majority party caucus in the House.  It 
also implies a similar effect in the Senate; although as I noted above, scholarship 
examining the role of parties in the Senate is scant.  Interestingly, based on my 
numerous analyses of House and Senate committee activity and policymaking from the 
105th-108th Congresses,23
                                                 
23 During this time period the Republicans held a majority in both the House and Senate with the 
exception of one congressional session of 2001 where the Democrats held a majority temporarily due to 
the party switch by Senator James Jeffords.   
 I find that the ideological heterogeneity (not homogeneity) of 
the majority party collation within the committee actually increases committee hearing 
activity and the likelihood that committee bills become law in the House.  Yet in the 
Senate, the opposite relationship emerges for the majority party.  Instead, increases in 
ideological homogeneity (similarity) of majority party coalitions related to increases in 
committee activity and policy success.  Although these findings seem counterintuitive, 
they may simply suggest unexpected and differing maintenance needs for parties within 
the policy process across the two chambers.   
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Previous work on the committee system suggests that hierarchy of authority may 
allow for the incorporation of various views and political positions in order to 
discourage political conflict (Fenno 1962).   It seems that in the House, the majority 
party is more active in the policy debate when their committee coalitions are more 
diverse.  This may be a way of keeping the peace through the policy process by 
allowing more diversity, within the party at least, in terms of the informational 
perspectives displayed regarding policy issues.  Allowing potentially dissenting party 
voices to go on record in exchange for later political support would not be unheard of 
(Mayhew 1974), and considering the sheer size of a voting coalition needed in the 
House to pass legislation, 218 members, such a practice could serve as an easy way to 
satisfy a dissenting member’s needs.  With the primary control of hearings in the House 
falling to the majority party, dissenting members could voice their opinions while the 
general majority party perspective could still emphasize desired points of information 
and structure the policy debate appropriately.  Ultimately, providing such members the 
opportunity to voice concerns could then increase the likelihood of party loyalty 
because members were rewarded when needed, allowing trust to build stability 
(O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2003; Meier and O’Toole Jr. 2002; Pearson 2005), and 
facilitate legislative success for those same committees.  Additionally, the finding that 
committees with more diverse party coalitions typically work in more competitive and 
crowded legislative jurisdictions (Table 11) may also contribute to the idea of why such 
committees are more active and successful.  If the ideological diversity were to cause 
political problems for the party, choosing to give legislative authority to multiple 
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committees can also increase the party’s ability to influence the process through 
alternative pathways, creating a win-win situation for the House majority party. 
In the Senate, increasing activity and success may demonstrate maintenance 
from another perspective.  Due to the greater level of power for individual senators and 
fewer mechanisms of formal party power, the majority party may need committees with 
ideologically homogenous coalitions to be more active in putting the majority party’s 
preferred policy perspective into the policy environment.  Opposite of the House, where 
members may be inherently predisposed to tow the party line, the Senate majority may 
need to be more active in presenting its chosen policy information to create a united 
front that can produce a winning coalition.  Considering the lack of procedural guards 
against interference with legislation on the floor, creating a united front within the party 
may be of paramount importance considering the minority party will have unlimited 
opportunities for dissention on the floor.  Assuring that “your own house in order” may 
be the first step of importance for Senate majority parties.  In addition to interesting 
results regarding the majority party, issues of party and ideology within minority party 
coalitions play a surprising role in committee and subcommittee activity in terms of 
managing information. 
Analyses presented in chapters 2 and 3 reveal that heterogeneous minority party 
committee collations in the House and homogenous minority party coalitions in the 
Senate relate to increased use of subcommittee by committees, and increases in activity 
by individual subcommittees.  Again I find an intriguing case of opposite, yet 
significant, findings across chambers.  Could the majority party find that it is in its best 
interests to put committees with diverse and contention positions within the minority 
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party on display?  With the extensive television coverage of congressional hearings it 
may be good politics to allow the minority to fight amongst itself on the record.  
Similarly, could it be good politics in the Senate for the majority party to put a hardened 
opposition on display?  Does alienating a unified opposition serve the majority good 
politically?   
These questions present great opportunity to explanation and understanding in 
more detail how committees and parties manage the flow of information in the policy 
debate within individual hearings.  Future research must examine individual hearing 
transcripts in order to explore possible trends in the position taking of majority and 
minority party members and determine if these differences facilitate across chamber 
policy agreements or conflict.  As the analyses presented above, and discussed here 
once again, demonstrate – party and ideology matter in the Senate.  Although party 
effects may manifest in different ways across chambers (always opposites?), future 
scholarship should explore through case studies of hearings and bill passage if this is or 
is not an actual manifestation of increasing partisanship in both chambers or if these 
findings are a sign of greater institutional differences in the role of party than one may 
expect.   
The following sections move from the discussion of partisan and ideological 
differences to differences regarding institutional differences in representation and 
institutional issues of legislative organization. 
Representation 
 While similar concerns and challenges face elected officials in any position 
simply due to the nature of political representation (Pitkin 1967), these influences may 
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manifest differently depending on the institution and constraints facing political 
representatives.  Considering the institutional differences between the House and Senate 
regarding the general prestige, length of term, and size of constituency, one may expect 
variation across chamber regarding when and how certain representational demands 
influence behavior in the policymaking process and political decision making.  We can 
expect that such representational differences would not only exist between a member of 
the House and a member of the Senate, but also in the institutional behaviors of 
committees and subcommittees across chambers.  Based on the analyses presented 
above, such difference manifested in two primary ways.  Total PAC contributions 
received by a subcommittee related to increases in the hearing activity of individual 
subcommittees in the House, but not in the Senate.  Additionally, in the Senate, 
committee legislation tended to find greater levels of success with passing legislation in 
the chamber when the issues within the committee’s jurisdiction were of higher public 
salience. 
 As was discussed in chapter 3, scholarship examining the role and influence of 
subcommittees is scant.  In order to examine factors influencing the use of 
subcommittees within the structural hierarchy of the committee system, one factor being 
the impact of pressure from organized constituencies on individual subcommittees.  In 
the House but not in the Senate, subcommittees whose membership received greater 
amounts of PAC contributions during an election cycle were more likely to hold 
hearings, and that actively manage information in the policy environment, during the 
given election cycle.  Previous research reveals that groups which give more to specific 
committees are more likely to access hearings and thus enter its favored policy 
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information into the debate (Esterling 2007).  However unexpected, this difference 
seems to make sense.  House members, who face re-election every two years, are often 
characterized as facing or participating in a “constant campaign” (Heberling and Larson 
2005).  In the Senate however, only one-third of the chamber’s membership faces re-
election every two years as senators serve on staggered, six year terms.  Because of this, 
research suggests that the nature of Senate representation varies during terms (Elling 
1982).  Senators or typically more responsive to their constituencies immediately 
following and immediately preceding an election, but may vote their conscious more 
often in the middle years of their term (Elling 1982).  Empirically, senators also see lags 
in their fundraising from PACs in the first four years of their term in comparison to the 
significant increases seen during the election cycle preceding a senator’s bid for re-
election (OpenSecrets.org).  Because of this difference in the nature of political 
competition across the chambers, it may be more urgent for House members to be seen 
as adequately responsive to organized constituencies.  If there were the case, then we 
would expect subcommittees to be freed for greater participation in the policy process.  
Because of this, subcommittees facing greater pressure from organized groups would be 
given a greater opportunity to demonstrate that Congress is listening, or even allow 
access and influence to particular groups.  Considering the fact that not all 
subcommittees are granted the ability to freely participate in the process (Staff 
Interviews 2009), this demand could carry increased weight in the House where all 
members are up for re-election during every Congress and seek to curry favor with 
influential constituencies.  Yet in the Senate, only twenty of the sixty members are 
facing re-election during a given Congress and thus would not create the same scale of 
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pressure for a committee or subcommittee.  When looking at committee policy success, 
as opposed to activity in the process, another representational difference appears.   
 Senate committees that have jurisdiction of issues of higher public salience are 
systematically more successful at getting committee legislation passed on the floor than 
committees dealing with issues of lower public salience.  This is not the case in the 
House, as issue salience has no significant impact on the success of committee bills in 
chamber.  A number of issues may explain this difference.  First, the House is simply 
more disorganized in terms of jurisdictional clarity across committees than the Senate 
(something I will discuss in more detail in the next section) and this disorganization is 
increased for committees dealing with more salient policy issues, which is not the case 
for the Senate.  Additionally, and I argue probably more importantly, the fact that 
senators represent a large and necessarily broader statewide constituency, and the 
common observation that senators typically possess higher levels of political ambition 
and occupy a positions of historically greater prestige than a member of the House 
suggests that senators would feel compelled to be responsive to issues of greater interest 
to the public.  While increasing salience in the House relates in more members with 
fiercer position, senators, typically representing more people and often desiring greater 
political achievement, may be compelled to identify and act on consensus.  Such 
differences are not simply representative of some House members and some senators, 
these traits are historically distinguishing characteristics between the two chambers 
(Matthews 1960) which could very well persist and manifest in the general 
responsiveness and success of Senate committees.  
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 Although the arguments presented above regarding representational differences 
between the House and Senate policy processes are certainly not conclusions of 
extensive and systematic research, they reveal a need for more comparative research on 
the nuances of the policy process across congressional chambers.  The norm of 
identifying institutional differences and then studying each chamber individually fails to 
contribute to our understanding of the policy process, especially considering the 
practical reality that both chambers must pass legislation in order to make law.  Such 
differences in the response to competing demands across chamber may necessarily 
create institutional points of conflict that must be settled in order for policymaking to 
occur.  It is necessary that scholars not only identify such differences, but seek to 
explain where such nuanced difference come from and the impact of such nuances on 
policy outputs. 
 Another difference across congressional chambers revealed by analyses 
presented in chapter 4 is the overall difference in the jurisdictional organization of the 
House and Senate.   
Institutional Dis-Organization 
The descriptive statistics presented in Tables 9 (House) and 10 (Senate) revealed 
an extreme difference in the nature of competition and complexity of policy issue 
jurisdiction between the House and Senate.  According the measure of jurisdictional 
entropy calculated in chapter 4, the House is nearly three times more disorganized than 
the House.  While this difference may be somewhat expected due to the chamber simply 
have more than four times as many members, this is an extensive difference in the 
disorganization of the committee system and therefore the primary system for 
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originating and moving legislation within chamber.  Such disorganization in the House, 
relative to the Senate, has serious implications for the policy process more broadly.  
As a school teacher might say, in the House there appears to be a tendency for 
“too many hands to be in the cookie jar.”  The increased disorganization in the House 
committee system is a result of more committees seeking and competing for access to 
more policy issues, creating an unpredictable, and a not so divided-division of labor 
across committees.  This competition can lead to changes in the jurisdictional rights of 
committees as well as introduce new information into policy debates and create policy 
change (Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 
1994, 1997; Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner 1995; Hardin 1998; Baumgartner, Jones 
and MacLeod 2000; Hardin 2002).  This difference in the ability of the Senate to 
maintain order in its legislative organization when compared to the House may 
contribute to the perspective suggesting that the House is now increasingly prone to 
non-traditional policy processes and the Senate is still more prone to the text book 
approach (Sinclair 1997).  In a disorganized system like the House, parties and leaders 
may need to get creative in order to move prioritized pieces of legislation while in the 
Senate, the traditional operating procedure may suffice.   
Normatively, it is unclear whether a clear division of labor or a more 
disorganized environment creates a more positive environment for policymaking.  A 
disorganized system would be open to higher levels of information flow, giving more 
perspectives regarding policy problems and solutions more airtime.  This may 
ultimately lead to wide shifts in policy preferences (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005), at least in one chamber, but create intense conflict within the 
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political system at large.  Is this a good thing?  Would greater organization in the House 
increase the ability for the chambers to communicate and craft quality legislation?  
Does the higher level of organization in the Senate committee system create a stagnant 
or consistently responsive legislative system?  The surprising impact of changes in 
committee membership facilitating committees policy success noted in chapter 4 (Table 
13), suggests that it does and that the Senate may need “shake-ups” to generate policy 
change.  One may argue that this is evidence of an adaptive cycle of neglect and over-
reaction that characterizes policymaking in Congress (Jones 2001; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005).  Additionally, the disorganized House system may be increasingly 
prone to facilitating policy change because the ability for the electorate to trace the 
chain of blame if policies fail, while the conventional route in the Senate leaves a clear 
path of blame for policy mistakes (Arnold 1990).  One thing is clear, this difference in 
the nature of policy making between the two congressional chambers deserves further, 
extensive investigation. 
Similar to the discussion of partisan and ideological difference and 
representational differences, along with the differences in institutional disorganization it 
is clear that the House and Senate manage the policy environment in sometimes 
strangely different way.  Yet evidence presented throughout this dissertation suggests 
that committees in both chambers certainly respond to a variety of the same demands 
emanating from the policy environment.  However, such responses to the policy 
environment appear to manifest in ways unique to each individual chamber.  This 
highlights the dangerous water in which congressional scholarship is treading after 
years of neglecting comparative analyses of policymaking in the House and Senate.  
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While congressional scholarship has often succeeded in identifying chamber 
differences, explaining the development of such differences and the ultimate policy 
impact of such differences is just beginning to receive the attention it deserves.  It is 
necessary to examine the Congress for what it is, a bicameral lawmaking body.  Too 
often studies of the Congress attempt to provide generalizable theories of congressional 
phenomena but only regarding one chamber.  However, based on the evidence 
presented in this dissertation, I argue that general theories of congressional 
policymaking should be the focus of scholarship.  General theories, built to encompass 
both the House and Senate, create scenarios where empirical analysis and hypothesis 
testing will uncover nuanced differences between the chambers.  This would increase 
our ability to predict and explain congressional policymaking in more practical and 
tangible ways.  
I argue that this dissertation, combined with existing research, moves toward a 
general theory of adaptive policymaking in Congress that centers the flow of 
information between congressional committees and the broader policy environment. 
Managing Information and Political Decision Making 
In Politics and the Architecture of Choice, Bryan D. Jones (2001) makes a 
compelling case for the adaptive nature of decision making and choice in organizations 
and institutions.  Jones (2001) eloquently describes the realistic nature of adaptive 
information processing that more genuinely represents the decision making capabilities 
of people and organization that the perfectly rational approach utilized in many studies 
of political institutions.  Because human rationality is bounded and the ability for 
humans adapt to our environment is limited, Jones (2001) argues that actions taken by 
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both individuals and organizations cannot simply be based on objective information.  
Instead, through filtering information in our environment, we determine what pieces of 
information are relevant and which are irrelevant, and apply that information to the 
decision making task at hand.  Facilitating what Jones (2001) calls an inherent tendency 
to “overemphasize” some factors and “neglect” others.  Jones (2001) articulates how 
these same tendencies manifest in groups, and thus decision making bodies such as 
political institutions.  This dissertation paints a picture of exactly how the U.S. Congress 
replicates this tendency toward adaptive information process through the management 
of the policy process by congressional committees and subcommittees. 
In my theory of information management in Congress, I seek to paint a picture 
of the complex and information rich environment that surrounds the national 
policymaking process.  I argue that Congress navigates this environment by allowing 
committees and subcommittees to manage information, filtering information in response 
to the variety of endogenous and exogenous demands facing the institution in order to 
structure the flow of information based on what policy issues and perspectives 
congressional institutions determine are relevant to the policy agenda.  Congressional 
hearings serve as a management tool for committees and subcommittees to shape the 
“problem space” (Jones 2001) to match the desire of, and demands facing the Congress.  
Empirical evidence based on statistical analysis, as well as participant observation and 
interviews of congressional staff, suggests that this is precisely the role and purpose of 
committee and subcommittee action.  Additionally, evidence suggests that when 
committees and subcommittees manage information in the policy environment 
effectively, success in the policy making arena follows.  This dissertation adds to a 
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growing body of work that boundedly-rational and adaptive nature of decision making 
in American political institutions, especially the Congress. 
Existing work highlights these decision making tendencies in major policy 
changes in Congress (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), 
changes in budget allocations within the federal budget (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007); and even within the regulatory tendencies of the 
federal bureaucracy (Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009).  I argue that this dissertation 
builds on this growing body of institutional research by providing evidence that the 
Congress responds to variety of competing demands in managing information to 
construct the problem space utilized to make policy decisions, and that this activity 
impacts the success or failure of committee policymaking.  In future work, I hope to 
build on this project by examining whether or not the tendency of “overemphasis” and 
“neglect” also manifest in the particular types of information and policy perspectives 
that committees and subcommittees attend to during the hearing process.  Through case 
studies of individual committees and subcommittees, I hope to examine the ebbs and 
flows in the types of witnesses and the political positioning of information provided by 
witnesses in congressional committees.  Additionally, I hope to examine the type of 
information excluded from the hearing process by committees and subcommittees that 
are still submitted to the political record via open petition.  If this body of work is 
correct, there should be consistencies in the types of information emphasized in 
hearings, and a corresponding neglect to particular issues that is visible via trends in the 
nature of information submitted to hearing records by groups or individuals via the 
public record.  Going one step further, future research should also study the reported 
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record of individual bills to be explain and understand the nuance influence of 
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Appendix:  Interviews of Congressional Staff 
 
From the Fall of 2008 till the Fall of 2009 I worked for the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, Chairman’s Staff, as a policy assistant during an American 
Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship.  During this time I observed 
the internal workings of this committee which inform my perspective of policymaking 
in congressional institutions.  I also utilized this access to Congress to conduct semi-
structured interviews (Kingdon 1973) with congressional staffers in order to inform my 
theoretical propositions and wrestle with empirical findings.  Interviews with individual 
staff members were acquired via “snowball” sampling.  Even as someone inside the 
Congress at the time, I found this to be the most effective way to acquire respondents 
who were willing to speak frankly regarding congressional policymaking activity due to 
the assumed level of trust garnered via friendly referrals.  Because this type of sampling 
is a non-probability method that relies of referrals from initial subjects to generate 
additional subjects, it can be prone to bias.  Due to this fact, I chose not to utilize the 
results of interviews for systematic quantitative analysis.  Instead they are used 
throughout the project to add richness to the project by incorporating “inside-the-
beltway” perspectives to propositions and findings.  In all, I conducted 48 semi-
structured interviews with individual congressional staff members.  Of the 48 
respondents, eight were working for Republican members of committee staff and 40 
were serving on Democratic staff (some of both sides having been employed by the 
opposing party previously). 36 of my respondents were serving on committee staff and 
12 in individual member offices.  Many of the respondents working on committee staff 
had previous experience working in member offices.  The experience level of the 
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respondents varied greatly, ranging from one to 40 years of experience working in 
Congress.  Clearly this is not a “representative” sample of congressional staff members, 
but it is a diverse set of respondents.  Despite the diversity of the sample, the 
respondents of all backgrounds had strikingly consistent and similar answers to most of 
my questions. 
In hopes of generating the most thoughtful and frank responses to my inquiries 
as possible, many steps were taken. In hopes of making the interviews pressure free 
situations, interviews were scheduled for no more than 30 minutes.  Although I took 
brief notes and maintained a checklist for expected and common responses (more 
detailed write ups were made immediately following the interviews), the interviews 
were not recorded and staff members were promised anonymity. I also made every 
effort to conduct the interviews in a conversational and relaxed manner.  This approach 
was helpful in creating and maintaining an environment that promoted frank and 
thoughtful responses.  This also allowed me to engage each subject in unique ways as 
the details and topical examples provided by the subjects varied, liberally inserting 
further questions or comments into the discussion.  While such traits of unstructured 
interviewing were adopted to improve my rapport with interview subjects, I believe I 
combined positive features of both unstructured and structured interviewing with my 
semi-structured approach. 
I did utilize and interview schedule in order to introduce structure, reliability, 
and replicability into my interviewing process.  The scheduled questions were asked of 
each respondent, with the same wording.  The order of questioning did sometimes vary.  
Thus, although there was a degree adaptation to individual respondents, I do believe the 
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interview data created to be replicable and potentially quantifiable (keeping the clear 
biases of a small, “snowball” sample discussed above in mind).  The interview schedule 
consisted of the following questions: 
 
1. What do you see as the role of committees and subcommittees in the policy 
process?  
2. What do you see as the purpose of hearings? 
3. Are either full committee hearings or subcommittee hearings more 
influential than the other? (Why?) 
4. Is there a difference between the work of full committees and the work of 
their subcommittees?  (Why?)  
5. Who determines the policy perspectives displayed in hearings? 
6. Do you consider hearings to be an outlet for competing policy perspectives? 
7. Do you think hearings influence the views of members? 
8. Are some subcommittees more powerful than others? (Why?) 
9. Do you believe that hearings are used to primarily kill legislation or discredit 
specific policy positions? 
10. From what sources do you commonly collect policy information? 
 
Incorporating this schedule of questions into a conversational exchange about 
committee, subcommittees, and hearings in congressional policymaking added great 
depth to my thinking and consideration of the topics under investigation.  I believe the 
semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for thoughtful and frank responses 
175 
 
from congressional staff regarding work they are commonly engaged in, but seldom 
directly describe in words.  In the words of John W. Kingdon, I believe that my semi-
structured approach produced “the quantifiable data one desires from a structured 
interview, while at the same time preserving rapport and responses that are relevant to 
the particular respondent” (1973, p.287). 
 
   
 
 
   
